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THE CASE STUDY OF STUDENT POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Brazil, 1964, and Dominican Republic, 1965

By BRYANT WEDGE*

WHEN violent political uprisings are anticipated by potential participants, politically responsible decision-makers, and scholarly observers, and do not occur, and when violent revolutionary uprisings suddenly erupt that no one, including most of the participants, expected, serious questions are raised as to the adequacy with which the conditions of spontaneous political violence are understood and analyzed by scholar and policy-maker alike—at least in particular cases. The problem is compounded when other cases are correctly predicted, as sometimes happens.

The task of social science is to develop explanations for significant social phenomena, preferably explanations that have predictive value. If social science is to contribute to a policy science it must be united with social problem-solving; that is, it must be useful in anticipating, directing, and meliorating the problems of social change.[1] Violent uprisings represent a profound challenge to social science, particularly to political science, in terms of both scientific explanation and social problem-solving.

The apparently simple question of under what conditions violence is likely to erupt has proved difficult to answer. Montesquieu, for example, in *The Persian Letters*, wrote, "In these States great events are not necessarily preceded by great causes; on the contrary, the least accident produces a great revolution, often as unforeseen by those who cause it, as by those who suffer from it."[2] Tocqueville considered the French Revolution "a convulsive and painful process, without transition, with-

* This article has been revised from a paper presented at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago. The field studies from which the interview data are drawn were conducted by the writer under the auspices of the Institute for the Study of National Behavior of West Medford, Mass., with the support of the United States Information Agency in Brazil and the Agency for International Development in the Dominican Republic. The findings and conclusions are the writer's responsibility and do not necessarily represent the views of these agencies or of the United States government. The author is grateful to Ted Gurr for his helpful criticism.

[1] Leonard Goodwin, "The Historical-Philosophical Basis for Uniting Social Science with Social Problem-Solving," *Philosophy of Science*, XXIX (October 1964), 377-92.

[2] Montesquieu, *The Persian Letters*, as quoted by David C. Rapaport, "*Coup d'état*: The View of the Men Firing Pistols," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Revolution* (New York 1966), 58.

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out precaution, without prior calculation."[3] And Arnold Forster probably represents contemporary political scholarship when he considers political violence "by its very nature beyond any simple or reasonable laws of causation."[4]

In response to this problem of explanation, Ted Gurr has proposed a theoretical model of "social patterns that dispose men to collective violence" that encompasses both the complexity of variables tending toward behavioral outcomes and the nonrational nature of human response to social circumstances.[5] Studies using cross-national aggregate data have been based on the model and generally tend to validate its component propositions.[6] This article represents a quite different approach to the phenomenon: the application of the model to the analysis and organization of case studies based primarily on the reports of participants in political events in which violent uprising was perceived as a possible outcome. I undertook the study with the conviction that progress in political analysis requires bridge-building between theory and case study, and study of the behavior of individual political actors in relation to social systems.[7]

Violent behavior is in the final analysis the action of individuals, as indeed is all political behavior. Hadley Cantril pointed out some time ago that the idea of a collective mind is not tenable: "Whatever characteristics the crowd or the mob exhibit must be owing solely to the mental processes and reactions of congregate individuals."[8] This to say, not that social circumstances do not affect individual behavior, but that explanations for behavior must be sought in individual reactions to circumstances as well as in the circumstances themselves. So the first complexity to which this discussion is addressed is that of the interface between political systems and the individual psychology of participants in political action; this may be termed the psycho-political interface. Consideration of this arena of transaction has been rather neglected by social science, not only because it is difficult, but also because the

[3] Alexis de Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime et la Revolution*, as quoted by Melvin Richter, "Tocqueville's Contributions to the Theory of Revolution," *ibid.*, 2, 81.

[4] "Violence on the Fanatical Left and Right," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCLXIV (March 1966), 142. Quotation courtesy of Ted Gurr.

[5] "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, XX (January 1968), 245-78.

[6] *Ibid.*, 278; see also "A Causal Model of Civil Strife; A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," *American Political Science Review*, LII (December 1968), and Gurr and C. Ruttenberg, "The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model," *Research Monograph 28*. Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1967.

[7] This argument is in accord with Michael Haas, "Bridge-Building in International Relations: A Neotraditional Plea," *International Studies Quarterly*, XI (December 1967), 320-38.

[8] *The Psychology of Social Movements* (New York 1941), 118.

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boundaries of academic disciplines restrain scientists from considering both sides of the transaction simultaneously.

The second problem in scientific explanation is that of reconciling theoretical and experimental approaches with empirical observations of actual cases in all their ambiguous complexity. Obviously, the development of explanations for complex, multifactorial phenomena requires the combined enterprise of several approaches, especially those involved in the interplay between theory and case study. I suggest that the acid test for social science comes when the actual case is examined in terms of theory, and the reverse. This, incidentally, is the way medicine has developed such competence as it has; I suggest that a professional social science will have to follow a similar path.

The Arena of Case Study

On March 21, 1964, the armed forces of Brazil intervened in the government in the name of legality and order. The intervention directly frustrated the aspirations of the dominant student political organization, the National Union of Students, whose voice had been consistently and loudly raised in support of the "revolutionary reforms" of President Goulart, especially in the preceding months. The students were prepared for this "reactionary" coup attempt; indeed, there had been many demonstrations in support of the government in the preceding weeks, and plans had been laid for a massive march on the state capitols and offices of government. The United States Embassy was fully alert to the dangerous circumstances and every man was at his post to render what service he could. The president begged students, workers, and loyal military units to rise in his support; his plea was echoed by student leaders throughout the country. Mass violence seemed certain, the outcome in doubt.

As everyone interested in these matters knows, the anticipated violent resistance to the Brazilian coup did not materialize. Students in Rio de Janeiro staged rallies and threw rocks, the demonstrations were broken up by troop units with few shots fired and few persons killed; in Recife, two students were killed by a hard-pressed officer trying to stop the throwing of coconuts and bottles. Student leaders were rounded up and jailed, the president left the country, and a general took office as interim president.

On April 24, 1965, a group of young military officers in the Dominican Republic attempted a coup d'état in favor of "constitutionalism" and against a suspected effort to impose military-oligarchic rule; the

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coup was opposed by senior officers in control of the regular military forces. Dominican students who, after the assassination of the dictator, Trujillo, four years before, had been deeply frustrated in their aspirations for reform, revolution, and a better life, did not expect the coup attempt; they were unprepared and had no program of action. The United States Embassy had little hint of special circumstances and certainly did not expect a violent outbreak in a country that had undergone seven changes of government and many minor coup attempts in the previous four years without popular explosion. (In fairness to the Embassy it must be added that the *possibility* of a blow-up was thoroughly recognized; indeed, Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., had constantly warned both Dominican leaders and his own government that the blood-bath which had been anticipated with the fall of Trujillo could still occur.) The ambassador was visiting the United States and most military attachés were attending a routine conference in Panama. At the crucial moment the provisional president pleaded for order and the young officers called on youth and workers for support on radio and television—as was quite routine. To the very last moment it seemed that the coup would probably fail but that, at most, it might result in just another fairly orderly change in government.

But, as is now history, massive violence unexpectedly erupted in Santo Domingo as large numbers of citizens, especially youths, rallied in majestic outrage to support the "Revolution." The regular military forces were brought to a stop by an armed and angry mob that rapidly became organized in the city; at least 700 people were killed in four days, the provisional president fled into hiding, and the country, virtually leaderless, was verging on a massive civil war. The United States intervened and troops were interposed between the warring parties, but hostilities continued for some time and about 3,000 people were eventually killed. Continued interposition and heroic diplomatic efforts by the Organization of American States and others ultimately brought order from the chaos and, over a year after the outbreak, supervised elections brought a return to constitutional government.

The observations in this article are drawn from dialogic interviews with students in their normal surroundings after the revolutionary events. I conducted dialogues with Brazilian students seven months after the coup, recording 132 individual interviews and 32 group interviews involving 653 students. In the Dominican Republic, five months after the violent outbreak, I interviewed 33 students individually and 248 in eighteen groups. In the cases of both groups and individuals the sample was weighted toward politically active reformist students.

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The data from such interviews are necessarily qualitative and certainly involve some retrospective revision of memory. Nevertheless, techniques of active participation in dialogue and debate, multiple sampling, and reports of observers, coupled with the emotive intensity with which the subjects express their memories of feeling and action—the phenomenon of emotional catharsis—provide the basis for a high level of confidence in the findings. Most important, subjects report on events *as they perceived them*; the actions of individuals are necessarily in terms of their particular outlooks.

Recognition of the anchoring of action in the perceptions of participants is perhaps the strongest argument for case study of participation in political acts; only in this way can the political analyst hope to avoid errors of mythologizing from his particular assumptions. This source of error is clearly present in prevalent views of the two crises examined here. For example, the impression that Communists and Castro-Communists played little role in organizing the Dominican street fighting[9] is belied by the almost universal statement of non-Communist participants who, after vehemently disclaiming any Communist character for the "revolution," would explain that "of course we needed all the help we could get and that included using the military guidance of Dominican Communists although not their political guidance"; besides this, I personally interviewed several self-proclaimed Communist youths who proudly referred to their Cuban training and whom I observed openly dispatching volunteer police forces to trouble spots.

The impression that deposed Dominican President Bosch exercised charismatic influence on the young people was similarly not supported; it is true that his return was sought as the symbol of legality, but he personally was the object of careful critical judgment by revolutionary youth throughout the Dominican Republic, as I observed in the comments of "constitutionalist" youths with whom I was conversing at the time of Bosch's speeches on his return to the country. Similarly, President Goulart of Brazil was ideologically popular until he violated ideo-

[9] See, for example, Theodore Draper, "The Dominican Intervention," *Commentary* (December 1965) and Tad Szulc, *Dominican Diary* (New York 1965). Firsthand observations and reports of participants concerning Communist roles in organizing the revolt at the levels of direct violent engagement indicate a very active participation, although participation at higher levels of the political structure was reported by these observers to be minimal. My direct observations agree with reports of John Bartlow Martin in *Overtaken by Events* (New York 1966) and statements of U.S. government spokesmen at the time of the uprising. I think this discrepancy arises from differences in the levels of political observation and, almost certainly, from the biases of the observers. At the outset of my studies I shared the views of Draper and Szulc, on the basis of my readings of reports and judgments as to the credibility of sources, but the method of participant dialogue led me to the different conclusions reported here.

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logic standards; his personal shortcomings were regarded indulgently. In short, the identification of personalism as politically crucial by many North American scholars did not accord with the pragmatism of Dominican youth or the ideologic idealism of Brazilians as a principal and *culturally dominant* factor determining perception and action.

The Gurr model provides a sufficient degree of isomorphism with the observed phenomena of political violence to offer a systematic framework for the organization of the data, although the propositions are interpreted here in terms of the kinds of judgment the data allow. The use of such models permits comparative systematization of observations and suggests relationships that might not be observed otherwise; moreover, the model is sufficiently flexible to accommodate observed relationships not explicitly stated—it is by such processes that heuristic models become the forerunners of established theory in empirical-inductive approaches to complex realities.

The essence of Gurr's model is that discrepancies between value expectations and perceived value capabilities of societies result in relative deprivation, and the consequent response tendency of frustration-aggression is channelled into collective response alternatives by available facilities and habits of social control and social facilitation. The reader is referred to Gurr's description; the variables are interpreted below in terms of the data available.[10] The data-gathering process can be refined and the propositions sharpened in further case study, but it is necessary to begin the process in ways that do not violate the fullness of reality or impose on analysis methods that blind the observer to what Whitehead calls a "complete experience."[11]

Psychological Preconditions for Violent Uprising

One of the most firmly established, experimentally and clinically validated propositions in the psychological study of behavior is the frustration-aggression hypothesis.[12] Experimental animals and men become angry when their goal-seeking purposes are interfered with; aggressive behavior appears to be an innate response to such frustration. Among men, common social purposes may be more or less widely shared in societies; interference with the realization of these purposes constitutes collective frustration and results in angry affects that are expressed in aggression toward the frustrating agent or surrogate agents. When the frustrating agent is perceived as political authority,

[10] P. 252.
[11] Alfred North Whitehead, *The Function of Reason* (Princeton 1929), 11.
[12] Gurr, 249 ff.

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aggression is directed toward aspects of the political system and the outcome is psychological predisposition toward political violence.

Central to this argument is the recognition, thoroughly adumbrated in Gurr's study, that the sense of frustration among men in society depends on shared *perceptions* of what is desirable and possible in the society. It follows from this that a basic reference point in the estimation of the degree of frustration that disposes people toward political violence must lie in the shared perceptions of individuals of what they want and deserve from their political authorities; the measurement of frustration-levels must always be based on an appreciation of the perceptual frame of reference of the individuals in given societies. We can now examine the variables contributing to relative deprivation among students in Brazil and the Dominican Republic in terms of Gurr's model.

Relative deprivation is the sense of unjustifiable frustration of expectations from the environment. How deprived did students in Brazil and the Dominican Republic perceive themselves to be and how angry were they?

Brazilian students, in 1964, were sharply aware of the discrepancy between the potential and the performance of their society. They shared the view, almost to a man, that their country held great potential wealth and capability for industrialization, self-sufficiency, and importance in the world. They unanimously subscribed to ideals of social justice, the need for extension of education and opportunity, and the right to social protection for all Brazilians from economic exploitation and hunger. But when they looked around, they saw poverty and illiteracy, underdevelopment of resources, instability of government, inequality of opportunity, and great economic strain. At the level of recognition and aspiration, then, the relative deprivation of social values was intense and universal: something was wrong with Brazilian society. Moreover, this view was loudly articulated by the leadership of the dominant student organization, by respected scholars and foreign experts, and by the president of the country.

Here, however, we must pause to note that the personal aspirations of Brazilian students were less frustrated than were their aspirations for society. Students in Brazil were privileged and recognized, the student voice was widely respected, the personal future of students was assured by the insatiable need of the society for educated manpower. Major subventions were made to the National Union of Students by the government and private corporations; the president asked for student support and, in turn, offered his government's help for student

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programs. Not only that, but the social expectations of student radicalism were well established, going back at least to the time when Brazilian students at the University of Montpellier approached Thomas Jefferson, then Ambassador to France, for advice on conducting a revolution for independence. We may fairly judge that relative deprivation was perceived as severe in the realm of social aspirations and minimal in frustration of personal expectations.[13]

Dominican students, in the months before the event, were equally disappointed in their hopes for their country. The downfall of Trujillo after thirty years of oppressive dictatorship had brought a surge of great expectations. There was very little illusion about the wealth of natural resources but there were great hopes for the benefits of liberty. Indeed, those benefits had been widely experienced—wages had risen unrestrainedly, foreign travel and imports had been extensive, political freedom was noisily exercised. There were excited plans for industrialization and land reform, for the expansion of education, and for social protection of the disadvantaged. A constitution was written and a president, Juan Bosch, was elected under OAS supervision. With this election, hopes for improvement in social conditions rose even higher among the majority of progressive-minded youth.

While hopes were high, however, material and political conditions in the nation were deteriorating. Disorder arose in many sections of society, especially as the limited resources of experienced managerial manpower were depleted by the exodus of Trujillo's associates, so that few competent personnel were left in executive positions. The economy deteriorated rapidly because of commodity price declines in the international markets—especially for sugar, on which the economy was greatly dependent. Unemployment rose, family institutions deteriorated (about a third of the university students came from broken families), and political life was in chaos as radical minority parties were formed on the right and left. President Bosch failed to stem these tides and, after seven months in office, he was overthrown by a military coup and sent into exile. Frustration of social aspirations was universal.

The personal expectations of most students were also frustrated. Not only were the personal circumstances of the majority, who had originated in the lower middle class, strained by economic dislocation, but their hopes for improvement of student life were disappointed. The Autonomous University of Santo Domingo expanded rapidly but conditions there deteriorated. Classes were crowded and irregular, teaching

[13] Irving L. Horowitz, *Revolution in Brazil: Politics and Society in a Developing Nation* (New York 1964), gives substantial evidence of social frustration before the crisis.

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was very uneven. Student political organizations sought "reform" in terms of the criteria that had been enunciated in 1918 at Cordoba University in Argentina—autonomy of the university from political interference, extraterritoriality of university grounds from police invasion (*fuero*), and student representation on governing boards. All of these were established and all were violated, especially after the fall of Bosch. And a deep split between generations took place as most students broke politically with their parents, whom they saw as discredited by their acquiescence in Trujillo's rule (this differed from the Brazilian situation, in which family ties were maintained as radicalism was indulged). Students were frustrated to the point of desperation.

The *intensity of commitment to value* refers to the strength of motivation to seek realization of aspirations. The more seriously a goal is sought, the greater is the anger when something interferes with its attainment. To this, Gurr adds two sub-propositions: that commitment varies directly with the amount of effort previously invested in its attainment, and that the closer realization of attainment seems to be, the stronger is the motivation. In other words, the more people want something, the angrier they are when they are prevented from getting it.

Estimating the magnitude of motivation involves finding out two main facts—the distribution of commitment to a particular goal in a population, and the motivational strength of commitment in its proponents. How many people seek the goal and how much does this purpose move them to action?

Despite the fact that the dominant student voice in Brazil advocated radical reform, the voice of revolution was that of a radical minority: it represented the position of an estimated 5 percent of the student population, those occupying an active revolutionary political position. I estimated that the distribution of political orientation approximated the following:

Table 1. Political Position Among Brazilian Students

	Active	*Passive*
Conservative	3%	15%
Moderate reformist	7%	60%
Revolutionary	5%	10%

The strength of motive cannot be estimated apart from the specifics of the culture. It is true that the active revolutionary students of Brazil worked very hard to advance their programs and to arouse public support for them. But it is also true that there is a long tradition in that

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culture of student radicalism and that there was substantial political and economic support for their activity. In fact, the importance of the movement, the fun of speech-making and conventioneering, and the moral satisfaction of espousing ideal and intellectually satisfying causes attracted a considerable fringe of opportunists. If a few splendid souls took the commitment completely seriously and were deeply motivated to action by it, many more went along for the ride. In the Brazilian case, neither of the sub-propositions is supported; the apparent effort toward the goals had been great and the goals had been close to attainment; in fact, some of them had already been achieved, but this appeared to diminish rather than encourage motivation.

Circumstances in the Dominican Republic were considerably different. Dissent, in the Trujillo period, had been a life-and-death matter; indeed this has been true throughout Dominican history. One measure of value-commitment is willingness to risk one's life for the goal, and this willingness had been well demonstrated by Dominican youth. The downfall of Trujillo followed the landing of young Dominican guerrillas on the 14th of June 1959; they were all killed, as were many dissident youths in the following years. After the fall of Bosch in 1964, another group—mostly Castroites and Communists, and all members of the "14th of June Movement"—took to the hills and were wiped out. Ideology was weak but motive was strong. To go a step further, Dominican students were not always certain what they were for, but they knew what they were against—military oppression. Instigation to violence is greater when motivated by negative rather than by positive values, by the presence of a hated object rather than by frustration of value expectations alone. The generality of this proposition requires study as a possible added variable that would significantly modify the model; for the present it must be offered as a suggestion.

The distribution of strong sentiment for valued purpose among Dominican students was quite broad. I was able to estimate the political position of these students as follows:

Table 2. Political Position Among Dominican Students

	Active	*Passive*
Conservative	1%	14%
Neutral	—	30% (includes most women)
Revolutionary	20%	35%

It appears from these cases that desperation rather than hopefulness precipitates violence, that smouldering resentment is more potent than previous effort. Overall assessment of intensity of commitment leads

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to the judgment that the Dominican students were strongly motivated toward anger, while the Brazilian students were only modestly motivated.

Legitimacy of deprivation refers to the perception of the interfering agent as reasonable, justified, or simply helpless to alter circumstances. If the frustration is seen as arbitrary or self-seeking there is greater anger than if it is seen as unavoidable and "just one of those things."

It will be recalled that the ultimate frustrating agent in both cases was military force directed against valued "reforms." Here, however, the similarity ends. In Brazil, the military role in government had been historically reasonable and supportive of democratic values; there was no sharp resentment of the military as such. Furthermore, the president had undermined his own legitimacy in the eyes of the student constituency by acting unconstitutionally in the weeks before the coup—and constitutionalism holds high value for most Brazilian students. The value for form, in this case, weighed against the value for substance; relatively few students wanted to achieve their goals at the price of destruction of highly valued institutions. Therefore, the military intervention was perceived as being about as justified as was the action of the government that espoused these values; neither was palatable but there wasn't much to choose between them in terms of legitimacy.

From the viewpoint of Dominican students there was no such ambivalence. The history of military oppression was 450 years old; Trujillo had ruled with a military iron fist and the constitutional president had been deposed by military coup. The senior officers, moreover, were notorious for their self-seeking; corruption and privilege had long attended their office, and they were strongly linked with the economic oligarchy in the practice of social exploitation. The line was clearly drawn by the revolting officers who adopted the slogan of "Constitutionalism." The depriving agent had no legitimacy whatever in the minds of students.

The *degree of deprivation* represents the perceived distance between aspirations considered justified and those enjoyed. Anger is assumed to vary directly with the degree of discrepancy.

I have outlined something of student hopes in Brazil and the Dominican Republic and some of the beliefs as to attainability. Instead of extending this description here, I will refer to measurements of public judgments using a self-anchoring scale made by Lloyd Free.[14] In both

[14] "Some International Implications of the Political Psychology of Brazilians" (July 1961) and "Attitudes, Hopes, and Fears of the Dominican People" (June 1962), *Institute for International Social Research Publications* (Princeton 1962).

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countries a probability sample of the population had been asked to indicate, on an eleven-point scale, their judgment of where they stood and where their country stood with respect to their self-defined aspirations for self and country. The judgment was made for a point five years in the past, for the present, and for five years in the future.

TABLE 3. AVERAGE RATINGS OF JUDGMENT FOR POSITION OF SELF AND COUNTRY WITH RESPECT TO ASPIRATIONS
(Derived from L. Free)

(On scale running from zero at the bottom to ten at the top.)

	Brazil (1960)		*Dominican Republic* (1962)	
	Self	*Country*	*Self*	*Country*
Past	4.1	4.9	1.6	1.7
Present	4.8	5.1	1.6	2.7
Future	7.4	7.6	5.8	7.0

These judgments fairly reflect the degree of deprivation perceived by students in the two countries; it is probable that at a later time Dominican students would have rated their personal positions somewhat higher and their country's position somewhat lower, and it is certain that by 1965 they would have been less hopeful for the future. Free's measurements illustrate the use of a variety of data in the assessment process that are entirely apt to the purpose; finer analysis of the data would be possible in a more elaborate study.

Brazilians thought that things were getting better, both for themselves and their country. They were optimistic about the future; Free judged that "their frustrations are not apt to build up into a feeling that the present basic system in Brazil must be smashed or radically changed."[15] Dominicans, by contrast, were exceedingly gloomy about their own positions although, in 1962, they thought that their country had improved. Their aspirations for the future, both personally and nationally, were very high—the discrepancy was greater than that measured anywhere else. By 1965, however, these hopes were already substantially disappointed. Using this measurement, Free concluded that "an extremely serious situation of popular discontent and frustration, fraught with a dangerous potential for upheaval, exists in the Dominican Republic."[16] The degree of deprivation was moderate in Brazil; it was exceedingly severe in the Dominican Republic.

The *proportion of opportunities interfered with* suggests that anger

[15] *Ibid.*, Brazil, 66.
[16] *Ibid.*, Dominican Republic, 16.

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is greater as there are fewer nonviolent means to seek valued goals; the extreme case is when all channels of response are blocked, when the frustrated and angry man's back is to the wall. The likelihood of violent response is hypothesized to rise when the opportunities for value-forwarding action are narrowed.

Few students in Brazil imagined that opportunities for forwarding their values would be completely interfered with, even by a military government. Not only had the military been mild in its domestic interventions, but the traditions of freedom of the press and speech were deeply established; beyond that, the capacity for extensive underground activity was quite well developed. This is to say, not that students liked the intervention, but that the whole political culture informed them that it would not be permanent nor its consequences total and that opportunities for value-forwarding activities would remain. They were correct. After the event many, but by no means all, public opportunities were suppressed; some students spent some time in jail and a few went into exile, but the deep trends toward social transformation that they advocated have continued, although haltingly. The proportion of value opportunities interfered with was so small as to represent a negative quality as an instigator of anger-violence among the student population as a whole.

Circumstances in the Dominican Republic were quite different. University youth had enjoyed a brief period of liberty to pursue political and social ends although there were some fairly serious restrictions after the fall of Bosch. But, in the event that a military-oligarchic regime should become established, there were no illusions about the outcome; liberty would be radically suppressed. Such was the history of the country and such was the memory of Trujillo. Students were quite certain that those who had taken an active part, especially after the outbreak of violence, would be hunted down and jailed or killed unless they could escape the country. The value deprivation was extreme and very vivid, not only of the purposes espoused, but of life itself. The violence, when it came, was in good part "the revolt of the damned."

Here, I must add a variable to the Gurr model that I consider crucial to the *precipitation* of many "spontaneous" violent outbursts. It is hypothesized that the likelihood of violent response varies directly with perceived threat to life. The evidence for this is almost entirely clinical and observational, as the conditions are difficult to reproduce experimentally, but the "cornered-rat response" differs in psychological quality from frustration of goal-seeking purposes. When the value di-

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rectly at stake is life, violent response occurs as a reaction to fear rather than as an expression of anger. This distinction is exceedingly important in the consideration of the role of police actions in precipitating and maintaining violence. Indeed, violent men and groups are sometimes disarmed by the removal of threatening forces. This threat-aggression response is often met in psychiatric work and may be distinguished also from the expectation of retribution, which is not necessarily immediate in quality.[17]

In the Dominican Republic the direct action of military forces in shooting and later bombing concentrations of "rebels" clearly precipitated violent response. Faced with a direct threat, students who had not anticipated participation in violence suddenly sought and accepted weapons. Frustration had brought them to protest, fear ensured its violent form. (It is true that the revolting young officers and their followers were armed, as were some conspiratorial groups committed to violent means to gain their ends, but this circumstance also obtained in Brazil; the difference in response lay in the character of the confrontation as well as the levels of frustration.)

Students in Brazil relied strongly on the well-established tradition of military restraint. Students in Recife were shocked, for example, by the shooting of two of their number and actually made excuses for the officer responsible—he was "confused" and hadn't counted on ricochet. Although the military moved swiftly and with a substantial show of force, it is unlikely that fear suppressed violence or greatly increased anger.

The *psychological preconditions* for violence may now be summarized in tabular form; I have recorded judgments on a five-point scale from — — to + + in terms of the factors disposing to violence:

Table 4. Strength of Instigating Variables Disposing to Violence

	Brazil	*Dominican Republic*
Relative deprivation	+	++
Intensity of commitment	+	++
Legitimacy of deprivation	0	++
Degree of deprivation	+	++
Interference with opportunity	0	++
Threat	+	++
Total Value of Instigation	+4	+12

[17] While Leonard Berkowitz considers that threat-aggression is a special case of frustration-aggression, in *Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis* (New York 1962), 38-49, Jerome Frank clearly distinguishes the two, in *Sanity and Survival: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace* (New York 1968), 75.

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It appears from this tabulation that students of Brazil were experiencing moderate degrees of frustration and reacted with modest anger. In the Dominican Republic every variable disposing to frustrated anger was at a very high level; moreover, conditions of threat were extreme and conducive to aggressive response.

Social Preconditions of Violent Uprising

Whether angry men turn to violence depends in large part on the effectiveness of social control balanced against the sources of social support for violent behavior. Under Trujillo, for example, the controls were so effective that collective violence was virtually impossible; when frustrated men and small groups did turn to violence they were sure to be wiped out—indeed, many persons turned their anger against themselves and committed suicide. Many more went into exile. On the other hand, absolute control generates its own destruction; sooner or later, in the contemporary world, such systems prove too brittle to survive; they are temporary and transitional and often fall in violence. The likelihood of violence in any political system, in Gurr's model, depends on social mediation, on the balance between factors that control the violent expression of anger and those that facilitate violent manifestations. I will sketchily review these factors in both Brazil and the Dominican Republic.

Before entering into the analysis of social preconditions as experienced by the student segments of the populations, it is necessary to review some aspects of the authoritative structure of the governments. It is obvious that authority structures encompass the principal institutions of social control and that they also permit the existence of institutionalized channels for protest. Governments, moreover, can provide social facilitation for nonviolent response alternatives. Questions of social control and social facilitation cannot be analyzed apart from consideration of political authority in case study although, conversely, political analysis alone cannot lead to estimation of the likelihood of violence within the system; this likelihood, rather, turns on the adequacy of government in relation to social conditions and social culture. This consideration in no way reflects on the validity of the Gurr propositions as general theory.

The government of Brazil derived its formal authority from constitutional processes; the elected president administered a federal authority with legislative powers resting in a bicameral legislature. And, theoretically, presidential power was restricted by legal constraints.

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In fact, informal agreements, sometimes amounting to conspiracy, dominated the governing process; this had long involved the consent of an elitist oligarchy and, ultimately, the military forces. The incumbent president, Goulart, had come to office somewhat irregularly from the vice-presidency when his predecessor, the quixotic Janio Quadros, had resigned after seven months in office. Still, the forms of constitutionalism were observed even as the president's influence on the directions of policy grew and as he attempted to build a new political base on the support of labor, students, and some elements of the middle class. So long as these forms were observed, the governing authority was respected—with the exception of some rebellious state governors who usually wrung compromises from the president—and the instruments of order, the police, military, and bureaucracy continued to function.

But Goulart was unquestionably a demagogic leftist and as his calls for "reforms" became more radical, so did his appeals for popular demonstration in his support become more strident, while strikes, protests, and other manifestations of civil disorder grew. Finally the president's bypassing of constitutional processes, in his attempts to promulgate law by decree, became so flagrant that the military leadership intervened in the name of preserving the constitution.

The Dominican government had much less legal justification than did the Brazilian; it was frankly the instrument of an even narrower oligarchy in league with a military junta that had overthrown constitutionally elected President Juan Bosch after seven months in office in 1963. Authority was ostensibly centralized in the office of the provisional president, Donald Reid Cabral, himself a member of the conservative oligarchy, but in fact was largely exercised by the police and military forces. Disorder, conspiracy, and small episodes of violence continued to break out in the country while efforts to stem the tide, especially by direct employment of workers by the government and by wage and other concessions to popular discontent, were only partly successful. Elections were promised for later in the year, but the former president was still in exile. The coup attempt that precipitated revolt was mounted to forestall a suspected effort by the provisional president to succeed himself in office with military support. In short, the government of the Dominican Republic based its real authority in military force and sanction, and maintained social order by force or the threat of force combined with promises of a return to democracy and concessions to public demands that had become vocal since Trujillo's downfall had weakened authoritarian control.

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The *expectation of retribution* by physical or social punishment deters violent outbreaks by already angry men when the expected retribution is severe and certain. When only moderate retribution is anticipated, however, the likelihood of violence may be increased by raising the level of frustrated anger. In other words, if punishment is seen as swift and absolute, men are not so likely to act violently as when punishment is doubtful. Low levels of expectation may actually diminish the likelihood of violence, but a decreasing fear of retribution tends to increase the probability of violence. In short, violence is suppressed by sufficient fear but increased when fear is moderate or decreasing.

Fear of retribution was never very great among Brazilian students; the tradition of moderate response to political protest, by the government and even the military, was very strong and actually the object of civic pride. Dissidents might be jailed for a while or have problems obtaining jobs, but torture and killing were scarcely thinkable. Certainly there was no expectation of retribution from the government in power, which had tended to encourage and reward demonstrations on behalf of its programs. But, even should the government fall—and all but the most committed student radicals had begun to suspect and even hope it would—it was expected that any succeeding regime, even a military dictatorship, would be fairly mild in its punishments, especially of students, who constituted a privileged and rather indulged segment of the population. Although, in the event, the military moved swiftly and with a substantial show of force, there is little evidence that expectation of retribution exercised notable suppressive effect or greatly increased anger. Rather, a feeling of disappointment in Goulart and in the outcome of their cause was reported by those students most active in opposition to the military.

The Dominican situation was much more complicated and in fact varied from hour to hour. No great retribution was expected from the shaky provisional government. Should the senior officers and the regular military prevail, no one doubted that retribution would be swift and complete against the participants—the memory of military ruthlessness and torture during Trujillo's dictatorship was strong and was being reenforced by continuing experience. But the military was split—it will be remembered that junior officers and some military units had precipitated the coup attempt—and it was by no means certain which side would prevail. There is no doubt that uncertainty as to outcome both diminished the fear of immediate retribution and increased the fear of ultimate retribution should the outbreak be crushed; this un-

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certainty greatly increased the level of violence. Furthermore, the likelihood of retribution had decreased since the fall of Trujillo and in so doing had diminished this source of inhibition of violent action.

The *persistence of anger* occurs when violence is inhibited by fear of retribution, but the likelihood of violence diminishes as the inhibiting force is maintained over time. Furthermore, the greater the commitment to the value being suppressed, the longer anger endures. In short, people give up when they can't possibly win but they remain angry when what they lose is very important to them.

In Brazil, as I have indicated, the fear of retribution was modest in the first place; furthermore, it appears that in absolute numbers more students were relieved by the restoration of order than were distressed by the downfall of Goulart. It was only among the minority of active revolutionaries that anger persisted and since they were unable to mount any effective response this anger soon evaporated into resignation and discouragement.

Dominican students, by contrast, had stored their anger at military rule over a very long time. Many a man in his forties had suffered the insults of Trujilloist suppression and had delayed violent response; a considerable number of these men appeared side by side with youth when violence broke out. There is little doubt that much of the force of violence in 1965 sprang from persisting anger displaced from the years of Trujillo's police. To this anger was added the insult of the military coup against President Bosch; again the outbreak of violence had been delayed. The question in the minds of most Dominicans was why the outbreak of violence was delayed so long; it appears to me that the anticipation of ruthless retribution had been so deeply established in the culture that it took some time and much testing before the fear of it was overcome. In fact, most of the Dominican population, especially in the countryside, was still cowed by fear even after the revolt; it is not surprising that youth, which had been less conditioned to fear, led the outbreak of violence.

Similarly, the values to which Brazilian students were committed were held with less intensity since they were ideal and intellectual in their primary qualities; the Dominican value for liberty, which was the principal value at stake, is held with deep emotional intensity. This is to suggest, not that Brazilians are any less sincere and serious, but only that their entire system is milder than that of the harsh tyrannies which have marked Dominican history.

Institutionalization of protest, which allows the discharge of anger by nonviolent aggression, tends to diminish the likelihood of civil

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violence. When established forms for the expression of anger are available, and when targets for the expression of hostility have been previously identified, the chances are that the aggression of angry men will be expressed through those channels. This is the familiar dynamic of the man who hates his boss but nightly berates his wife and kicks the dog.

Brazilian students enjoyed a vast array of channels for the expression of displeasure. I have mentioned the activities of the Student Union; these went on in every university and on the national level. Speeches, demonstrations, student strikes, and petitions constantly took place, often in connection with national issues such as the nationalization of petroleum resources. In the early months of 1964, these activities became so frenzied that university life was seriously disrupted. There seemed little likelihood that all of these institutional channels for protest could be suppressed by any government.

It has been demonstrated by Leonard Berkowitz that hostility is generalized from the frustrator to previously disliked objects.[18] Brazilian students had a good deal of difficulty identifying the frustrating agent, and tended to speak in terms of the oligarchy or international imperialists. Some political figures were considered to be aligned with these forces but scarcely as primary agents. The further to the left the student, the more apt he was to blame "United States imperialism" for his frustration and to satisfy his hostility with savage cartoons and editorials and with an occasional demonstration in front of an embassy. But this alleged force was not directly reachable. Moreover, geography interposed itself: Brazil is a vast country and the capital quite inaccessible—in city after city it was some other place that was to blame. Thus the United States and the oligarchs, equally unreachable, provided well-established objects for displaced anger.

After the fall of Trujillo, Dominican students developed a number of institutions of protest, especially student political groupings within the university. Incorporated in the whole climate, however, was a high component of institutionalized violence. The 14th of June Movement, which was born of violence, provided a popular focal point—even after it became dominated by young Dominican Communists in 1963, this organization kept its loosely organized constituency of non-Communist adherents and never relinquished the idea of guerrilla action. The university itself was the site of intense political struggles that faithfully reflected the Dominican macrocosm; strikes, lock-outs, and demonstrations were constant. These institutions were not strongly estab-

[18] *Ibid.*, chap. 2.

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lished; Dominican students did not expect that the institutions could survive military repression.

Even less, in the Dominican situation, was there any pattern for displacement of anger from the frustrating agent. Dominican students identified, without any serious dissent, the frustrator—the Dominican police and military. Even the young Communists did not very seriously maintain that United States imperialism was a principal problem; as Lloyd Free's study also showed, the United States enjoyed great popularity among the Dominican people at large. The military were not distant and unreachable, but directly and physically confronted the citizens of Santo Domingo. There were almost no established channels of institutionalized displacement of hostility.

Beliefs and traditions sanctioning civil violence increase the likelihood of violent action when men are angry. The suggestion here is that habits and patterns of violent expression of anger tend to be self-perpetuating and that these tendencies are reinforced by the existence of beliefs and ideologies holding that violence is an effective means to achieve social purposes. There is little doubt that violent behavior tends to be contagious: once a model or pattern of violent uprising has been established it is apt to be imitated, even across national boundaries.

As I have suggested, the political culture of Brazil incorporates a long and proud tradition of resolving political conflict with minimal violence and loss of life. While this tradition is historically faulty—there have been periods of serious political bloodshed in various Brazilian crises—it is very generally subscribed to. The tradition is reinforced, moreover, by at least two other aspects of Brazilian national culture: paternalism and universalism of reasoning. The paternalistic family is still a very strong institution in Brazil and, with respect to youth, astonishingly flexible; young men are indulged during their periods of political radicalism, but family ties still exercise some restraining force. Edmund Glenn and I have noted that the extreme universalism or globalism of cognitive forms characterizing the social communication culture of educated Brazilians permits the existence of profound discrepancies between idea and action.[19] The consequences of beliefs and traditions for action are, it is clear, profoundly dependent on this aspect of civic culture.

The concepts of political violence were well represented in Brazil

[19] Glenn, "A Cognitive Approach to the Analysis of Cultures and Cultural Evolution," *General Systems*, XI (1966), 115-31. Wedge, "Communication Analysis and Comprehensive Diplomacy," in A. Hoffman, ed., *International Communication and the New Diplomacy* (Bloomington, Ind. 1968), 24-47.

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and quite constantly articulated on the radical left, especially among the more radical Communists. There was much talk and threat of violent mass mobilizations and of guerrilla action. But this talk had a theoretical quality—it was ideological rather than practical in its effect. Student leaders were quite well organized and prepared to agitate and lead the outraged masses of the populace; they were scarcely concerned with the conditions for violent revolution, but assumed on the basis of theory that such conditions existed. These discrepancies between tradition and ideology and between theory and practice greatly diminished the effects of belief in violence in Brazil.

Both tradition and belief supported the resort to violence in the Dominican Republic. The violent activity of a repressive police formed a model for violent response. Time and time again in Dominican history, tyrants had been overthrown by violent civil uprisings. The 14th of June Movement explicitly subscribed to techniques of violence and guerrilla war; and the political consciousness of an entire generation had been awakened by the landings of 1959, so that the fundamental model for combating oppression was one of violent response. There was little theory—the great majority of youths who participated in the uprising had never considered violence as a strategy and most had not considered personal participation—but there were constant practical examples.

With the fall of Trujillo, as I have mentioned, there was a profound split between generations. Families rapidly lost influence with their young people and, in large degree, accepted this loss. The generation of youth became remarkably free from parental or social restraint. The reasoning patterns characteristic of Dominican society were pragmatic and case-particularistic in the extreme. In a culture where survival has depended on having one's particular facts correct—as is always true in a police state—there can be little indulgence in theory. As a consequence, ideology played little role in mobilizing violent response, although the combination of ideas and practical organization for their realization in the 14th of June Movement played a significant role in the organization of the uprising; these ideas and techniques were very largely of Communist origin and young Dominican Communists were the most effective organizers, but the ideas scarcely penetrated the consciousness of the fiercely libertarian political culture of Dominican youth.

Finally, in the Gurr model, *group support* facilitates the likelihood of violent civil action. When there is a high level of interaction among participants and agreement among them as to the frustrating agent,

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when there is organized support for violent action and precedents for violent action, violent outcomes are likely.

I have indicated that the tradition of noisy but nonviolent political action was strong in Brazil, while violence on the part of authorities and their opponents alike was the norm in the political culture of the Dominican Republic. This was reflected in the organization of youth for political action: although the Brazilian student organizations developed very strong propaganda activities they had almost no military plans or theory, while virtually every Dominican student knew of the quite well developed Military Bureau of the 14th of June Movement and of its smuggling and concealing of arms. Even those who did not approve of this activity relied on the organization when violence appeared inevitable: however surprised they felt, their minds had been prepared for the action.

These preconditions certainly influenced the "spontaneous" violence in the Dominican Republic and the "spontaneous" resignation in Brazil, but it is certain that crowd phenomena played a critical part in the respective outcomes.

Despite all the planning in Brazil, a number of factors diluted the development of massive crowd phenomena. Typically, students gathered in university centers and organized demonstrative marches on administrative offices. But the turnout, for reasons I have mentioned, was smaller than the organizers had expected; most citizens and students stayed at home and waited to see what would happen. In no case were they attacked in defensive positions; on the contrary, the initiative of marching up to police and military lines lay with the crowd—violence appears much more likely when men are defending themselves against threat than when they are taking the initiative. There were few firearms in the crowds; stones, bottles, and coconuts were more usual weapons. Students who participated in marches reported great uncertainty and uneasiness; they did not feel strong support from the crowd nor strong leadership from those who urged them on. While some observers have judged that a principal crowd-dampening force was exerted by the efficiency of the military coup-makers in organizing support and that "lack of support, or even a long delay, could have resulted in bloodshed or perhaps even a civil war . . . ,"[20] very few of the participants whom I interviewed shared that judgment; they felt that the crowds might have held demonstrations and dissipated rapidly in almost any event. Finally, although the uprisings were planned to take place in a number of cities simultaneously, there was poor communication among them.

[20] Araken Tavora, *How Brazil Stopped Communism* (Rio de Janeiro, 1964), 85.

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Crowd conditions in the Dominican Republic were very sharply defined. The revolt centered in downtown Santo Domingo. There had been little preparation, but when the coup attempt was precipitated the nuclear forces were armed military units following the leadership of the rebelling young officers. Bands of people came spontaneously from other parts of the city and from the countryside in response to rebel calls on Radio Santo Domingo. Almost from the first it was apparent that the police could not maintain control, and most police left the area. Defensive positions were established and quantities of additional arms, from caches and from a captured arsenal, were passed out to civilians. Armed bands of civilians began to roam the streets.

Both participants and observers reported striking and unanticipated behavior. The majority of students who answered the call to support the "Constitutionalists" did so without forethought and with a vague intention of demonstrating moral backing. Almost as soon as they encountered the crowds in the city, they recall, they were caught up in a frenzy of rage, especially after the air attacks. They sought and accepted arms, they sought and accepted assignments from the apparent leaders; their overriding thought was to resist and strike back at the military forces. They experienced the very strong feelings of solidarity with one another in a desperate cause, and of group support for their actions.

Judgments of the effects of social mediating factors on the likelihood of violence are summarized in the following table:

TABLE 5. STRENGTH OF MEDIATING VARIABLES DISPOSING TO VIOLENCE

	Brazil	*Dominican Republic*
Retribution	0	+
Persistence of anger	0	++
Institutionalization of protest	—	+
Beliefs and traditions	—	++
Group support	0	++
Total Mediating Factors	2—	8+

Each of the above judgments is made, as nearly as possible, in the context of the respective political culture; each judgment is complex and involves overlapping and feedback loops among the variables. But, once again, the arithmetical product is striking and suggests that social forces in Brazil were fairly evenly balanced in terms of contribution to the likelihood of violence, while in the Dominican Republic these forces tended strongly toward a violent outcome, at least in the perception of student participants.

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In so far as the qualitative judgments that have been made are sustainable and in so far as the Gurr model is adequate, it appears that moderate psychological predisposition and minimal social mediation made for a low probability of the outbreak of civil violence in Brazil. With the same qualifications, both the psychological predisposition and social mediation making for violent civil uprising were at a very high level in the Dominican Republic prior to the outbreak of civil war.

It is beyond the scope of this discussion to consider the conditions of actual outbreak and the subsequent organization of violent revolutionary uprisings. Suffice it to say that a considerable number of factors, some of them quite accidental, appear to enter into the actual outbreak of violence. Factors of leadership, of specific personalities, of who is at home when the police come, of the season of the year and the weather of the day, of a single trigger-happy soldier may influence the precipitation of violence. But the case of Brazil suggests that where the preconditions for violence have only moderate force there is considerable tolerance for provocative incidents. The Dominican case—especially the behavior of persons who were mobilized from distant parts of the countryside—suggests that when the preconditions have great strength, even relatively minor provocation may precipitate violent response.

Conclusion

Exploration of the applicability of a general theoretical explanation for the likelihood of civil violence has suggested some of the possibilities and illustrated some of the difficulties in bridging the gap between theory and empirical case study of the psychology of participants. At this point, it can be said that the model succeeds in providing a guide to the assessment of specific cases and that the case-material provides suggestive empirical validation of the principal propositions. It must also be said that the evidence suggests that fairly extensive modification of the propositional statements will be necessary in order to evolve procedures for case study, and that some of the lesser propositions may not prove valid in empirical circumstances—a question that can be answered only by accumulated case studies. Finally, it appears to me that, although we are very far from possessing a reliable capability for predicting the likelihood of civil violence in specific societies, there is an encouraging possibility for developing such a capability by utilizing the Gurr model as the basis for a series of case studies.

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CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY

By AREND LIJPHART*

Types of Western Democratic Systems

IN Gabriel A. Almond's famous typology of political systems, first expounded in 1956, he distinguishes three types of Western democratic systems: Anglo-American political systems (exemplified by Britain and the United States), Continental European political systems (France, Germany, and Italy), and a third category consisting of the Scandinavian and Low Countries. The third type is not given a distinct label and is not described in detail; Almond merely states that the countries belonging to this type "combine some of the features of the Continental European and the Anglo-American" political systems, and "stand somewhere in between the Continental pattern and the Anglo-American."[1] Almond's threefold typology has been highly influential in the comparative analysis of democratic politics, although, like any provocative and insightful idea, it has also been criticized. This research note will discuss the concept of "consociational democracy" in a constructive attempt to refine and elaborate Almond's typology of democracies.

The typology derives its theoretical significance from the relationship it establishes between political culture and social structure on the one hand and political stability on the other hand. The Anglo-American systems have a "homogeneous, secular political culture" and a "highly differentiated" role structure, in which governmental agencies, parties, interest groups, and the communication media have specialized functions and are autonomous, although interdependent. In contrast, the Continental European democracies are characterized by a "fragmentation of political culture" with separate "political sub-cultures." Their roles "are embedded in the sub-cultures and tend to constitute separate sub-systems of rôles."[2] The terms "Anglo-American" and "Continental European" are used for convenience only and do not imply that geo-

* This note represents an intermediate stage of a research project concerning political stability in democratic systems. An earlier and briefer discussion of the concept of consociational democracy, in the context of a critical analysis of the utility of typologies in comparative politics, appeared in the author's "Typologies of Democratic Systems," *Comparative Political Studies*, I (April 1968), 3-44. The author is indebted to the Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, for financial support.

[1] Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (August 1956), 392-93, 405.

[2] *Ibid.*, 398-99, 405-07 (italics omitted).

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graphical location is an additional criterion distinguishing the two types of democratic systems. This point deserves special emphasis, because some of Almond's critics have misinterpreted it. For instance, Arthur L. Kalleberg states that the two types "are based on criteria of geographic location and area," and that "Almond does not come out and specify that these *are* his criteria of classification; we have to infer them from the titles and descriptions he gives of each of his groups of states."[3] Actually, Almond does indicate clearly what his criteria are, and he also specifically rejects the criterion of geography or region as irrelevant, because it is not based "on the properties of the political systems."[4]

Political culture and social structure are empirically related to political stability. The Anglo-American democracies display a high degree of stability and effectiveness. The Continental European systems, on the other hand, tend to be unstable; they are characterized by political immobilism, which is "a consequence of the [fragmented] condition of the political culture." Furthermore, there is the "ever-present threat of what is often called the 'Caesaristic' breakthrough" and even the danger of a lapse into totalitarianism as a result of this immobilism.[5]

The theoretical basis of Almond's typology is the "overlapping memberships" proposition formulated by the group theorists Arthur F. Bentley and David B. Truman and the very similar "crosscutting cleavages" proposition of Seymour Martin Lipset. These propositions state that the psychological cross-pressures resulting from membership in different groups with diverse interests and outlooks lead to moderate attitudes. These groups may be formally organized groups or merely unorganized, categoric, and, in Truman's terminology, "potential" groups. Cross-pressures operate not only at the mass but also at the elite level: the leaders of social groups with heterogeneous and overlapping memberships will tend to find it necessary to adopt moderate positions. When, on the other hand, a society is divided by sharp cleavages with no or very few overlapping memberships and loyalties—in other words, when the political culture is deeply fragmented—the

[3] Kalleberg, "The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems," *World Politics*, XIX (October 1966), 73-74. Hans Daalder's critical question "Why should France, Germany, and Italy be more 'continental,' than Holland, or Switzerland, or more 'European' than Britain?" seems to be based on a similar erroneous interpretation; see his "Parties, Elites, and Political Developments in Western Europe," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton 1966), 43n.

[4] Almond, 392. There is also no reason, therefore, to call the exclusion of Scandinavia and the Low Countries from the "Continental European" systems an "artificial qualifier," as Kalleberg does, 74.

[5] Almond, 408.

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pressures toward moderate middle-of-the-road attitudes are absent. Political stability depends on moderation and, therefore, also on overlapping memberships. Truman states this proposition as follows: "In the long run a complex society may experience revolution, degeneration, and decay. If it maintains its stability, however, it may do so in large measure because of the fact of multiple memberships."[6] Bentley calls compromise "the very process itself of the criss-cross groups in action."[7] And Lipset argues that "the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations."[8] Sometimes Almond himself explicitly adopts the terminology of these propositions: for instance, he describes the French Fourth Republic as being divided into "three main ideological families or subcultures," which means that the people of France were "exposed to few of the kinds of 'cross-pressures' that moderate [their] rigid political attitudes," while, on the other hand, he characterizes the United States and Britain as having an "overlapping pattern" of membership.[9]

In his later writings, Almond maintains both the threefold typology of Western democracies and the criteria on which it is based, although the terms that he uses vary considerably. In an article published in 1963, for instance, he distinguishes between "stable democracies" and "immobilist democracies." The latter are characterized by "fragmentation, both in a cultural and structural sense" and by the absence of "consensus on governmental structure and process" (i.e. the Continental European systems). The former group is divided into two sub-classes: one includes Great Britain, the United States, and the Old Commonwealth democracies (i.e. the Anglo-American systems), and the other "the stable multi-party democracies of the European continent—the Scandinavian and Low Countries and Switzerland."[10] And in *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, published in 1966, a distinction is drawn between modern democratic systems with "high subsystem autonomy" (the Anglo-American democracies) and those with "limited subsystem autonomy" and fragmentation of political

[6] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York 1951), 508, 511.

[7] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures*, 4th ed. (Evanston 1955), 208.

[8] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City 1960), 88-89.

[9] Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston 1966), 122, 263; Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton 1963), 134.

[10] "Political Systems and Political Change," *American Behavioral Scientist*, VI (June 1963), 9-10.

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culture (the Continental European democracies). The third type is not included in this classification.[11]

In what respects are Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries "in between" the Anglo-American and Continental European democracies? Here, too, Almond consistently uses the two criteria of role structure and political culture. A differentiated role structure (or a high degree of subsystem autonomy) is related to the performance of the political aggregation function in a society. The best aggregators are parties in two-party systems like the Anglo-American democracies, but the larger the number and the smaller the size of the parties in a system, the less effectively the aggregation function will be performed; in the Continental European multi-party systems only a minimum of aggregation takes place. The "working multi-party systems" of the Scandinavian and Low Countries differ from the French-Italian "crisis" systems in that some, though not all, of their parties are "broadly aggregative." Almond gives the Scandinavian Socialist parties and the Belgian Catholic and Socialist parties as examples.[12] This criterion does not distinguish adequately between the two types of democracies, however: if one calls the Belgian Catholic party broadly aggregative, the Italian Christian Democrats surely also have to be regarded as such. On the other hand, none of the Dutch and Swiss parties can be called broadly aggregative.

Instead of using the extent of aggregation performed by political parties as the operational indicator of the degree of subsystem autonomy, it is more satisfactory to examine the system's role structure directly. Like the Anglo-American countries, the Scandinavian states have a high degree of subsystem autonomy. But one finds a severely limited subsystem autonomy and considerable interpenetration of parties, interest groups, and the media of communication in the Low Countries, Switzerland, and also in Austria. In fact, subsystem autonomy is at least as limited in these countries as in the Continental European systems. According to the criterion of role structure, therefore, one arrives at a dichotomous rather than a threefold typology: the

[11] Almond and Powell, 259 (italics omitted).

[12] Almond, rapporteur, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," *American Political Science Review*, LII (March 1958), 275-77; Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 42-43. See also Göran G. Lindahl, "Gabriel A. Almond's funktionella kategorier: En kritik," *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift*, No. 4 (1967), 263-72; and Constance E. van der Maesen and G. H. Scholten, "De functionele benadering van G. A. Almond bij het vergelijken van politieke stelsels," *Acta Politica*, I (1965-66), 220-26.

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Scandinavian states must be grouped with the Anglo-American systems, and the other "in-between" states with the Continental European systems.

The application of the second criterion—political culture—leads to a similar result. Almond writes that the political culture in the Scandinavian and Low Countries is "more homogeneous and fusional of secular and traditional elements" than that in the Continental European systems.[13] This is clearly true for the Scandinavian countries, which are, in fact, quite homogeneous and do not differ significantly from the homogeneous Anglo-American systems. But again, the other "in-between" countries are at least as fragmented into political subcultures —the *familles spirituelles* of Belgium and Luxembourg, the *zuilen* of the Netherlands, and the *Lager* of Austria—as the Continental European states. Therefore, on the basis of the two criteria of political culture and role structure, the Western democracies can be satisfactorily classified into two broad but clearly bounded categories: (1) the Anglo-American, Old Commonwealth, and Scandinavian states; (2) the other European democracies, including France, Italy, Weimar Germany, the Low Countries, Austria, and Switzerland.

Fragmented but Stable Democracies

The second category of the above twofold typology is too broad, however, because it includes both highly stable systems (e.g., Switzerland and Holland) and highly unstable ones (e.g., Weimar Germany and the French Third and Fourth Republics). The political stability of a system can apparently not be predicted solely on the basis of the two variables of political culture and role structure. According to the theory of crosscutting cleavages, one would expect the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Austria, with subcultures divided from each other by mutually reinforcing cleavages, to exhibit great immobilism and instability. But they do not. These deviant cases of fragmented but stable democracies will be called "consociational democracies."[14] In general, deviant case analysis can lead to the discovery of additional relevant variables, and in this particular instance, a third variable can account for the stability of the consociational democracies: the behavior of the political elites. The leaders of the rival subcultures may engage

[13] "A Functional Approach," 42.

[14] Cf. Johannes Althusius' concept of *consociatio* in his *Politica Methodice Digesta*, and the term "consociational" used by David E. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism* (Princeton 1961), 24-25.

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in competitive behavior and thus further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability, but they may also make *deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation*. As a result of such overarching cooperation at the elite level, a country can, as Claude Ake states, "achieve a degree of political stability quite out of proportion to its social homogeneity."[15]

The clearest examples are the experiences of democratic Austria after the First World War and of pre-democratic Belgium in the early nineteenth century. The fragmented and unstable Austrian First Republic of the interwar years was transformed into the still fragmented but stable Second Republic after the Second World War by means of a consociational solution. As Frederick C. Engelmann states, "the central socio-political fact in the life of post-1918 Austria [was that] the Republic had developed under conditions of cleavage so deep as to leave it with a high potential for—and a sporadic actuality of—civil war." The instability caused by the deep cleavage and antagonism between the Catholic and Socialist *Lager* (subcultures) spelled the end of democracy and the establishment of a dictatorship. The leaders of the rival subcultures were anxious not to repeat the sorry experience of the First Republic, and decided to join in a grand coalition after the Second World War. According to Engelmann, "critics and objective observers agree with Austria's leading politicians in the assessment that the coalition was a response to the civil-war tension of the First Republic."[16] Otto Kirchheimer also attributes the consociational pattern of Austria's post-1945 politics (until early 1966) to "the republic's historical record of political frustration and abiding suspicion."[17] Val R. Lorwin describes how the potential instability caused by subcultural cleavage was deliberately avoided at the time of the birth of independent Belgium: the Catholic and Liberal leaders had learned "the great lesson of mutual tolerance from the catastrophic experience of the Brabant Revolution of 1789, when the civil strife of their predecessors had so soon laid the country open to easy Habsburg reconquest. It was a remarkable and *self-conscious 'union of the oppositions'* that made the

[15] Claude Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration* (Homewood 1967), 113. This possibility exists not only in the fragmented democracies, but also in fragmented predemocratic or nondemocratic systems, of course. See also Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley 1968), 1-15, 197-211.

[16] Frederick C. Engelmann, "Haggling for the Equilibrium: The Renegotiation of the Austrian Coalition, 1959," *American Political Science Review*, LVI (September 1962), 651-52.

[17] Kirchheimer, "The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes," *Social Research*, XXIV (Summer 1957), 137.

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revolution of 1830, wrote the Constitution of 1831, and headed the government in its critical years."[18]

The grand coalition cabinet is the most typical and obvious, but not the only possible, consociational solution for a fragmented system. The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system. Instead of the term "grand coalition" with its rather narrow connotation, one could speak of universal participation, or as Ralf Dahrendorf does, of a "cartel of elites."[19] A grand coalition cabinet as in Austria represents the most comprehensive form of the cartel of elites, but one finds a variety of other devices in the other Western consociational democracies and, outside Western Europe, in the consociational politics of Lebanon, Uruguay (until early 1967), and Colombia. Even in Austria, not the cabinet itself but the small extra-constitutional "coalition committee," on which the top Socialist and Catholic leaders were equally represented, made the crucial decisions. In the Swiss system of government, which is a hybrid of the presidential and the parliamentary patterns, all four major parties are represented on the multi-member executive. In Uruguay's (now defunct) governmental system, fashioned after the Swiss model, there was *coparticipación* of the two parties on the executive.

In the Colombian and Lebanese presidential systems, such a sharing of the top executive post is not possible because the presidency is held by one person. The alternative solution provided by the Lebanese National Pact of 1943 is that the President of the Republic must be a Maronite and the President of the Council a Sunni, thus guaranteeing representation to the country's two major religious groups. In Colombia, the Liberal and Conservative parties agreed in 1958 to join in a consociational arrangement in order to deliver the country from its recurrent civil wars and dictatorships. The agreement stipulated that the presidency would be alternated for four-year terms between the two parties and that there would be equal representation (*paridad*) on all lower levels of government. In the Low Countries, the cabinets are usually broadly based coalitions, but not all major subcultures are permanently represented. The typical consociational devices in these democracies are the advisory councils and committees, which, in spite

[18] Lorwin, "Constitutionalism and Controlled Violence in the Modern State: The Case of Belgium" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, San Francisco, 1965), 4 (italics added). For a description of the establishment of consociational democracy in the Netherlands, see Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*, 103-12.

[19] Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (Garden City 1967), 276.

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of their very limited formal powers, often have decisive influence. These councils and committees may be permanent organs, such as the powerful Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands—a perfect example of a cartel of economic elites—or *ad hoc* bodies, such as the cartels of top party leaders that negotiated the "school pacts" in Holland in 1917 and in Belgium in 1958.

The desire to avoid political competition may be so strong that the cartel of elites may decide to extend the consociational principle to the electoral level in order to prevent the passions aroused by elections from upsetting the carefully constructed, and possibly fragile, system of cooperation. This may apply to a single election or to a number of successive elections. The *paridad* and *alternación* principles in Colombia entail a controlled democracy for a period of sixteen years, during which the efficacy of the right to vote is severely restricted. Another example is the Dutch parliamentary election of 1917, in which all of the parties agreed not to contest the seats held by incumbents in order to safeguard the passage of a set of crucial constitutional amendments; these amendments, negotiated by cartels of top party leaders, contained the terms of the settlement of the sensitive issues of universal suffrage and state aid to church schools. A parallel agreement on the suffrage was adopted in Belgium in 1919 without holding the constitutionally prescribed election at all.

Consociational democracy violates the principle of majority rule, but it does not deviate very much from normative democratic theory. Most democratic constitutions prescribe majority rule for the normal transaction of business when the stakes are not too high, but extraordinary majorities or several successive majorities for the most important decisions, such as changes in the constitution. In fragmented systems, many other decisions in addition to constituent ones are perceived as involving high stakes, and therefore require more than simple majority rule. Similarly, majority rule does not suffice in times of grave crisis in even the most homogeneous and consensual of democracies. Great Britain and Sweden, both highly homogeneous countries, resorted to grand coalition cabinets during the Second World War. Julius Nyerere draws the correct lesson from the experience of the Western democracies, in which, he observes, "it is an accepted practice in times of emergency for opposition parties to sink their differences and join together in forming a national government."[20] And just as the forma-

[20] Nyerere, "One-Party Rule," in Paul E. Sigmund, Jr., ed., *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations* (New York 1963), 199.

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tion of a national unity government is the appropriate response to an external emergency, so the formation of a grand coalition cabinet or an alternative form of elite cartel is the appropriate response to the internal crisis of fragmentation into hostile subcultures.

Furthermore, the concept of consociational democracy is also in agreement with the empirical "size principle," formulated by William H. Riker. This principle, based on game-theoretic assumptions, states: "In social situations similar to *n*-person, zero-sum games with side-payments [private agreements about the division of the payoff], participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger." The tendency will be toward a "minimum winning coalition," which in a democracy will be a coalition with bare majority support—but only under the conditions specified in the size principle. The most important condition is the zero-sum assumption: "only the direct conflicts among participants are included and common advantages are ignored."[21] Common advantages will be completely ignored only in two diametrically opposite kinds of situations: (1) when the participants in the "game" do not perceive any common advantages, and when, consequently, they are likely to engage in unlimited warfare; and (2) when they are in such firm agreement on their common advantages that they can take them for granted. In the latter case, politics literally becomes a game. In other words, the zero-sum condition and the size principle apply only to societies with completely homogeneous political cultures and to societies with completely fragmented cultures. To the extent that political cultures deviate from these two extreme conditions, pressures will exist to fashion coalitions and other forms of cooperation that are more inclusive than the bare "minimum winning coalition" and that may be all-inclusive grand coalitions.

Almond aptly uses the metaphor of the game in characterizing the Anglo-American systems: "Because the political culture tends to be homogeneous and pragmatic, [the political process] takes on some of the atmosphere of a game. A game is a good game when the outcome is in doubt and when the stakes are not too high. When the stakes are too high, the tone changes from excitement to anxiety."[22] Political contests in severely fragmented societies are indeed not likely to be "good games." But the anxieties and hostilities attending the political process may be countered by removing its competitive features as much

[21] William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven 1962), 29, 32-33.
[22] Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," 398-99.

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as possible. In consociational democracies, politics is treated not as a game but as a serious business.

Factors Conducive to Consociational Democracy

Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy. Efforts at consociationalism are not necessarily successful, of course: consociational designs failed in Cyprus and Nigeria, and Uruguay abandoned its Swiss-style consociational system. Successful consociational democracy requires: (1) That the elites have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures. (2) This requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures. (3) This in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability. (4) Finally, all of the above requirements are based on the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation. These four requirements are logically implied by the concept of consociational democracy as defined in this paper. Under what conditions are they likely to be fulfilled? An examination of the successful consociational democracies in the Low Countries, Switzerland, Austria, and Lebanon suggests a number of conditions favorable to the establishment and the persistence of this type of democracy. These have to do with inter-subcultural relations at the elite level, inter-subcultural relations at the mass level, and elite-mass relations within each of the subcultures.

Relations among the elites of the subcultures

It is easier to assess the probability of continued success of an already established consociational democracy than to predict the chance of success that a fragmented system would have if it were to attempt consociationalism. In an existing consociational democracy, an investigation of the institutional arrangements and the operational code of inter-elite accommodation can throw light on the question of how thorough a commitment to cooperation they represent and how effective they have been in solving the problems caused by fragmentation. *The length of time a consociational democracy has been in operation* is also a factor of importance. As inter-elite cooperation becomes habitual and does not represent a deliberate departure from competitive responses to political challenges, consociational norms become more

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firmly established. And, as Gerhard Lehmbruch states, these norms may become an important part of "the political socialization of elites and thus acquire a strong degree of persistence through time."[23]

There are three factors that appear to be strongly conducive to the establishment or maintenance of cooperation among elites in a fragmented system. The most striking of these is the existence of *external threats* to the country. In all of the consociational democracies, the cartel of elites was either initiated or greatly strengthened during periods of international crisis, especially the First and Second World Wars. During the First World War, the comprehensive settlement of the conflict among Holland's political subcultures firmly established the pattern of consociational democracy. "Unionism"—i.e., Catholic-Liberal grand coalitions—began during Belgium's struggle for independence in the early nineteenth century, but lapsed when the country appeared to be out of danger. As a result of the First World War, unionism was resumed and the Socialist leaders were soon admitted to the governing cartel. The Second World War marked the beginning of consociational democracy in Lebanon: the National Pact—the Islamo-Christian accord that provided the basis for consociational government for the country—was concluded in 1943. In Switzerland, consociational democracy developed more gradually, but reached its culmination with the admission of the Socialists to the grand coalition of the Federal Council, also in 1943. The Austrian grand coalition was formed soon after the Second World War, when the country was occupied by the allied forces. In all cases, the external threats impressed on the elites the need for internal unity and cooperation. External threats can also strengthen the ties among the subcultures at the mass level and the ties between leaders and followers within the subcultures.

A second factor favorable to consociational democracy, in the sense that it helps the elites to recognize the necessity of cooperation, is a *multiple balance of power among the subcultures* instead of either a dual balance of power or a clear hegemony by one subculture. When one group is in the majority, its leaders may attempt to dominate rather than cooperate with the rival minority. Similarly, in a society with two evenly matched subcultures, the leaders of both may hope to achieve their aims by domination rather than cooperation, if they ex-

[23] Lehmbruch, "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon" (paper presented at the Seventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Brussels, 1967), 6. See also Lehmbruch, *Proporzdemokratie: Politisches System und politische Kultur in der Schweiz und in Österreich* (Tübingen 1967).

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pect to win a majority at the polls. Robert Dahl argues that for this reason it is doubtful that the consociational arrangement in Colombia will last, because "the temptation to shift from coalition to competition is bound to be very great."[24] When political parties in a fragmented society are the organized manifestations of political subcultures, a multiparty system is more conducive to consociational democracy and therefore to stability than a two-party system. This proposition is at odds with the generally high esteem accorded to two-party systems. In an already homogeneous system, two-party systems may be more effective, but a moderate multiparty system, in which no party is close to a majority, appears preferable in a consociational democracy. The Netherlands, Switzerland, and Lebanon have the advantage that their subcultures are all minority groups. In the Austrian two-party system, consociational politics did work, but with considerable strain. Lehmbruch states: "Austrian political parties are strongly integrated social communities . . . and the bipolar structure of the coalition reinforced their antagonisms."[25] The internal balance of power in Belgium has complicated the country's consociational politics in two ways. The Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal subcultures are minorities, but the Catholics are close to majority status. The Catholic party actually won a legislative majority in 1950, and attempted to settle the sensitive royal question by majority rule. This led to a short civil war, followed by a return to consociational government. Moreover, the Belgian situation is complicated as a result of the linguistic cleavage, which cuts across the three spiritual families. The linguistic balance of power is a dual balance in which the Walloons fear the numerical majority of the Flemings, while the Flemings resent the economic and social superiority of the Walloons.

Consociational democracy presupposes not only a willingness on the part of elites to cooperate but also a capability to solve the political problems of their countries. Fragmented societies have a tendency to immobilism, which consociational politics is designed to avoid. Nevertheless, decision-making that entails accommodation among all subcultures is a difficult process, and consociational democracies are always threatened by a degree of immobilism. Consequently, a third favorable factor to inter-elite cooperation is a *relatively low total load on the decision-making apparatus*. The stability of Lebanon is partly due to its productive economy and the social equilibrium it has maintained so

[24] Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven 1966), 337.
[25] Lehmbruch, 8.

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far, but it may not be able to continue its successful consociational politics when the burdens on the system increase. Michael C. Hudson argues that the Lebanese political system is "attuned to incessant adjustment among primordial groups rather than policy planning and execution." As a result, its "apparent stability . . . is deceptively precarious: social mobilization appears to be overloading the circuits of the Lebanese political system."[26] In general, the size factor is important in this respect: the political burdens that large states have to shoulder tend to be disproportionately heavier than those of small countries. Ernest S. Griffith argues that "democracy is more likely to survive, other things being equal, in small states. Such states are more manageable. . . ."[27] In particular, small states are more likely to escape the onerous burdens entailed by an active foreign policy. Lehmbruch states that the Swiss, Austrian, and Lebanese cases "show that the preservation of the inner equilibrium presupposes a reduction of external demands to the political system." And he even goes so far as to conclude that the type of politics found in these three countries "seems to work in small states only."[28]

INTER-SUBCULTURAL RELATIONS AT THE MASS LEVEL

The political cultures of the countries belonging to Almond's Continental European type and to the consociational type are all fragmented, but the consociational countries have even clearer boundaries among their subcultures. Such *distinct lines of cleavage* appear to be conducive to consociational democracy and political stability. The explanation is that subcultures with widely divergent outlooks and interests may coexist without necessarily being in conflict; conflict arises only when they are in contact with each other. As Quincy Wright states: "Ideologies accepted by different groups within a society may be inconsistent without creating tension; but if . . . the groups with inconsistent ideologies are in close contact . . . the tension will be great."[29] David Easton also endorses the thesis that good social fences may make good political neighbors, when he suggests a kind of voluntary *apartheid* policy as the best solution for a divided society: "Greater success

[26] Hudson, "A Case of Political Underdevelopment," *Journal of Politics*, XXIX (November 1967), 836.
[27] Griffith, "Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, L (March 1956), 102.
[28] Lehmbruch, 9.
[29] Wright, "The Nature of Conflict," *Western Political Quarterly*, IV (June 1951), 196.

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may be attained through steps that conduce to the development of a deeper sense of mutual awareness and responsiveness among *encapsulated cultural units*." This is "the major hope of avoiding stress."[30] And Sidney Verba follows the same line of reasoning when he argues that political and economic modernization in Africa is bringing "differing subcultures into contact with each other and *hence* into conflict."[31]

This argument appears to be a direct refutation of the overlapping-memberships proposition, but by adding two amendments to this proposition the discrepancy can be resolved. In the first place, the basic explanatory element in the concept of consociational democracy is that political elites may take joint actions to counter the effects of cultural fragmentation. This means that the overlapping-memberships propositions may become a self-denying hypothesis under certain conditions. Secondly, the view that any severe discontinuity in overlapping patterns of membership and allegiance is a danger to political stability needs to be restated in more refined form. A distinction has to be made between essentially homogeneous political cultures, where increased contacts are likely to lead to an increase in mutual understanding and further homogenization, and essentially heterogeneous cultures, where close contacts are likely to lead to strain and hostility. This is the distinction that Walker Connor makes when he argues that "increased contacts help to dissolve regional cultural distinctions within a state such as the United States. Yet, if one is dealing not with minor variations of the same culture, but with two quite distinct and self-differentiating cultures, are not increased contacts between the two apt to increase antagonisms?"[32] This proposition can be refined further by stating both the degree of homogeneity and the extent of mutual contacts in terms of continua rather than dichotomies. In order to safeguard political stability, the volume and intensity of contacts must not exceed the commensurate degree of homogeneity. Karl W. Deutsch states that stability depends on a "balance between transaction and integration" because "the number of opportunities for possible violent conflict will increase with the volume and range of mutual transactions."[33] Hence, it may be desirable to keep transactions among antagonistic subcultures

[30] Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York 1965), 250-51 (italics added). See also G. H. Scholten, "Het vergelijken van federaties met behulp van systeem-analyse," *Acta Politica*, II (1966-67), 51-68.

[31] Verba, "Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research," *World Politics*, XX (October 1967), 126 (italics added).

[32] Connor, "Self-Determination: The New Phase," *World Politics*, XX (October 1967), 49-50.

[33] Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level* (Garden City 1954), 39.

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in a divided society—or, similarly, among different nationalities in a multinational state—to a minimum.

ELITE-MASS RELATIONS WITHIN THE SUBCULTURES

Distinct lines of cleavage among the subcultures are also conducive to consociational democracy because they are likely to be concomitant with a high degree of *internal political cohesion of the subcultures*. This is vital to the success of consociational democracy. The elites have to cooperate and compromise with each other without losing the allegiance and support of their own rank and file. When the subcultures are cohesive political blocs, such support is more likely to be forthcoming. As Hans Daalder states, what is important is not only "the extent to which party leaders are more tolerant than their followers" but also the extent to which they "are yet able to carry them along."[34]

A second way in which distinct cleavages have a favorable effect on elite-mass relations in a consociational democracy is that they make it more likely that the parties and interest groups will be the organized representatives of the political subcultures. If this is the case, the political parties may not be the best aggregators, but there is at least an *adequate articulation of the interests of the subcultures*. Aggregation of the clearly articulated interests can then be performed by the cartel of elites. In Belgium, the three principal parties represent the Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal spiritual families, but the linguistic cleavage does not coincide with the cleavages dividing the spiritual families, and all three parties have both Flemings and Walloons among their followers. Lorwin describes the situation as follows: "The sentimental and practical interests of the two linguistic communities are not effectively organized, and the geographical regions have no administrative or formal political existence. There are no recognized representatives qualified to formulate demands, to negotiate, and to fulfill commitments."[35] The religious and class issues have been effectively articulated by the political parties and have by and large been resolved, but the linguistic issue has not been clearly articulated and remains intractable. In Switzerland, the parties also represent the religious-ideological groups rather than the linguistic communities, but much of the country's decentralized political life takes place at the cantonal level, and most of the cantons are linguistically homogeneous.

A final factor which favors consociational democracy is *widespread*

[34] Daalder, 69.

[35] Lorwin, "Belgium: Religion, Class, and Language in National Politics," in Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, 174.

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approval of the principle of government by elite cartel. This is a very obvious factor, but it is of considerable importance and deserves to be mentioned briefly. For example, Switzerland has a long and strong tradition of grand coalition executives, and this has immeasurably strengthened Swiss consociational democracy. On the other hand, the grand coalition in Austria was under constant attack by critics who alleged that the absence of a British-style opposition made Austrian politics "undemocratic." This attests to the strength of the British system as a normative model even in fragmented political systems, where the model is inappropriate and undermines the attempt to achieve political stability by consociational means.

Centripetal and Centrifugal Democracies

An examination of the other two types of the threefold typology of democracies in the light of the distinguishing characteristics of consociational democracy can contribute to the clarification and refinement of all three types and their prerequisites. In order to avoid any unintended geographical connotation, we shall refer to the homogeneous and stable democracies as the *centripetal* (instead of the Anglo-American) democracies, and to the fragmented and unstable ones as the *centrifugal* (instead of the Continental European) democracies. The centrifugal democracies include the French Third and Fourth Republics, Italy, Weimar Germany, the Austrian First Republic, and the short-lived Spanish Republic of the early 1930's. The major examples of centripetal democracy are Great Britain, the Old Commonwealth countries, the United States, Ireland, the Scandinavian states, and the postwar Bonn Republic in Germany.

The French Fourth Republic is often regarded as the outstanding example of unstable, ineffective, and immobilist democracy, but the explanation of its political instability in terms of cultural fragmentation has been criticized on two grounds. In the first place, Eric A. Nordlinger rejects the argument that the "ideological inundation of French politics" and its "fragmented party system" were responsible for its chronic instability; he states that this explanation conveniently overlooks "the way in which the game of politics is actually played in France. Although ideologism pervades the parties' electoral and propaganda efforts, this public ideological posturing of French politicians does not prevent them from playing out their game of compromise in the Assembly and its *couloirs*. In fact, the political class thinks of compromise as a positive principle of action, with parliamentary activity

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largely revolving around nonideological squabbles. . . ."[36] The elites of the center parties that supported the Republic fulfilled to some extent all of the logical prerequisites for consociational democracy except the most important one: they lacked the ability to forge effective and lasting solutions to pressing political problems. They indeed played a nonideological game, but, as Nathan Leites observes, with a "well-developed capacity for avoiding their responsibility."[37] In other words, they were nonideological, but not constructively pragmatic. To turn a centrifugal into a consociational democracy, true statesmanship is required. Moreover, it is incorrect to assume that, because the elites were not divided by irreconcilable ideological differences, mass politics was not ideologically fragmented either.[38]

The second criticism of the cultural fragmentation thesis alleges, on the basis of independent evidence, that not only at the elite level but also at the mass level, ideology played a negligible role in France. Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux demonstrate that the French electorate was not highly politicized and felt little allegiance to the political parties.[39] But the lack of stable partisan attachments does not necessarily indicate that the political culture was not fragmented. Duncan MacRae argues persuasively that political divisions did extend to the electorate as a whole in spite of the apparent "lack of involvement of the average voter." Even though political allegiances were diffuse, there were "relatively fixed and non-overlapping *social* groupings" to which "separate leaders and separate media of communication had access."[40] The combination of fragmentation into subcultures and low politicization can in turn be explained by the negative French attitude toward authority. Stanley Hoffmann speaks of "potential insurrection against authority," and Michel Crozier observes that this attitude makes it "impossible for an individual of the group to become its leader."[41]

[36] Nordlinger, "Democratic Stability and Instability: The French Case," *World Politics*, XVIII (October 1965), 143.

[37] Leites, *On the Game of Politics in France* (Stanford 1959), 2.

[38] Nor does the reverse assumption hold true. Giovanni Sartori relates the instability of Italian democracy to "poor leadership, both in the sense that the political elites lack the ability for problem-solving and that they do not provide a generalized leadership." This weakness of leadership, he continues, "is easily explained by the fragmentation of the party system and its ideological rigidity." ("European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in LaPalombara and Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development*, 163.) The example of the consociational democracies shows that this is not a sufficient explanation.

[39] Converse and Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVI (Spring 1962), 1-23.

[40] MacRae, *Parliament, Parties, and Society in France: 1946-1958* (New York 1967), 333.

[41] Hoffmann and others, *In Search of France* (Cambridge 1963), 8 (italics omitted); Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago 1964), 220.

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Strong cohesion within the subcultures was mentioned earlier as a factor conducive to consociational democracy; the lack of it in France can explain both that the French people were fragmented but at the same time not politically involved, and that the political elites did not have the advantage of strong support from the rank and file for constructive cooperation.

On the other hand, the example of France also serves to make clear that the lack of problem-solving ability as a cause of political instability must not be overstated. After all, as Maurice Duverger points out, in spite of all of the Fourth Republic's flaws and weaknesses, it "would have continued to exist if it had not been for the Algerian war."[42] The critical factor was the too-heavy burden of an essentially external problem on the political system. Similarly, the fragmented Weimar Republic might have survived, too, if it had not been for the unusually difficult problems it was faced with.

Germany's experience with democracy also appears to throw some doubt on our threefold typology and the theory on which it is based. Weimar Germany was a centrifugal democracy but the Bonn Republic can be grouped with the centripetal democracies. In explaining this extraordinary shift, we have to keep in mind that cultural fragmentation must be measured on a continuum rather than as a dichotomy, as we have done so far. The degree of homogeneity of a political culture can change, although great changes at a rapid pace can normally not be expected. Three reasons can plausibly account for the change from the fragmented political culture of the unstable Weimar Republic to the much more homogeneous culture of the Bonn Republic: (1) the traumatic experiences of totalitarianism, war, defeat, and occupation; (2) "conscious manipulative change of fundamental political attitudes," which, as Verba states, added up to a "remaking of political culture";[43] (3) the loss of the eastern territories, which meant that, as Lipset argues, "the greater homogeneity of western Germany now became a national homogeneity."[44]

The degree of competitive or cooperative behavior by elites must also be seen as a continuum. Among the consociational democracies, some are more consociational than others; and many centripetal democracies have some consociational features. The phenomenon of war-

[42] Duverger, "The Development of Democracy in France," in Henry W. Ehrmann, ed., *Democracy in a Changing Society* (New York 1964), 77.

[43] Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton 1965), 133.

[44] Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York 1963), 292.

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time grand coalition cabinets has already been mentioned. The temporary Christian Democratic-Socialist grand coalition under Chancellor Kiesinger falls in the same category. In fact, the stability of the centripetal democracies depends not only on their essentially homogeneous political cultures but also on consociational devices, to the extent that a certain degree of heterogeneity exists. The alternation of English-speaking and French-speaking leaders of the Liberal party in Canada may be compared with the Colombian device of *alternación*. In the United States, where, as Dahl states, "the South has for nearly two centuries formed a distinctive regional subculture,"[45] cultural fragmentation led to secession and civil war. After the Civil War, a consociational arrangement developed that gave to the South a high degree of autonomy and to the Southern leaders—by such means as chairmanships of key Congressional committees and the filibuster—a crucial position in federal decision-making. This example also shows that, while consociational solutions may increase political cohesion, they also have a definite tendency to lead to a certain degree of immobilism.

Even in Denmark, which is among the most homogeneous of the centripetal democracies, one finds considerable consociationalism. This does not appear in grand coalition cabinets—in fact, Denmark is known for its long periods of government by minority cabinets—but in the far-reaching search for compromise in the legislature. The rule of the game prescribes that the top leaders of all four major parties do their utmost to reach a consensus. This is *glidningspolitik*, which Gerald R. McDaniel translates as the "politics of smoothness"[46]—an apt characterization of consociational politics.

[45] Dahl, 358.

[46] McDaniel, *The Danish Unicameral Parliament* (unpubl. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley 1963), iv.

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Research Notes

SOME EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON NATIONS AND THEIR BEHAVIOR*

By R. J. RUMMEL

WITH THE growing academic and governmental interest in quantitative research on nations, it is becoming increasingly important to separate substantive findings from the technical arcana in which they are embedded. In recognition of this need, this report extracts and consolidates the major results of the Dimensionality of Nations (DON) project.[1]

The DON project (6)[2] has been in existence since 1962 and is now in its second phase. Phase I of DON defined the major dimensions of variation among all nations for the mid-1950's and the grouping of nations on these dimensions. During this phase much of the methodological underbrush surrounding the use on cross-national data of its major mathematical model—factor analysis—was cleared away, and some measure of control was developed over problems of error and noncomparability in the data.

The second phase has been concerned with defining the dimensions of interaction *between* nations for separate periods of time. A theoretical structure—a social field theory (3, 4)—has been developed to couple the cross-national findings of Phase I of DON with the interaction analyses of Phase II. The essential idea of this theory is that the differences of nations in their attributes are related to their behavior towards each other. Nation differences are conceived of as social dis-

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[1] Since the purpose of this report is to consolidate the major findings of DON that are now scattered through more than three dozen publications, reports, and intra-project papers, no citations or references to the relevant work of others will generally be made. In the various DON reports and publications from which these findings are extracted, however, an effort has been made to embed the results in the relevant theoretical and empirical work of such scientists as Hayward Alker, Karl Deutsch, Johan Galtung, Harold Guetzkow, Robert North, Lewis F. Richardson, Bruce Russett, Raymond Tanter, Quincy Wright, J. David Singer, and Dina Zinnes.

[2] Numbers in parentheses refer to the numbered bibliography at the end of the report. These numbers will be used to reference the findings to be presented.

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tances that act like physical forces on behavior, affecting its nature and magnitude.

Under Phase II of the project, a complete set of analyses has been finished for the mid-1950's; a second set of analyses for 1963 is in the data-collection stage.

The major substantive findings from these analyses are organized into the first two sections: *national characteristics* and *dyadic international behavior*.[3] The first section is from Phase I of the project and is divided into *dimensions of national characteristics, dimensions in the foreign behavior of nations*,[4] and *correlations between national characteristics and foreign behavior*. Phase II results are given in the second section and are classified into *dimensions of dyadic international behavior* and *correlations* between *socioeconomic, political, and geographic distances and dyadic international behavior*.

Following the sections listing substantive findings is a section on theory. The theoretical results are organized into findings on *structuring the international system* and *linking international behavior and national characteristics*. The final section of this report is on *methodological results*, which are divided into those on *error in cross-national data* and on *a quantitative international relations*.

Not all findings from the DON project can be presented here. Considering that about a half million correlations, more than two hundred factor-analysis tables, and several dozen multiple regression equations have been generated by DON, only the most prominent or interesting results can be described. However, what is prominent or interesting will vary with theoretical concern or policy interest, of course. Therefore, anyone who wishes to see if additional results have been found that are relevant to his specific questions is encouraged to consult any of the publications or documents listed in the bibliography. Those not published are available on request from the DON project.

[3] "Dyadic international behavior" refers to the behavior of one nation toward another nation. Thus, the behavior of the United States toward China, Bulgaria toward Greece, or Cuba toward Mexico is dyadic.

[4] As distinguished from "dyadic international behavior" as defined in n. 3, the "foreign behavior of nations" refers to the total behavior of a nation toward *all* nations. Thus, for example, the concern is with the total exports or total number of threats of Canada, rather than its exports or threats just to Cuba. The difference between "dyadic international behavior" and "foreign behavior of nations" perhaps can be seen best in terms of two data matrices. The findings on dyadic international behavior result from an analysis of a dyad (e.g., U.S. → Chile) by behavior (e.g., exports) matrix. For the foreign behavior of nations, however, the findings are from a nation (e.g., Canada) by behavior (e.g., total exports) matrix.

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ORGANIZATION OF DON FINDINGS

A. NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

1. Dimensions of National Characteristics
   - 1.1 Major dimensions
   - 1.2 Measures of the major dimensions
   - 1.3 Grouping of nations on their profiles
   - 1.4 Dimensions of political systems
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2. Dimensions in the Foreign Behavior of Nations
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A. NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS[5]

1. Dimensions[6] of National Characteristics

1.1 *Major dimensions*

1.1.1 Nations vary in their national characteristics along seven major dimensions:[7] (9, 13, 15, 28, 29)

economic development—undeveloped to highly developed,
size—small to large,
political orientation—non-totalitarian to totalitarian,
density—sparsely populated to densely populated,
Catholic culture—negligible to high proportion of Catholic population,
foreign conflict behavior—none to much,
domestic conflict behavior—none to much.

1.1.2 These seven major dimensions have little correlation with each other (29), so that a nation's value on one dimension is largely unrelated to its values on the other dimensions (e.g., the economic development of a nation is largely unrelated to its size and political system; the domestic conflict behavior of a nation is largely unrelated to its economic development or political orientation).

1.1.3 Over half of the variation of nations on their diverse characteristics can be described by these seven major dimensions (27).

[5] The findings to be presented in this section were determined by various factor analyses of 236 characteristics for 82 nations on 1955 data. The reliability of the results has been measured by comparison with several similar studies done by others, by replications for different years for subsets of characteristics, and by including in the analyses measures of data error. See, for example, (15).

[6] A "dimension" as used here is a cluster of highly intercorrelated characteristics (or behavior, as in the next section). Nations having high magnitudes on one characteristic in the cluster have high magnitudes on the others. A dimension can be labeled in terms of the nature of all the characteristics involved in the cluster. For example, a dimension involving such intercorrelated characteristics as GNP per capita, telephones per capita, vehicles per capita, percentage population urban, and literacy might be called "economic development," since this seems to be the common element linking these characteristics. The primary technique employed in generating these dimensions was principal axes factor analysis applied to a product moment correlation matrix with unities in the diagonal. All principal axes with eigenvalues equal to or greater than unity were usually extracted and rotated to both orthogonal varimax and oblique biquartimin solutions. Thus, the dimensions reported here are the oblique or orthogonal simple structure factors. For a conceptual discussion of the method employed here, see (12).

[7] Fifteen dimensions have been delineated, but the seven reported here account for more variance than the other dimensions and have also been reported by others working on nations with different sets of data.

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1.1.4 Economic development and size account for about a third of the variation of nations on their diverse characteristics (16, 27).

1.2 *Indicators of the major dimensions*

1.2.1 Indicators (or measures) of a nation's position on the seven dimensions of variation are:[8] (15)

energy consumption per capita—economic development,
population—size,
bloc membership[9]—political orientation,
number killed in foreign violence—foreign conflict behavior,
number killed in domestic violence—domestic conflict behavior,
proportion of Roman Catholics in the population—Catholic culture,
ratio of population to area (density).

1.3 *Grouping of nations on their profiles*

1.3.1 Nations cluster into seven distinct groups in terms of the similarity of their profiles across their dimensions of variation.[10] (9, 13). These groups are (the most representative nation for each group is given in parentheses):

peaceful, undeveloped Catholic nations (Mexico),
undeveloped, small totalitarian nations (Ethiopia),
seaport-independent, linguistically and ethnically diverse nations (India),
densely populated, internally peaceful, homogeneous nations (Netherlands),
small, internally peaceful, non-Catholic, nontotalitarian nations (Sweden),
small, peaceful nontotalitarian nations with high foreign student ratio (Switzerland),

[8] An indicator of a dimension is the characteristic (or behavior, as in the next section) that is central to the cluster of attributes defined by a dimension. In factor analysis terms, the measure would be among those characteristics correlating most highly with the factor-dimension.

[9] An alternative measure is freedom of political opposition, ranging from no freedom to form political groups and oppose the government's policies to freedom to form political groups and contest the party in power for the authority to govern.

[10] The finding of *seven* groups here and *seven* major dimensions in 1.1.1 are unrelated. These groups were defined by standardizing the data for each indicator of the fifteen dimensions (see n. 7) found, determining the profile of each nation across these indicators, calculating the Euclidean distance between nations on their profiles, and then directly factor analyzing the distances between all nations to determine the clusters of nations that have similar profiles.

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small, undeveloped, peaceful, nontotalitarian Catholic nations (Costa Rica),
small, sparsely populated, seaport and trade dependent nations (Syria),
large, externally conflictful, economically developed nations (U.S.A.).

1.4 *Dimensions of political systems*

1.4.1 The characteristics of national political systems vary along three statistically independent dimensions:[11] (4)
polyarchic—constitutionalism, representativeness, little military participation, and diffuse power structure,
Communist—non-Communist to Communist system,
monarchic—non-monarchical to monarchical system.

1.4.2 Nations are distributed into four distinct groups in terms of their profile similarity across the three political system dimensions.[12] These groups are:[13]
Communist nations,
Western polyarchies,
monarchies—e.g., Saudi Arabia, Nepal, Jordan,
dictatorships—e.g., Pakistan, Taiwan, Paraguay, Haiti.

1.4.3 The more economically developed a nation, the more likely it is to have polyarchical political characteristics (4).

1.5 *Dimensions of domestic (internal) conflict behavior*

1.5.1 The domestic conflict behavior of nations (e.g., riots, demonstrations, purges, assassinations, revolts) vary along three dimensions:[14] (1, 3, 7, 8, 14)
turmoil—no turmoil to much turmoil involving many riots and demonstrations,

[11] These dimensions result from a factor analysis through oblique rotation of ten political system characteristics for 82 nations on 1955 data.

[12] Groups were determined using the same technique as for 1.3.1, except that here profiles were based on factor scores. This technique was involved in the delineation of all subsequent nation groupings to be presented in this report.

[13] Finding four groups of nations with similar profiles across the three dimensions is not contradictory. This means that in the three-dimensional space defined by polyarchic, Communist, and monarchic dimensions, there are four distinct clusters of nations. There can be any number of clusters, even on one dimension. On a size dimension, for example, there could be a cluster of small nations, a cluster of middle-sized nations, and a cluster of very large nations. These groups would be clusters because nations would "bunch up" at these magnitudes, with few nations in between.

[14] These dimensions were determined through several factor analyses of 1946-1963 domestic conflict data for all nations. There is some question whether the revolution and subversion dimensions are distinct or comprise an *internal war* dimension. See (17) and (18).

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revolution—no revolutionary activity to many revolutions,[15]
subversion—no subversion to major attempts at subversion.[16]

1.5.2 A nation's magnitudes along the three domestic conflict dimensions are not highly related to its scores on the economic development, size, political orientation, density, Catholic culture, or foreign conflict dimensions. (1, 2, 7, 8, 11, 14)

2. Dimensions in the Foreign Behavior of Nations

2.1 *Major foreign dimensions*[17]

2.1.1 Nations vary in their public and private foreign behavior along seven major dimensions (8):
participation in the international system—low to high participation,
foreign conflict—none to high,
foreign aid—none to much received,
ideology—low to high agreement with United States UN voting,
popularity—few to many foreign visitors and students,
South American[18]—far from to close to the United States,
migration—low to high migration.

2.1.2 The largest amount of variation among nations in their public and private foreign behavior can be accounted for by the *participation* dimension (8). This dimension involves such activities as a nation's total trade, number of embassies and legations, treaties, foreign mail, UN representatives, and international organization memberships.

2.2 *Indicators of the major foreign dimensions*

2.2.1 Indicators (or measures) of a nation's behavior along the seven dimensions of variation are:[19] (8)
total trade—participation,
total threats—foreign conflict,

[15] "Revolutions" comprise social or palace revolutions.

[16] "Subversion" comprises small or large scale terrorism or guerrilla warfare.

[17] The findings of this and the following subsections are from a factor analysis of 82 nations on 94 international relations characteristics on 1955 data.

[18] Since publication of the study (8) reporting these dimensions, I have begun to doubt whether "South American" is an adequate label for this dimension. Air distance from the U.S. is involved, to be sure, but so are expelling or recalling ambassadors and a proportionately high membership in medical non-intergovernmental organizations. These characteristics may not uniquely define South American behavior. Therefore, this dimension might better be considered unnamed until its general nature can be determined.

[19] See n. 8.

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technical assistance and relief fellowships received—foreign aid,
net percent UN votes in agreement with the U.S.A.—ideology,
ratio of visitors to population—popularity,
air distance from the U.S.A.—South American,
ratio of immigrants to population—immigration.

2.3 *Dimensions of UN voting*

2.3.1 Roll-call voting in the 1955 UN General Assembly (Xth Session) varies along four major dimensions[20] (4):
Cold War[21]—for versus against the U.S. position in opposition to the U.S.S.R.,
admission of new states—against versus for,
self-determination—against versus for,
colonialism—against versus for.

2.3.2 Nations divide into four distinct voting groups (for the 1955 Xth Session)
Western economically developed democracies
Communist nations in addition to India, Yemen, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia
a South American group, including Nicaragua, Paraguay, Panama, Dominican Republic, and Honduras
an economically underdeveloped group, including such nations as Liberia, Costa Rica, Philippines, Haiti, Pakistan, and Taiwan.

2.4 *Dimensions of foreign conflict behavior*

2.4.1 Nations vary in their foreign conflict behavior—e.g., threats, accusations, antiforeign demonstrations, mobilizations, alerts, clashes—along five major dimensions[22] (1, 7, 8, 9, 13):

[20] The method by which these dimensions are delineated involved (1) factor analyzing all votes (without estimating missing votes—a missing-data correlation program was employed) separately for the seven main committees of the General Assembly and for the Plenary Session. The roll-calls highly correlated with each of the dimensions for each of the eight analyses were then amalgamated into a common matrix and factor analyzed. The five dimensions presented here are from this amalgamated analysis. Some of these dimensions appear to differ significantly from those found by Hayward Alker and Bruce Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven, 1965). No conclusion should be drawn from this difference, however, since their research design for analyzing UN roll-call votes was quite different from that of DON.

[21] Elsewhere I have named this an "internationalism" dimension (4). Reconsideration of the roll-calls involved, however, implies that they are Cold War, rather than supranational or internationalist, in orientation.

[22] The following five dimensions are a revision of the *war*, *belligerency*, and *diplomatic* foreign conflict dimensions found in (1), (17), and (18). The revision is based on a subsequent analysis (9) of twice as many—26—variables.

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warning and defensive acts—none to many alerts, military movements, mobilizations, etc.,
military violence—none to many discrete military acts, clashes, etc.,
negative communications—none to many threats, warnings, accusations, etc.
negative sanctions—none to many severances of diplomatic relations, boycotts, expulsions of diplomatic officials, etc.,
antiforeign acts—none to many antiforeign demonstrations, attacks on embassies, etc.

2.4.2 Nations distribute themselves into six distinct groups in terms of the similarity of their profiles across the dimensions of foreign conflict (9, 13). Three of these groups for 1955 are:
U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and U.K.,
Israel, Egypt, Taiwan, and China,
S. Korea, U.S.A.,[23] Pakistan, and China.

3. Correlations Between National Characteristics and Foreign Behavior

3.1 *Major correlations*

3.1.1 The *participation* of nations in the international system (see finding 2.1.2) can be accounted for jointly by their economic development and size (8, 29). The more economically developed and larger a nation is, the more it will be active in the international system.

3.1.2 The international politics of a nation as represented by bloc allegiance, bloc trade, U.S. and U.S.S.R. aid, and UN votes in agreement with the U.S. and U.S.S.R., are closely related to its political orientation (29).

3.2 *U.N. Voting* (1955 Xth Session)[24]

3.2.1 Most of the voting of a nation in the UN can be accounted for by its economic development, size, political system, density, and Catholic culture.

3.2.2 Economic development is the single most important determinant of UN voting behavior.

3.3 *Foreign conflict*[25]

[23] The U.S.A. is peripheral to this and to the first group.

[24] These findings are derived from a number of previously unreported multiple regression analyses. Profiles for all 1955 UN members on the dimensions of UN voting (see 2.3.1) were regressed on indicators (see 1.2.1) of the cross-national dimensions of nations (see 1.1.1).

[25] There are only negative findings to report on the correlations between national characteristics and foreign conflict. This in itself is a finding, of course, the implications of which are explored in (11).

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3.3.1 The foreign conflict behavior of a nation is statistically independent of its economic development, size, political system, density, or Catholic culture (9, 13, 29).

3.3.2 There is *little* correlation[26] between the foreign conflict of a nation and its (11, 31)

level of economic or technological development,
level of international communications or transactions,
amount of cooperation with other nations,
totalitarianism,
power capability,
military capabilities,
modal psychological motivations,
values,
number of borders with different nations.

3.3.3 In general, internal instability and conflict within nations have little correlation with their foreign conflict behavior[27] (1, 2, 7, 8, 11, 29).

B. DYADIC BEHAVIOR

4. Dimensions of Dyadic Behavior[28]

4.1 *Major dyadic dimensions*

4.1.1 The behavior of a nation towards another varies along eight major dimensions[29] (15, 35):

salience—low to high salience involving treaties, translations of its literature, tourists, non-intergovernmental international organizations, etc.,
emigration and communication—low to high,
UN voting—none to high similarity in UN voting,
exports—none to relatively many,
foreign students—none to relatively many,
international organizations—few to many co-memberships,
official conflict behavior—none to much,
diplomatic representation—none to relatively high representation.

[26] A "little correlation" is defined here as less than 10 percent of the variance.

[27] This is true even when the correlation assessed for domestic conflict lagged in occurrence behind foreign conflict behavior. See (18).

[28] See n. 4.

[29] These dimensions result from factor analyses of four samples: a raw-data, random sample of 164 dyads; transformed data on the previous sample; a raw-data, selected sample of 182 dyads; transformed data on the previous sample. The selected sample consisted of all possible dyads among fourteen nations selected to reflect the major attribute, and regional groupings of nations.

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4.1.2 The behaviors of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. towards other nations (along these eight dimensions) are not distinctly different from the behavior of other nations toward each other.[30]

4.2 *Indicators of the major dyadic dimensions*

4.2.1 Indicators (or measures) of a dyad's (A → B) position on the eight dyadic dimensions of international behavior are:[31] (15)

tourists A → B—salience,
emigrants A → B / A's population—emigration and communications,
UN voting agreement—UN voting,
students A → B / A's total students to all nations—foreign students,
exports A → B / A's GNP—exports,
intergovernmental organization co-memberships / A's total memberships—international organizations,
military violence—official conflict behavior,
embassy or legation A → B / A's total embassies or legations—diplomatic representation.

4.3 *Diplomatic representation patterns*[32]

4.3.1 The patterns of diplomatic representation of nations (existence of embassies and legations) roughly follow regional lines, with Latin American, Communist, North European, Southeast Asian (including New Zealand and Australia), and Middle Eastern clusters. The U.S.A. has a distinctly different pattern of representation from those of other nations while Japan, Egypt, and India are similar in their patterns.

4.4 *Dyadic conflict behavior*

4.4.1 The dyadic conflict behavior of nations (9, 13) varies along five major dimensions:[33]

[30] It should be theoretically fruitful to determine why the behavior of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. should not differ from that of other nations in spite of their being the most powerful nations within the international system and the leaders (for 1955) of antagonistic blocs.

[31] See n. 8.

[32] These patterns were defined by a direct factor analysis of a diplomatic representation matrix. Each cell of the matrix had a one or zero depending on whether the nation defined by a row had an embassy or legation in the nation defined by the intersecting column. All factors with eigenvalues greater than unity were extracted and rotated to an orthogonal (varimax) solution.

[33] These results are for 340 dyads having conflict on 16 variables for 1955 data (2,139 conflict acts). Another analysis just completed on 1963 data has delineated similar dimensions.

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warning and defensive acts—none to many,
military violence—none to much,
negative communication—none to much,
negative sanctions—none to many,
antiforeign acts—none to many.

4.4.2 The dimensions of conflict behavior of *a nation towards all other nations* and the dimensions of *dyadic conflict behavior* are identical (Compare 4.4.1 and 2.4.1).

4.4.3 Five groups of dyads can be distinguished in terms of the similarity of their conflict behavior (9, 13). Two of these groups in 1955 are:

Egypt → Israel,
Israel → Egypt,
Taiwan → China,
China → Taiwan,

And

U.S.S.R. → U.S.A.,
U.S.A. → U.S.S.R.,
China → U.S.A.,
U.S.A. → China.

Dyads unique[34] in their conflict behavior for 1955 are:

East Germany → West Germany,
Jordan → Turkey,
Jordan → U.S.A.,
U.S.A. → Poland.

4.4.4 Dyadic conflict is nearly symmetrical. That is, the conflict behavior A → B is usually reciprocated B → A. The dyads A → B and B → A are similarly located along the conflict dimensions.

5. Correlations Between Socioeconomic, Political, and Geographic Distances and Dyadic International Behavior.

5.1 *Major correlations*[35]

5.1.1 The more similar the profiles of two nations are on the major attribute dimensions (1.1.1) and the closer they are geographically, the more transactions they have with each other (35).

[34] Each of the following dyads is unique in having a profile of conflict behavior completely dissimilar from that of other dyads across the five dyadic conflict dimensions (4.4.1).

[35] These correlations were determined by factor analyzing a matrix including measures of dyadic *distances* on attribute dimensions (1.1.1.); geographic distances; dyadic distances in race, language, and religion; and dyadic behavioral data.

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5.1.2 The farther apart two nations are in their economic development and size, the more *salient* each is to the other (e.g., the more treaties, translations, tourists, etc.) (35).

5.1.3 The more similar two nations are in economic development, political orientation, Catholic culture, and density, the more aligned their voting in the UN and the less conflictful their interaction will be (35).

5.1.4 Dissimilarities in size and economic development are the most important determinants of the variation in behavior of nations toward each other, explaining about 85 percent of the variance.

5.2 *Dyadic conflict behavior*

5.2.1. The magnitude of conflict behavior of one nation toward another is statistically independent of its emigration and communications to that nation or co-memberships in international organizations (35).

5.2.2 The magnitude of conflict behavior of one nation toward another has little correlation[36] with their UN voting agreement (35).

5.2.3 The more dissimilar two nations are in economic development and size and the greater their joint technological capability to span geographic distance is, the more overt conflict they have with each other (35).

5.3 *Distinguishing peace and conflict systems of interaction*[37]

5.3.1 Treaties, mail, tourists, emigrants, and student migrations are more highly correlated with export patterns for nations in overt conflict with each other than for nations not having such conflict (38).

5.3.2 The relative amount of translations by nations of each others' literature is more highly correlated with their relative tourist movements for nations in overt conflict with each other than for nations not having such conflict (38).

5.3.3 UN voting alignments for nations at peace have the same correlation with their interactions as they do for nations in overt conflict (36, 37).

5.3.4 UN voting alignments for nations at peace are much less

[36] See n. 26.

[37] These results were determined by dividing the four samples of dyads (see n. 29) into subsamples of dyads involving at least one conflict act (such as a threat) and dyads without any conflict. The latter samples were called dyadic *peace* subsamples and the former were called dyadic *conflict* subsamples. Each subsample was then separately factor analyzed through orthogonal and oblique (biquartimin) rotation.

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highly correlated with religious similarity than they are for nations in conflict with each other (35, 36).

5.3.5 Student migrations, tourists, and treaties become highly correlated with language similarity for nations in conflict with each other (36, 37).

5.3.6 The two most important behaviors distinguishing between peace and conflict international systems are mail A → B / A's domestic mail, and translations A → B / A's total translations (38).

5.3.7 Racial distance is the most important characteristic distinguishing between peace and conflict international systems (36).

6. Theory

6.1 *Structuring the international system* (3, 4)

6.1.1 The dyadic *behavior* of nations can be represented by a linear vector space with (basis) dimensions given by finding 4.1.1.

6.1.2 The location of *dyads* (e.g., A → B) within this *behavioral* space can be determined by the measures of finding 4.2.

6.1.3 The *attributes* of nations can be represented by a linear vector space with (basis) dimensions given by finding 1.1.1.

6.1.4 The location of *nations* within this attribute space can be determined by the indicators of finding 1.2.1.

6.2 *Linking dyadic behavior and nation attributes* (3, 4)

6.2.1 The dyadic behavior of nations can be theoretically linked with their attributes via the concept of *distance vector*.

6.2.2 The location of dyads in behavior space is a function of distances between them in attribute space. Verification and substance for this idea are given by findings 5.1 and 5.2.3.

7. Methodology

7.1 *On error in cross-national data*

7.1.1 Error in cross-national data can be divided into *random* and *systematic* error (19). Random error will tend to make the judgment of the reliability of the findings more conservative than otherwise. Such error will not alter the definition and interpretation of the major dimensions of nations. Systematic error can, however, distort the findings.

7.1.2 Systematic error in cross-national data varies along two major dimensions:[38] (19).

[38] These dimensions were determined by factor analyses through orthogonal rotation of 66 measures of error in 1955 statistical data on the attributes of nations.

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demographic data error—none to much,
economic-welfare data error—none to much.

7.1.3 Demographic data error is largely correlated with economic development. (19).

7.1.4 Economic-welfare data error is largely correlated with political orientation (19).

7.1.5 Availability of data on nations is correlated with both economic development and the political orientation of nations (19).

7.2 *On quantitative international relations*

7.2.1 The major concepts of international relations, such as power,[39] conflict, integration, international organizations, and diplomacy, can be given a meaningful and integrated mathematical representation.

7.2.2 The international system can be treated as a mathematical *field*.

7.2.3 In amenability to quantitative methods, international relations appears indistinguishable from physical or other social phenomena.

[39] The size dimension of (1.1.1) also can be interpreted as a power capability dimension, since highly correlated with size are such power "elements" as size of armed forces, defense budget, population, national income, energy production, and resource potential.

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REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts

By ROGER D. HANSEN

THE appearance of major studies by Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas in the late 1950's won for integration theory a prominent position among the contemporary approaches to the study of international relations.[1] A decade later its achievements are very much a matter of debate. While many students of integration theory have been led, by disappointment with results, to focus their attention on smaller and more manageable units, such as local communities and city-suburb relations, others continue investigations at the international level.[2]

Among the latter group the so-called "neofunctionalists" have been particularly prominent, largely because of the favorable reception accorded to Haas's *The Uniting of Europe*. For some time Europe remained the focal point for most of the works on regional integration, but in the past several years the application of integration theory to Latin America, Africa, and Asia has become increasingly fashionable. During the course of these endeavors Haas and Philippe Schmitter have developed a conceptual framework that they suggest will illuminate the process of regional integration in the European environment and in less developed areas of the world as well. Since Haas has studied integration efforts in both industrial and nonindustrial settings and has attempted to devise a conceptual approach applicable to both, an investigation of some of the limitations it entails provides a fairly accurate assessment of the present neofunctional contribution to regional integration theory. This is true for two reasons: Haas is one of the most thoughtful and sophisticated theorists of regional integration; and most, though not all, of his major concepts and conclusions complement and confirm those of other leading students in the field.[3]

[1] See, for example, Karl Deutsch, *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton 1957), and Ernest Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford 1958).

[2] For some of the recent trends in the literature on political integration, see Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia 1964), *passim*.

[3] See, for example, the various writings by Deutsch, including his several essays in *The Integration of Political Communities*; by Amitai Etzioni, including *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces* (New York 1964); and essays collected in *International Political Communities: An Anthology* (New York 1966).

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A Model of Regional Integration

"Does the economic integration of a group of nations automatically trigger political unity? Or are the two processes quite distinct, requiring deliberate political steps because purely economic arrangements are generally inadequate for ushering in political unity?"[4] The Haas-Schmitter model is specifically addressed to the question of the automaticity of the link between economic and political integration; and their thesis is that "under modern conditions the relationship between economic and political union had best be treated as a continuum."[5] Why? In order to portray the Haas-Schmitter views most fully and fairly, their answer is presented with no intervening interpretation:

> Linkages between economic objectives and policies, on the one hand, and political consequences of a disintegrative or integrative nature, on the other, are of a "functional" character: they rest very often on indirection, on unplanned and accidental convergence in outlook and aspiration among the actors, on dialectical relations between antagonistic purposes. They also frequently contain elements of creative personal action by administrators who seize upon crises, the solution of which upgrades common interests among the actors; hence they include an organizational component which may, depending on the organization, be of dominant significance. Integration can be conceived as involving the *gradual politicization* of the actors' purposes which were initially considered "technical" or "noncontroversial." Politicization implies that the actors, in response to the initial purposes, agree to widen the spectrum of means considered appropriate to attain them. This tends to increase the controversial component, i.e., those additional fields of action which require political choices concerning how much national autonomy to delegate to the union. Politicization implies that the actors seek to resolve their problems so as to upgrade common interests and, in the process, delegate more authority to the center. It constitutes one of the properties of integration—the intervening variable between economic and political union—along with the development of new expectations and loyalties on the part of organized interests in the member nations.[6]

[4] Haas and Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America," *International Organization*, XVIII (Autumn 1964), revised and reprinted in *International Political Communities*, 259-99.
[5] *Ibid.*, 261.
[6] *Ibid.*, 261-62, italics added.

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The authors define a successful political union as a regional entity upon which actors bestow a "significant portion of their loyalties." They posit that a successful union implies an end to threats of revolt or secession even though the scope of central control continues to be extended. "In other words, a political union can be said to exist when the politicized decision-making process has acquired legitimacy and authority."[7]

Having developed the dynamic of *politicization*, Haas and Schmitter construct three sets of observable variables "which seem to intervene more or less consistently between the act of economic union and the possible end product we label political union."[8] They consist of *background variables* (size of member-units, rates of interunit transactions, extent of social pluralism within the units, and elite complementarity), *variables at the moment of economic union* (degree of shared government purposes, and powers delegated to the union), and *process variables* (decision-making style, post-integration rates of transactions, and the adaptability of governments in situations of disappointment and crisis). High, mixed, or low ratings are to be determined for each set of variables as they are applied to the study of any regional grouping. The higher the scores, the more likely it is that an economic union will automatically be transformed into a form of political union. "Because a spillover is likely to occur in these cases [i.e., cases of high scores for all three sets of variables], the functional adaptation to its implications is likely to be 'automatic' in the sense that the participating actors will make the kinds of decisions which will safeguard their collective economic welfare. . . ."[9] The lower the scores, the less the automaticity and the more difficult the move from economic to political union.

With the exception of the final variable—adaptability in crises—all are familiar in the literature of regional integration and need not be discussed here. A further word should be said about the adaptability measurement, however, because it involves an issue of some importance to our following analysis of the Haas-Schmitter scheme and Haas's original theoretical observations upon the course of European integration. Haas has consistently maintained that economic integration will have more spillover into a broad range of political issues than will any other functional approach—i.e., that economic issues and policies are less "autonomous" than others. The process of spillover from economic integration will not only lead to *gradual politicization*, but also to occasional *crises*. "Crisis is the creative opportunity for realizing [the] potential to redefine aims at a higher level of consensus."[10] Thus, a

[7] *Ibid.*, 265-66. [8] *Ibid.*, 266. [9] *Ibid.*, 274. [10] *Ibid.*, 273.

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low degree of autonomy characterizing modern industrialized economic sectors and the propensity for economic integration involving such economies to engender crises are crucial assumptions in Haas's "expansive logic of economic integration," and will be analyzed below.

A final element in the Haas-Schmitter model should be noted—the concept of the "functional equivalent." The authors argue that in Western Europe "the element of automaticity to which we have called attention is provided by the internal logic of industrialism, pluralism, and democracy. . . . Industrial society is *the* setting in which supranationality and a lively spillover process are able to flourish. . . . [However,] specific regions may well possess unique cultural or stylistic attributes which are able to serve as *functional equivalents* for important traits isolated in [Western Europe]."[11] Much of the article in which this model appears is devoted to a study of the functional equivalents in the Latin American scene which may help to overcome the otherwise low scores that the authors attribute to their integration variables in the case of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA).

A Critique

The theoretical and empirical weaknesses in the model may best be illustrated by applying it to the process of integration first in Western Europe, and then in less developed regions of the world. The Haas treatment of European integration might be sketched thus: Within the European economy limited sectoral agreements so increase trade flows and ensuing common problems that a supranational bureaucracy develops to deal with them, and an ever-broadening number of economic activities are touched by growing supranational jurisdiction. Industrial groups also organize at the new regional level in order to influence the emerging power centers. Over time these centers of jurisdiction are granted increasing powers; political loyalties, following in the wake of economic interests, gradually attach themselves to the new supranational entities. As Haas recently summarized his early views, "The superiority of step-by-step economic decisions over crucial political choices is assumed as permanent; the determinism implicit in the picture of the European social and economic structure is almost absolute. Given all these conditions, we said, the progression from a politically inspired common market to an economic union, and finally to a political union among states, is automatic."[12]

[11] *Ibid.*, 284-85, italics added.

[12] Ernst Haas, "The 'Uniting of Europe' and the Uniting of Latin America," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, v (June 1967), 327.

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The major question that has arisen over the Haas analysis (and prognosis) is the necessary extent of the political ramifications of economic union in the Western European case. As Etzioni suggests, "how far [spillover] carries unification before it is exhausted is a question whose answer is as yet largely unknown."[13] Much recent criticism of the dialectic of spillover simply points to the obvious fact that the pace of European integration has diminished.[14] To the extent that the "logic of economic integration" as expounded by Haas and other functionalists suggested an inevitability about the eventual political unification of Europe of the Six, this type of criticism appears to have at least temporary validity. Most of it, however, analyzes *what* has happened rather than *why* it has happened, thereby contributing little to a better understanding of the integration process in industrially and politically developed regions. Of much greater importance, and therefore considered in some detail below, is a theoretical critique developed by Stanley Hoffmann and others. In addition, economic theory and economic events in the Western European setting suggest some limitations to the spillover thesis that heretofore have been ignored or overlooked.

Economic analysis, both theoretical and empirical, is most helpful, however, in calling into question the relevance of the Haas-Schmitter model to the understanding of the connections between economic and political integration in Latin America and other semi-industrial and nonindustrial regions. One perceptive student of regional integration in African and Latin American settings has suggested that in many underdeveloped areas "much that in the European context would be simple welfare politics becomes tinged with emotive and symbolic content that is usually associated with national security politics. One consequence . . . is that there is less opportunity for autonomous bureaucrats to go quietly about the business of integration in 'noncontroversial' spheres. . . . If the problem in most underdeveloped areas is one

[13] Etzioni, *Political Unification*, 54.

[14] For contrasting views on the present pace of and prospects for Western European integration, see Ronald Inglehart, "An End to European Integration?" *American Political Science Review*, LXI (March 1967); Karl Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment," *ibid.*, LX (June 1966); and Deutsch, *et al.*, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (New York 1967). Whereas Deutsch and his collaborators believe that the integration movement "has stopped or reached a plateau since 1957-58," Inglehart argues that the political socialization of Western Europe's postwar youth in a setting of European cooperation has produced an orientation favorable to continued moves toward political integration. These studies provide interesting examples of differing methodological approaches to the study of regional integration, including the use of transactions-flow measurements, elite- and mass-opinion survey techniques, and content analysis.

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of premature 'overpoliticization,' then it is not helpful for comparative study to conceive of the integration process as 'gradual politicization.' "[15] A discussion of the theory and practice of economic integration in such unions as the Central American and East African common markets will both substantiate the objection raised by Nye and suggest the necessity of some major revisions in present neofunctional approaches as applied to economically less developed regions.

Western Europe: "High" Politics and the International System

Stanley Hoffmann recently wrote of Europe of the Six that "the failure (so far) of an experiment tried in apparently ideal conditions tells us a great deal about contemporary world politics, about the chances of unification movements elsewhere, and about the functional approach to unification. For it shows that the movement can fail not only when there is a surge of nationalism in one important part, but also when there are differences in assessments of the national interest that rule out agreement on the shape and on the world role of the new, supranational whole."[16] He argued that "functional integration's gamble could be won only if the method had sufficient potency to promise a permanent excess of gains over losses, and of hopes over frustrations. Theoretically, this might be true of economic integration. It is not true of political integration (in the sense of 'high politics')."[17]

In treating the distinction between "high politics" and economic welfare issues in this manner, Hoffmann's analysis contrasts sharply with the Haas-Schmitter model, which insists that "economic and political union had best be treated as a continuum," and Haas's view that "the advent of supranationality [within the EEC institutions] symbolizes the victory of economics over politics, over that familiar ethnocentric nationalism which used to subordinate butter to guns, reason to passion, statistical bargaining to excited demands."[18] It is one of two major elements in the Hoffmann approach to the study of regional integration that both differentiates it from that of the neofunctionalists and produces some markedly dissimilar theoretical and empirical observations. Hoffmann, Liska, and other "traditionalists" have consist-

[15] J. S. Nye, Jr., "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration," *International Organization*, XIX (Autumn 1965), 870-84.

[16] Stanley Hoffmann, "The Fate of the Nation-State," *Daedalus*, VC (Summer 1966), 867.

[17] *Ibid.*, 882.

[18] Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," in Stephen Graubard, ed., *A New Europe?* (Boston 1963).

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ently argued the validity of the distinction between "high" and "low"—or welfare—politics. They view the latter as concerned with interests that are both calculable and representative of only a negligible fraction of a nation's resources. In contrast, high politics has as its core "the vital interests of national diplomacy and strategy."[19] When dealing with these major issues of foreign policy and defense, "nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance . . ."[20] to any commitment to supranational mechanisms. Viewed in this context, the Haas approach to regional integration appears to omit a significant set of variables, and has led Hoffmann to argue that "as long as the process is not completed, we must analyze the building of the political community as an incipient instance of 'interest group politics,' of 'domestic politics of the community,' and as a continuing example of traditional interstate politics."[21]

The second major element in the Hoffmann approach to Western European integration that clearly distinguishes it from that of the neofunctionalists is its emphasis upon the international setting in which the European integration experiment has been undertaken. Hoffmann argues that the failure of the unification movement among the Six to progress into high politics via economic spillover can be traced to the interaction of three elements in the present international system—"one of which characterizes every international system, and the other two only the present system."[22] The universalistic factor is "the *diversity* of domestic determinants, geo-historical situations, and outside aims among its units; any international system based on fragmentation tends, through the dynamic of unevenness . . . to reproduce diversity."[23] Of the two unique features, one is that today's is "the first truly *global* international system; the regional subsystems have only a reduced autonomy; the 'relationships of major tension' blanket the whole planet. . . ."[24]

The inevitable result of the combination of these two international system features, Hoffmann argues, is that intra-Six relations have become "subordinated to their divergencies about the outside world; the 'regional subsystem' becomes a stake in the rivalry of its members about the system as a whole."[25] And he offers as evidence of this dynamic

[19] Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York 1968), 404, fn. 12.

[20] Hoffmann, "Fate of the Nation-State," 882.

[21] Hoffmann, "Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial System," reprinted in Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr., eds., *The Atlantic Community: Progress and Prospects* (New York 1963), 11.

[22] Hoffmann, "The Fate of the Nation-State," 864.

[23] *Ibid.*, 864. [24] *Ibid.*, 864. [25] *Ibid.*, 865.

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the mounting disagreements among the units of the Six—between France and Germany in particular—over the world role of Europe and its relationship with the United States. The third system feature—the nuclear age and the present "stability of a bipolar world"—supports and expands the operations of national diversity. "Damocles' sword has become a boomerang, the ideological legitimacy of the nation-state is protected by the relative and forced tameness of the world jungle."[28]

One might add that the legitimacy of the European states of the Six in recent years has been supported not only by the operation of nuclear deterrence, but also by their effectiveness in the areas of economics and welfare. Experiencing some of the world's most rapid growth rates, the Six emerged from their weakened national situations of the immediate postwar years with a renewed capacity to attract popular support. Paradoxically enough, economic integration played a major role in strengthening these national capacities for independent action in other policy areas. Thus the very effectiveness of economic cooperation in stimulating economic growth within the EEC expanded the margins for political conflict among its members on a broad range of foreign and defense policy issues. One of the reasons for the contradictory outcome of the functional approach to regional integration is that the spillover from economics into politics has been to date far more limited than that which Haas had projected, a point which will be developed below.

The Hoffmann analysis thus raises two major issues with regard to the present neofunctional literature on regional integration. The first involves the interaction between what we might label the endogenous and the exogenous variables—between the region engaged in integration schemes on the one hand, and the international environment on the other. The second involves the distinction between high and low politics. Is the traditional view of a discontinuity between the two preferable to the continuum proposed by Haas and Schmitter? The answer to both questions will of course be conditioned as much by one's particular interest in and approach to the study of international relations as by the inherent merits and demerits of present regional integration theory itself. There is evidence to suggest, however, that the neofunctionalist approach should be significantly modified if it is to deal effectively with the range of issues raised by Hoffmann and others.

We shall argue below that the Haas-Schmitter model suffers from a

[28] *Ibid.*, 865.

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serious theoretical inadequacy in its dealing with regional integration schemes in less developed areas: it does not attempt to isolate and measure those exogenous factors in the international environment that affect the integration *process*. Moreover, its theory is so constructed that questions about the interaction between subsystem and macro-system do not generally appear relevant to the outcome of integration efforts beyond the initial analysis of "elite complementarity." It makes no systematic attempt to locate and measure the effects of international environment changes on elite perceptions within the regional union over time. In the European case, those who approach the study of integration from a different conceptual viewpoint—e.g., that of historical sociology and systems analysis—also raise the same general issue. Hoffmann, as we have seen, traces much of the failure of spillover to the diversity of national situations in Western Europe and the intimate connection between the region and the bipolar relationship of major tension that has structured the international system since the end of World War II.[27] These interacting variables engendered Hoffmann's "logic of diversity," which soon challenged Haas's "logic of integration" (i.e., spillover) in the race for Europe's future. While much empirical work remains to be done in order to test the relevance of the variables suggested by Hoffmann and others who employ somewhat similar modes of conceptualization, the limitations inherent in the neofunctionalist approach should encourage further efforts in that direction.

Haas himself has recently recognized that "something is missing" in his exploration of the integration process in Western Europe.[28] But he does not view the inadequacy of his original theory as a product of its disregard for the interaction between exogenous and endogenous variables. Rather he continues to focus exclusively on aspects internal to regional integration experiments, and concludes that he underestimated the "built-in limits" of pragmatic interest politics concerned with economic welfare.

> Pragmatic interests, simply because they are pragmatic and not reinforced with deep ideological or philosophical commitment, are ephemeral. . . . And a political process which is built and projected from pragmatic interests, therefore, is bound to be a frail process, susceptible to reversal. And so integration can once more develop into disintegration.[29]

[27] A nation's "situation," in Hoffmann's terms, is "made up altogether of its internal features—what, in an individual, would be called heredity and character—and of its position in the world." *Ibid.*, 868.

[28] Haas, "The 'Uniting of Europe,'" 327.

[29] *Ibid.*, 327-28.

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The halting of the gradual move toward political union in Western Europe followed the rejection by De Gaulle's EEC partners of his bid for a common foreign and defense policy, and his subsequent failure to lure the Bonn government away from its Washington moorings. It appears that at this point the General was unwilling to allow the Community to pass into its third stage, which would have instituted a process of decision-making by a majority-vote method in the Council of Ministers. Although not all of his reasons are yet known, the outcome of his stand during the 1965 crisis was to restrain effectively the movement toward supranationality within the Six.[30] Thus the integration movement, based on "pragmatic politics," was stalled by the opposition of one member state whose government viewed increased supranationality as detrimental to its own conception of a proper European foreign policy and defense posture.

Haas develops the following matrix to encompass his amended views of regional integration:

AIMS OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ELITES

		Dramatic-Political	*Incremental-Economic*
Aims of Statesmen	Dramatic-Political	Integration either direct and smooth; or impossible	Integration erratic and reversible
	Incremental-Economic	Integration erratic and reversible	Integration gradual but automatic

The trouble with Haas's amended approach is that it offers many possibilities without suggesting how we are to account for any of them. What situations, events, pressures are conducive to the dramatic-political integrative leadership of a Bismarck, a Cavour? When will similarly motivated elites appear? To say, as Haas does, that "reliance on high politics demands either a statesman of this calibre or a widely shared normative elite consensus"[31] and that "in most actual situations in which regional integration is desired, neither ingredient is present in sufficient quantity"[32] may indicate something about the general dis-

[30] All discussions of these events are conjectural, though some are undoubtedly better reasoned than others. Leon Lindberg argues that De Gaulle's efforts were an attempt not so much to halt the process of integration as to restructure the EEC so as to provide France a maximum leverage within the Community. See Lindberg, "Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System," *International Organization*, xx (Spring 1966).

[31] Haas, "The 'Uniting of Europe,'" 328.

[32] *Ibid.*, 328.

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tribution of an integration effort's basic ingredients. However, such static observations are of limited value in explaining, for any given case, either the initial "mix" of the variables or the dynamic process itself.

The appearance of a De Gaulle remains a mystery within the context of the Haas approach, and Haas still refers to France as the "deviant case" within the Six.[33] In terms of the contrasting Hoffmann paradigm, the interaction of international system characteristics and the process of European integration suggests the inevitability of such "deviance" as perceptions change on the part of one actor or another. Thus, while Haas's amended theory is surely strengthened by his recognition that "integration and disintegration as two rival social processes are simultaneously at work,"[34] it still seems too isolated from external variables that may well help to account for the variety of outcomes observed. In some cases, as will be suggested below, certain "compelling" international environmental pressures may trigger and sustain integration efforts; in others, the minimum degree of interaction between system and regional subsystem may enhance the prospects for success.[35]

The fact that Haas now agrees with his critics that the distinction between high and low politics is a valid one[36] still leaves integration theorists of whatever persuasion with an unresolved methodological problem. We must agree with Karl Kaiser that the traditional distinction between high and low politics makes sense only if it refers to attitudes, and not to fixed objects of politics. "The same issue may shift on the spectrum between 'low' and 'high' (a) according to specific circumstances, (b) within time, and (c) between different countries. Hence no clear lines can be drawn either according to issues or attitudes alone."[37]

Kaiser's own view of the neofunctionalist approach to regional integration in Western Europe is that its concepts "remain valid in a large area, but they do not help us to understand various issues of 'high' politics or defence that have come to plague the Community, nor do they provide an answer to the interconnection between the two. Similarly, the body of systematic knowledge developed by a more Hobbes-

[33] *Ibid.*, 319.

[34] *Ibid.*, 315.

[35] It may not be accidental that most successful instances of African integration occurred under colonial rule, which imposed a type of subsystem autonomy, and that the United States' experiment in federation was undertaken during a period when the Atlantic Ocean implied extended periods of isolation from—rather than involvement at —the center of world politics.

[36] "The results of our surmises add up to a rebirth of nationalism and antifunctional high politics as far as France is concerned." Haas, "The 'Uniting of Europe,'" 325.

[37] Karl Kaiser, "The U.S. and the EEC in the Atlantic System: the Problem of Theory," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, v (June 1967), 401-02.

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ian outlook on a world of conflict and tension does not provide the tools, let alone the explanation, for examining the impact of functional integration within the EEC. . . ."[38]

Stressing the necessity of incorporating the insights of the thus far "partial" theoretical approaches to the study of regional integration in the European Community, Kaiser proposes an empirical systems-analysis approach expanded from Stanley Hoffmann's initial suggestions of a decade ago.[39] Patterns of interaction among the basic units of international politics are to be studied in terms of structure (including dimensions of influence and form), tasks performed in common, transnational forces operating across the frontier of the major units, unit objectives and means, and unit determinants (both ecological and sociopolitical). Within this framework " 'unification,' 'community building,' 'sector integration,' or 'functional integration' can be researched as part of manifestations of system change."[40]

Western Europe: The Economic Limitations on Spillover

The increasingly comprehensive paradigms for the study of regional integration—witness Kaiser's approach, among others—clearly suggest that the neofunctionalist approach has failed to comprehend some major relevant variables. Another weakness of the Haas model is that it has overweighted one of its own primary concepts, that of spillover from the economic to the political sector. An analysis of the economic achievements of the EEC to date reveals two characteristics that have helped to weaken the logic of spillover. The first is that the Common Market can operate so as to produce major economic gains without moving from customs union to political union. The second is that the benefits of economic integration in the Common Market have been equitably spread among the member units, thus avoiding to a considerable extent a series of "distribution crises" that might well have aided the spillover process.

Expanding the size of the market open to producers within the EEC has permitted the achieving of economies of scale resulting from mass production and product specialization; it has also induced greater competition. Further, increased rates of regional investment, both domestic and foreign, have been engendered by the move toward free trade within the Six and the establishment of a common external tariff.

[38] *Ibid.*, 404-05.
[39] See Stanley Hoffmann, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," *World Politics*, XI (April 1959).
[40] Kaiser, 410.

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A recent Brookings study of the Common Market concludes that its economic achievements have been very substantial.

> The conditions requisite for a successful customs union are all present: the members are advanced countries at an almost equivalent level of industrialization; they have long been major trading partners and have common geographical borders; they are all heavily engaged in international trade and some of them had high tariffs originally, allowing much scope for rationalization. Furthermore, the EEC began during a period of economic prosperity, which made the required economic adjustments easier. In turn, because the EEC was successful, economic prosperity was prolonged and enhanced. Thus there has occurred an interaction between income growth and international trade in a "virtuous circle" often sought but seldom achieved.[41]

Intra-EEC trade "grew at a truly remarkable compound annual rate of 17.0 percent between 1958-59 and 1965."[42] Investment rates rose substantially in each country, as did GNP growth rates and the inflow of foreign capital.

Of vital importance in understanding the limitations to the logic of spillover in this setting is the recognition that these very substantial benefits have been achieved without much movement toward greater supranational jurisdiction. Economists have long recognized that customs unions among developed countries can deliver a substantial economic payoff for a very limited price in terms of the surrender of national sovereignty. In a theoretical work written in 1960, Bela Balassa concluded that "an inter-governmental approach appears to be sufficient to ensure satisfactory operation of an economic union without a unification of the institutional structure. . . ."[43] Krause, in his new study of the EEC, confirms the Balassa view: "Economic integration requires coordination of many economic policies and this involves essentially political decisions, but formal political institutions may not be needed to bring this about. Governments do not need to be told, for instance, that excessive inflation in an open economy quickly leads to difficulties for themselves and their trading partners. They can see for themselves the rapidly deteriorating balance of payments, and pressures immediately arise for corrective actions. A 'hidden hand' toward

[41] Lawrence B. Krause, *European Economic Integration and The United States* (Washington 1967), 20.
[42] *Ibid.*, 21.
[43] Bela Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration* (Homewood, Illinois 1961), 272.

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policy coordination is directed by the market mechanism and it has proven to be very effective with the EEC."[44] And Krause's analysis of the workings of the Common Market led him to the following conclusion: "What is certain is that political integration will occur only as a result of a positive political decision to bring it about, not as a result of economic pressures alone."[45]

The final observation to be made with reference to the workings of the EEC and the process of spillover is that the gains from economic integration were spread among the Six in such a way that no major "distribution crises" arose, thus depriving the spillover process of opportunities in which to "redefine aims at a higher level of consensus." While the bitter contest over a common agricultural policy might be characterized as a problem of distribution of benefits—French agricultural gains balanced against German manufacturing gains—this particular issue had its origin in the Messina negotiations. It *did not arise* as an unexpected crisis resulting from integration; rather, like the ghost of Hamlet's father, it appeared in the first act and never ventured far from the stage. The other major crisis faced among the Six, involving various British bids for membership in the EEC, has had little to do with economic issues.[46]

Economic theory suggests why the "hidden hand" of the marketplace helped to minimize the problem of an equitable distribution of economic gains from free trade among the EEC countries. It is worth investigating because it also provides us with a frame of reference for understanding the quite different experience with economic integration among less developed countries.

Economists have noted that economic integration efforts are often accompanied by two contrasting types of results; Myrdal has labeled one set "spread effects," and the other "backwash effects."[47] *Spread effects* are those that tend to minimize income disparities within a market area; they include such factors as increased demand in more developed centers for the products of the less developed periphery and the transmission to the latter of technological knowledge, improved skills, and capital. *Backwash effects* include the movement of capital and skilled labor toward the more advanced centers, and the concentration

[44] Krause, 24.

[45] *Ibid.*, 24.

[46] The crisis over agriculture, for that matter, was an issue less of economics than of politics. All commentators on the 1965 confrontation concur that the moment was chosen by De Gaulle to press the issues of structure in and direction of the Community.

[47] See Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions* (London 1957), chap. 3.

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in them of new industries, thus tending to increase regional disparities in levels of economic development.

For the purpose of this essay, the relevant point of these theoretical observations is that spread effects, which are likely to reduce regional disparities on the average, predominate in a union of developed economies.[48] Highly developed price systems permit the exploitation of cost differences; existing industrial structures in each country allow all to benefit from the effects of increasing intra-industry specialization; infrastructure similarities discourage the concentration of foreign investments in any single member-unit; and the existence of highly developed transport and communications facilities promotes intraregional exchange. Factors such as these have often been cited as contributing, for example, to the decline of disparities in income among various regions of the United States. They have undoubtedly helped to minimize both the number and the magnitude of crises in the EEC and, in doing so, to limit the opportunities for an active spillover process.

In contrast, backwash effects play a far greater role in unions of underdeveloped countries; the more marked the initial disparities in such a union, the more the backwash effects tend to predominate. "With an imperfect price system, primitive transportation facilities, and an uneven distribution of social and economic overhead in these areas, *agglomerative tendencies* assume importance. These are related to the availability of overhead capital, skilled labor and linked industrial processes, when the latter not only provide ready markets and low-cost inputs but also contribute to future improvements through the exchange of technological information and induced technical change."[49]

In retrospect, we may tentatively suggest that three factors led to an overestimation of the expansiveness of functional integration in Europe of the Six. They were, first, a failure to relate the process of regional integration closely enough to relevant international system factors; second, a tendency to deny rather than to investigate the discontinuity between high and welfare politics proclaimed by traditionalists; and third, a failure to recognize that sizeable (and equitably distributed) economic gains would result from a common market *coordinated* by sovereign states rather than managed by ceaselessly expanding supranational authorities.

[48] On this point see Balassa, *Theory of Economic Integration*, 204.

[49] Bela Balassa, *Economic Development and Integration* (Mexico City 1965), 123, italics added.

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Regional Integration Among Less Developed Countries

Backwash effects and their tendency to aggravate existing disparities in levels of development in Latin American, African, and Asian regional economic integration experiments sharply limit the relevance of the Haas-Schmitter model as applied to these areas of the world. As Nye points out, integration involving less developed countries seems to produce not "gradual politicization," but "overpoliticization." A brief discussion of the two most comprehensive economic integration attempts among such countries at present—the East African and the Central American common markets—will substantiate this observation.

The East African common market originated with a customs union between Kenya and Uganda in 1917; Tanganyika became the third member in 1927. Despite its longevity, the common market was in a state of collapse by 1965. The severe frictions among the three newly independent African states arose over the issue of the distribution of the benefits from economic integration. Uganda and Tanganyika argued that all the gains were going to Kenya, and cited the following indicators: Kenya was supplying well over 60 percent of the intraregional exports; its trade surplus with the other members was substantial and growing; and it was steadily enhancing its position as the industrial center of the union. Kenya was producing 70 percent of the manufactures of the common market and exporting a growing percentage of them to the two relatively less developed member countries. By 1958, 404 of the 474 companies registered in East Africa were located in Kenya. By 1960 the country's manufacturing sector accounted for 10 percent of Kenya's GNP, as against 4 percent figures in the other two member states.[50]

The failure of the integration scheme to spread its benefits equitably produced growing frictions and demands for reform, including explicit threats of withdrawal by Tanganyikan government officials. The most significant result was the Kampala Agreement of 1964, which included a provision to allocate selected major industries to each of the three member countries, and another to ensure an equitable distribution of other manufacturing establishments through a complex system of inducements.[51] When the Agreement failed to produce immediate results

[50] See Nye, "East African Economic Integration," *International Political Communities*, 405-36; Miguel Wionczek, "La Communidad Economica de Africa Oriental," *Commercio Exterior*, XVII (October 1967), 837-40.

[51] See Donald Rothchild, "Region-Building in Africa: The Implications of the Treaty for East African Cooperation for United States Policy," paper presented at the Annual International Studies Association Conference, Washington, D.C., March 29, 1968.

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Tanzania began to restrict regional imports, over the heated protests of Kenyan industrial and governmental circles. Growing trade restrictions, together with the decision to dissolve the region's monetary union and establish three national central banks, "provoked a general fear that the common market and common service agreements might be completely destroyed."[52]

The crisis produced another, more comprehensive attempt to resolve the existing disputes over the issue of *balanced economic growth* in the union. In East Africa, as in Central America, the concept of balanced growth has to do not so much with GNP growth rates as with an increasingly equitable distribution of industry throughout the union and generally balanced increases in intraregional trade. The results of the Philip Commission's efforts to reach a compromise settlement were the signing in June, 1967, and the putting into effect, as of December 1, 1967, of the Treaty of East African Cooperation—"an ingenious effort to eliminate the causes of past frictions among the member countries."[53] Among the major devices marshalled by the Treaty to achieve a balanced industrial spread in the region are programs for fiscal incentives, transfer taxes, an East African Development Bank, and industrial licensing laws. Whether or not the scheme succeeds, its intricacy and comprehensiveness are symbolic of the political sensitivity in less developed countries to the problem of "equal distribution," and especially to the insistence of each on the right to an "industrial sector," however limited.

The Central American Common Market is less than a decade old, but the explosive political issue of "balanced economic development" (*desarrollo económico equilibrado*) surfaced as soon as the freeing of internal trade and the formation of a uniform external tariff began to affect trade flows and the location of new industry in the region. In Central America the two "less developed" member countries are Honduras and Nicaragua; the latter qualifies only in the sense that its manufacturing sector is somewhat smaller than those in the three "advanced" member countries—Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. The issues raised by Honduras and Nicaragua are the same as those set forth by Uganda and Tanzania: the backwash effects accompanying membership in the Central American Common Market are limiting their economic (particularly industrial) development. And their evidence is the same: growing trade deficits with the more advanced member countries, loss of tariff revenues resulting from the freeing of

[52] Wionczek, 839.
[53] *Ibid.*, 840.

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trade, and the increasing concentration of industry in the more advanced industrial centers of Guatemala City, San Salvador, and San José (Costa Rica).

In fact, of course, the complaints of Honduras and Nicaragua about the processes of economic development in the region are overdrawn. Both are probably deriving economic benefit from membership in the Common Market. But the major issue there, as in East Africa, is that of gains *relative* to those of one's partners, not as measured against any absolute standard. Some countries are clearly gaining *more* than others; and that, the evidence indicates, is the crucial issue. Governmental and industrial elites in these countries are highly sensitive to the backwash problem for three reasons. First, it is so easily *measurable*; statistics on trade and new industrial investment are gathered as part of the everyday functions of government. Second, it is so *visible*; in Central America a new manufacturing complex creates such a vivid contrast to its environment that it necessarily commands attention. Third, elites involved in these integration schemes have been alerted to the problem even before it has arisen. As Aaron Segal notes, "Economists in Honduras and Tanganyika read Myrdal's studies and applied his analysis in specific cases."[54]

NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS: TRADE WITH CENTRAL AMERICA
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

	COMMERCIAL BALANCE							
	1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Nicaragua	—$0.2	—$1.1	—$1.8	—$2.6	—$7.9	—$11.0	—$13.3	—$23.8
Honduras	3.4	2.7	3.8	— 0.5	— 1.3	— 4.3	— 6.5	— 17.2

In the Central American case, by 1966 the frictions resulting from the tendency for industrialization to center in three of the five member states had produced a breakdown in the Common Market's institutional functioning. The crisis lasted for a year and was highlighted by the meeting, in September of that year, of the regional Economic Council; at the meeting both Nicaragua and El Salvador announced their decision to withdraw from the Market should their mutually exclusive demands be rejected. The Nicaraguan Minister of Economy

[54] Aaron Segal, "The Integration of Developing Countries: Some Thoughts on East Africa and Central America," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, v (March 1967), 269, fn. 32. For specific examples of elite perceptions of the problem and the manner in which it becomes a major political issue, see, for example, the Tanganyikan Development Plan, and the 1966 Report to the Honduran Congress by the then Minister of Economy, Manuel Acosta Bonilla, especially 34-43.

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stated that his country would withdraw if it were not granted certain forms of preferential treatment within the Common Market. To this ultimatum the Salvadorean Minister of Economy replied that, if Nicaragua were granted preferential treatment, El Salvador would withdraw from the integration scheme. A compromise is still being sought.[55]

The Central Americans, like the East Africans, have attempted to cope with the issue of balanced development through a regional development bank that lends generously to the less developed members, through licensing arrangements that encourage domestic and foreign investors to locate new plants in the less industrialized member states, and through various other forms of preferential treatment. However, all such attempts are inadequate to overcome the agglomerative tendencies associated with the backwash effects of economic integration in less developed regions. This is true even in regions like Central America where the disparities in the economic structures are not very pronounced, and for at least three reasons. First, the more advanced member countries are too short of resources for their own development programs to do much by way of aiding fellow-members. Second, governmental elites in the more developed countries do not wish to supply such assistance; nor are the vested interests in those countries particularly receptive to any such channeling of resources or to agreements granting others preferential treatment. Third, the factors contributing to the lagging performance of a member country in these unions are often such that financial resources alone cannot restore anything resembling a balance except in the very long run. In the case of Honduras, for example, impediments to development are more political, administrative, and "human-resource"–oriented than are those of its neighbors; only years of slow and marginal improvements at these levels of development will permit Honduras to benefit from the advantages of economic integration on anything like an equal basis with other member countries.[56]

The evidence from the East African and Central American cases clearly suggests that, for less developed countries, economic integration is better conceptualized in terms of high politics than its welfare equivalent in Western Europe. Indeed, this might have been surmised on *a priori* grounds. The traditionalists have always maintained that the core of high politics lay in the realm of foreign and defense policy. But it is clear that in the present international system there is a very high

[55] For a detailed account see Roger D. Hansen, *Central America: Regional Integration and Economic Development* (Washington 1967), chap. 4.

[56] See *ibid.*, chaps. 4 and 5 for a more detailed discussion.

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correlation between industrialization and the capacity (though, in the nuclear age, not always the immediate inclination) of states to engage in high politics; indeed, industrialization might be considered as a prerequisite to any meaningful high-political role performance. It enables a state to produce essential military and technological components of foreign and defense policies at the "hardware" level, and to finance and supply foreign aid and other capital exports at the level of "software."[57] Western European nations could afford to treat economic integration as a matter of welfare politics without foreclosing their high-politics option because each started from a significantly industrialized base. The case is quite other in the less developed regions of the world. And while few—if any—of the countries in these areas will make it to center court, some will obviously become *regional* powers. For this reason it is not surprising that growing industrial concentration in Kenya or Guatemala should represent a concern for Tanzania or Honduras going beyond the level of welfare politics. This would seem to be especially true for an area like Central America, with a history of regional military conflict and attempts at hegemony by the regional "great power," i.e., Guatemala. In an industrialized area like Western Europe, economic integration, by distributing benefits equitably, will not intensify regional hierarchy; indeed, spread effects may tend to diminish it. In contrast, economic integration has *exactly the opposite effect* in underdeveloped regions of the world.

The East African and Central American experiences confirm the observation that "instant politicization" characterizes economic integration in the less developed world. The findings sharply limit the relevance of the Haas-Schmitter model—one that would have us view economic and political union as a continuum, and gradual politicization as the mode of movement along that continuum. It can, of course, be asserted that despite the heated frictions and high politics of these two common markets, both are still in operation—and generally at increasingly comprehensive levels of economic integration. This is quite true, and we shall argue below that the odds in favor of their continuation may be somewhat better than recent crises suggest. However, such a conclusion is derived from a line of reasoning that has virtually no relation to the Haas-Schmitter model, a model that can hardly incorporate in its present form the high politics of industrial development noted above.

[57] Again the crucial issue is elite perception. Even though there are often more satisfactory approaches to economic development than intensified programs of industrialization, elites in most less developed countries don't believe it.

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The Future of Regional Integration in Less Developed Areas: Theory and Practice

Thus far we have dealt with some of the theoretical limitations involved in the literature on regional integration of less developed areas, but not upon its prognostications for the future of present and pending experiments. In these concluding comments we will alter our focus in an attempt to answer two questions: How does the current literature on regional integration assess the probabilities for success of integration schemes in Latin America, Africa, and Asia? Do the existing concrete examples of such regional integration confirm theoretical conclusions, or do they suggest the need for alteration?

Virtually all of the present writing is pessimistic about the future of integration schemes among less developed countries. Etzioni, for example, tentatively suggests that limited horizons, lack of administrative and political skills, and preoccupation with problems of domestic modernization all represent major barriers to successful integration efforts.[58] Hoffmann regards fully integrated units ("political communities") and pluralistic social structures within them as essential requisites for successful regional integration, and observes that the lack of such structures in many Latin American countries reduces integration to "a chimera."[59] Deutsch's "capabilities" approach also produces pessimistic observations on regional integration among underdeveloped nations. In most such states domestic "loads," derived from as well as necessitating social, political, and economic change, are already overstraining capabilities. In these circumstances it is difficult to imagine that a growth in the capacity for "responsiveness" among member units to each others' needs will keep pace with the increasing burdens imposed by integration schemes.[60] Finally, Haas argues that "because the modern 'industrial-political' actor fears that his way of life cannot be safeguarded without structural adaptation, he turns to integration; by the same token, political actors who are neither industrial, nor urban, nor modern in their outlook . . . seek refuge in national exclusiveness. Thus, countries dominated by a non-pluralistic social structure are poor candidates for participation in the integration process. Even if their governments do partake at the official level, the consequences of their participation are unlikely to be felt elsewhere in the social structure."[61]

[58] Etzioni, *Political Unification*, 318-21.

[59] Hoffmann, "Fate of the Nation-State," 904-05.

[60] See in particular the Deutsch essays in *The Integration of Political Communities* for an extended treatment of these concepts.

[61] Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," *International Political Communities*, 106.

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Haas and Schmitter, in their studies of LAFTA, seem to confirm this pessimism. Applying their scheme of variables, they conclude that the area is "an unlikely candidate for international community formation. . . ."[62] They account for the fact that LAFTA has not entirely collapsed by the appearance of two "functional equivalents":—the bargaining principle of "reciprocity," and the role of Latin America's *técnicos*. The reciprocity principle entails the willingness of parties to recognize duties as well as rights—specifically in the LAFTA case the willingness to see that benefits from integration are equitably shared. The *técnicos*, the region's economists/civil servants, are portrayed as playing a role in LAFTA similar to that undertaken by integration-oriented civil servants in Western Europe.[63] The Haas-Schmitter prediction, however, remains generally pessimistic about the prospects for Latin American integration.

Are such conclusions concerning the prospects for successful regional integration in underdeveloped areas confirmed by today's concrete examples? In general, the answer seems to be in the affirmative. Etzioni's study of two such instances that failed, Nye's analysis of the failure to achieve *political* union in East Africa, and the lack of progress toward political union in Central America all highlight the barriers to political integration among less developed nations.[64]

Against this general background, however, the continued functioning of the East African and Central American economic integration schemes poses an interesting question: How have they managed to survive in the face of the difficulties suggested both by political and by economic theory? At the level of economic theory we have noted the probability that a union of underdeveloped countries will suffer from backwash effects that promote an unbalanced distribution of gains, unless the member countries are very evenly matched in levels of economic development. Given the high politics of new industrial location, disparities in infrastructure and pre-integration levels of industrialization will be particularly conducive to distribution crises. And in actual practice, we have observed that such conflicts have emerged in both regions. At the level of political analysis, we have noted the tendency of distribution crises to politicize issues raised by economic integration very rapidly, without allowing "gradual politicization" to operate. A final problem posed by theory for these two economic unions has been

[62] Haas and Schmitter, *The Politics of Economics in Latin American Regionalism: The Latin American Free Trade Association after Four Years of Operation*, Monograph Series in World Affairs, III (Denver 1965-66), 7.

[63] *Ibid.*, chap. 5.

[64] See Etzioni, *Political Unification*; Nye, "East African Economic Integration"; Hansen.

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expressed by Etzioni: "Unions that try to maintain a medium-level integration, e.g., economic only, or economic with a minimum of political integration, are unstable, not because they are likely to disintegrate but because their capacity to form consensus is out of balance with the need for it: they are likely to become more integrated or regress to a lower level of integration."[65]

The first point to be made is that either or both of the economic unions under consideration might collapse at any moment; each is operating in an atmosphere of constant crisis. In 1965 the East African common market was on the verge of collapse; in 1966 two Central American member-states openly threatened withdrawal. In both cases, however, economic integration was preserved; in East Africa the crisis had produced by the end of 1967 a far more complex scheme of coordination than had ever before been undertaken in the region. Thus, while we recognize the fragility of both common markets, the reasons for their continued operation are worth considering.

Several relevant factors emerge as we shift our attention from an exclusively regional focus to the interaction between these regional groupings and the international environment within which they are functioning. An analysis of the structure of the international system and the transnational forces of change within it indicates why these particular states have turned to economic integration rather than seeking Haas's "refuge in national exclusiveness." It has long been recognized that a high degree of external "compellingness" can promote integration, that external threats often lead to a corresponding tightening of cooperative bonds. We have already noted that the degree of international stability inherent in the bipolar balance that emerged by the 1960's lessened the external pressures for European integration. France (like China) could better afford the risks of reasserted national autonomy within the interstices of the superpower confrontation. In contrast, two elements in the present international system enhance the degree of compellingness for economic integration among the countries of Central America and East Africa.

The first involves a particular characteristic of the present international economic system—generally referred to as "sluggish" world demand for many primary commodities—and its effect upon the prospects for economic growth in small countries whose economic perform-

[65] Etzioni, "The Dialectic of Supranational Unification," reprinted in *International Political Communities* (orig. *The American Political Science Review*), LVI, 143 (December 1962).

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ances are heavily dependent upon the export of such items. The Central American case is illustrative of the problem.

For many years prior to the formation of the Common Market, and as late as the 1950's, over half of the region's income was obtained from agriculture, and four crops—coffee, bananas, cotton, and cocoa—accounted for approximately 90 percent of Central American export earnings. They also represented close to one quarter of the region's total gross national product. The exportation of a few commodities weighing so heavily in the total value of a country's production can be viewed in two ways. It is often seen as a significant advantage. World trade allows a country to increase its national income, concentrating its resources in the production of those commodities wherein its comparative advantage lies and exchanging them for goods produced less expensively abroad than they could be domestically. This, in highly simplified form, is the essence of the static argument for free trade. In contrast, a pattern of production that concentrates heavily on a very few export commodities can also be viewed as a problem of dependence upon the unpredictable vagaries of world demand and supply conditions—a dependence that severely restricts a country's capacity to influence its own economic performance. After World War II, as conscious policies directed toward economic development assumed increasing priority in the underdeveloped world, the latter view became predominant.

Two specific complaints have been developed with regard to such dependence. The first concentrates on the fact that primary commodity trade has historically proved particularly vulnerable to marked short-term fluctuations of price and earnings. Where these products represent a substantial portion of national income, the effect of such fluctuations on economic performance can be significant. Furthermore, when countries are implementing development programs in which foreign exchange is a limiting factor, sudden shortfalls in export earnings can, by restricting imports, produce major bottlenecks and thus retard development.[66]

A second—and much more important—complaint focuses not on fluctuations in primary commodity export earnings, but on the long-term trends for such commodities. It argues that growth in demand for

[66] A recent study by Alasdair MacBean, *Export Instability and Economic Development* (Cambridge 1966), concludes that, with regard to the underdeveloped world *as a whole*, the problem of instability of export earnings has been overstated. The study does not deal with the second problem, that of longer-term trend prospects for primary commodity earnings.

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many primary commodities will be slow and therefore unreliable as an impetus to economic development. Future trade prospects for Central America's traditional exports are discouraging, a fact that underlines the applicability to Central America of arguments stressing the perils of undiversified export dependence. In 1966 the three major export crops—coffee, bananas, and cotton—accounted for 80 percent of the area's export earnings. Prospective world demand and supply conditions for these crops suggest that Central America's export sector is likely to grow in the medium-term future at a rate of no more than 3 percent per annum. Since the region's annual population growth rate —among the highest in the world—is close to 4 percent, traditional exports will make no contribution to raising Central American annual per capita income from its present base of $300.

There are two general explanations for the slow growth in world demand for agricultural products of the underdeveloped countries. The first involves the low income-elasticity of demand for foodstuffs: as income increases, a diminishing proportion of it is spent on food. The second is that the industrialized countries are becoming increasingly self-sufficient in agricultural products. This development is due both to great productivity gains in developed-country agricultural production and to increased levels of agricultural protection. The slow growth in world demand for the raw-material exports of the underdeveloped countries can again be traced to two developments in the industrialized countries: productivity gains, and the increasing replacement of raw-material inputs by synthetics in industrial production.

The years between 1950 and 1962 serve to illustrate the problem. The volume of underdeveloped-country exports rose slowly—57 percent over the period, or about 4.5 percent annually. In addition, the terms of trade for the underdeveloped countries deteriorated; that is to say, the prices they received for their exports fell sharply in relation to the prices they had to pay for their imports. For Latin America, the drop was 21 percent and, for the most part, reflected adverse movements in coffee prices.[67]

The issue of sluggish demand for many traditional exports of the less developed countries has been analyzed in detail on many occasions, and the effort to separate fact from fiction need not be repeated here. What is relevant for our purposes is that elites in countries like those of

[67] All measurements of terms-of-trade trends are heavily influenced by the base period chosen; different time periods would yield significantly different results. The years discussed here are chosen not because they are particularly representative of longer-term trends, but rather because they illustrate the problem that concerned Central American officials.

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Central America have been convinced by some overstated economic arguments that their continued dependence upon the export of a few primary products condemns them to economic instability and slow rates of growth. Furthermore, even a most judicious weighing of the evidence leads to the general conclusion that "the limited possibilities of expanding the exports of primary products would appear as a constraint to the acceleration of economic growth in the less developed countries."[68] This is particularly true for traditional Central American exports, while it would not be true for other primary products like fruits, certain vegetables, and beef, for which income-elasticities of demand are significantly higher. As these countries seek to diversify their economies through industrialization, major impediments to efficient production imposed by the size of their domestic markets on the one hand and the difficulties of exporting manufactured goods on the other most often result in inefficient structures of production, balance-of-payment difficulties, and economic stagnation.[69]

Problems posed by export dependence and by the limitations of microscopic domestic markets were major compelling factors in the Central American decision to attempt economic integration. And in less than a decade the results are striking: over 95 percent of the items listed in the Central American tariff schedule are entitled to free trade within the region; over 98 percent are covered by a common external tariff; regional trade has grown by close to 400 percent, rising from 6 percent of total Central American imports to close to 20 percent by 1968. It is interesting to note in the face of this impressive effort that more than twenty official attempts at political unification of the region have failed dismally since the disintegration of the original Central American Federation over a century ago.

In East Africa a major attempt at political unification in 1963 failed as well; yet economic union persists despite regional dissension. Here the explanation is similar, but with a variation: Economic union was a pre-independence achievement. When faced with the realization that the common market was disintegrating (1965-66), elites in each member country recognized the compellingness of the situation. For Kenya, it lay in the fact that her protected access to Tanzania and

[68] Balassa, *Economic Development and Integration*, 67. For a general discussion of the degree of primary commodity export dependence in Central America, see Hansen, chaps. 1 and 2.

[69] See Harry Johnson, *Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries* (Washington 1967), for a discussion of tariff structures in Europe and the United States and their effect upon the export possibilities for manufactured products from the less developed countries.

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Uganda provided the Kenyan manufacturing sector with its major foreign markets; without them Kenya's economy would face mounting structural difficulties. For the other two members, compellingness involved not present markets for manufactures so much as potential markets. They, even more than Kenya, needed the protection of the union's common external tariff to foster incipient manufacturing sectors. The bargain struck in June, 1967, and made operative in December cannot be explained in its entirety by this commitment to industrialization; without it, however, the course of events is inexplicable.

The pressures exerted by the international environment upon economies like those under consideration should not be understood to imply an absolute economic necessity for integration; they are more subtle. Economists studying underdeveloped countries speak of "demonstration effects"; political scientists talk about the "crises" of legitimacy, participation, and distribution arising in many of these countries in unison rather than sequentially.[70] Both groups are noting aspects of the same phenomenon—the broad social and psychological impact of the economically and politically developed world on other regions. Modernizing elites in most less developed countries have identified industrialization with development; to the extent that it is viewed as synonymous with modernity, industrialization has become a goal that transcends cost-benefit analysis.

This impact, too, is a transnational pressure especially compelling to the smallest, least developed countries. The greater are the limits to the growth of an industrial sector in one of these countries, imposed by lack of domestic purchasing power, and the more vulnerable is its present economy to the problems of export dependence, the *more compelling* are the pressures to resolve domestic problems through various modes of economic integration, and *the less possible* is a retreat into "national exclusiveness." This "model" must be qualified by the recognition that a certain learning period may be needed to convince such nations of the difficulties implied by exclusiveness. Contrasting Latin America with Africa, it is probable that the economic lesson is better understood where the "political kingdom" is of an older vintage. It may also be that Latin American nations are more prepared for differing forms of economic integration because the commitment of a substantial segment of their governing elites (and other politically relevant actors) to industrialization is a phenomenon with a half-century history.

[70] See various essays in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton 1966).

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If a final illustration of the interaction between international system and regional integration is needed, the issues raised at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development provide us with one. A major impediment to rapid economic growth within many less developed countries is that their domestic markets are too small to support efficient industrialization. If they were able to export their industrial products to the West, this bottleneck could be overcome. However, as many recent studies have shown, the levels of effective tariff protection in the United States and Western Europe are generally very high for just those industrial products the less developed countries are now manufacturing in quantity. This, then, is another important sense in which the international economic system is compelling Latin America and other regions toward various patterns of integration. Furthermore, given the internal conflicts engendered by common markets in such regions, it can surely be hypothesized that if the West were to abolish the tariffs in question—for example, those on textiles, leather goods, sporting goods, and bicycles—or to grant significant trade preferences to the less developed countries, movements toward regional integration in Asia, Africa, and Latin America would probably experience a major setback.[71] Faced with the lure of the West's markets, less developed countries would probably conclude that the costs of regional integration far outweighed its benefits. Thus transnational forces—in this instance trade patterns and the process of industrialization—can be both integrating and disintegrating in nature. Unless and until regional integration theory is amended to take account of such variables, it will continue to present only a partial picture of the total process.

The use of the word "model" two paragraphs above should be disclaimed immediately. No systematic attempt to construct an alternative approach has been included in this critique of the neofunctionalist paradigm of regional integration. Nor is it suggested that the Haas-Schmitter model, which has provided the focus for much of the preceding discussion, is not a valuable contribution to our understanding of the integration process. An examination of this literature in the light of present empirical evidence does suggest, however, that major attention should be paid to two sets of unresolved questions.

First, just how expansive is "the logic of economic integration?" Theoretical and empirical issues raised here suggest that the "hidden

[71] For differing views on the capacity of the less developed countries to benefit from such preferences, see Gardner Patterson, "Would Tariff Preferences Help Economic Development?", *Lloyds Bank Review*, No. 76 (April 1965); and Harry Johnson, "Trade Preferences and Developing Countries," *ibid.*, No. 80 (April 1966).

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hand" of the marketplace in economic integration schemes among advanced economies with increasingly competent monetary and fiscal policy tools may operate to diminish the number of distribution crises, limit spillover into politics, and promote the coordination of sovereign national policies rather than the emergence of supranational institutions. Conversely, the "logic of economic integration" among less developed countries—as suggested by economic analysis and confirmed empirically—may generally substitute overpoliticization for gradual politicization, significantly diminishing the relevance of current neofunctionalist theory. Finally, if high and low politics are still best conceptualized as discontinuous, how does spillover affect changing perceptions of the former category?

Second, what is the theoretically appropriate manner of relating the process of regional integration to the international environment in which it operates? The lower the degree of regional autonomy in the present international system, the more necessary will it be for present theoretical approaches that concentrate on what we have labeled *endogenous* regional factors—or variables, in the Haas-Schmitter sense—to incorporate *exogenous* factors in a systematic manner. Events in the Western European, Latin American, and East African cases considered above reflect a dynamic interaction between an internal regional dialectic, analyzed by present theory, and changing international environmental pressures relatively unexplored in current neofunctionalist literature. Resolving the problem may prove theoretically and empirically formidable; ignoring it will hamper productive research.

In this context, are there not some advantages to examining in far greater detail the concept and ramifications of compellingness? Would it not lead to a better understanding of the dynamics of economic unions like the Central American and East African common markets than does an emphasis on political culture, present rate of transactions, elite complementarities, and the like? Would it not suggest that such economic integration schemes may be increasingly compelled to function—perhaps for decades—with rather minor implications for political integration?[72] Might it not shed new light on the difficulties facing LAFTA, in which some large member countries with sizeable internal markets are far less compelled than others?[73] May not Argentina and

[72] If this proves to be the case, Etzioni's predictions regarding "medium-level integration, e.g., economic only, or economic with a minimum of political," may have to be amended. Over the past decade Central America has neither become more integrated at the political level nor regressed to a lower level of integration.

[73] Other elements are of course important in determining attitudes in the larger member countries. Mexico has often been LAFTA's strongest proponent, principally because Mexican products are thought to be highly competitive in a LAFTA-wide market.

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Brazil be more able, but perhaps less willing, to engage in endless LAFTA negotiations whose payoff, given the small amount of trade involved, may be quite marginal for them? May they not choose in favor of bilateral—rather than continental—integration arrangements? Finally, might not such an approach be more fruitful in comprehending such spin-offs from LAFTA as the Andean bloc, whose member states' needs for economic integration, in order to overcome present obstacles to efficient industrialization and sustained growth, are significantly greater than are those of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—and who may therefore be more willing to take significant steps toward integration?

Such observations suggest the need for regional integration theory concerned with less developed areas of the world to move in the direction proposed by Karl Kaiser *à propos* of Western Europe. One student of Africa and Latin America has already argued for the introduction of the concept of an outside catalyst, while recognizing that if such a catalyst proves to be a relevant variable, "automatic politicization" à la Haas-Schmitter would have little meaning.[74] This is a step in the proper direction, though it does not seem to go far enough. The idea of a *deus ex machina* as necessary to regional integration theory can attain its proper significance only if it is incorporated in such a way that relevant exogenous variables—including both external actors and transnational forces of change—cannot be ignored. And an empirical systems-analysis approach may prove to be the most effective method of fulfilling this requirement. The difficulties of such an approach are obvious. The more comprehensive the scope becomes, the more apparent it is that all aspects of international and regional change are a part of a "seamless web" of social reality that defies exhaustive treatment. Hence the advantages of regional integration theory that is partial and selective in scope; and hence, unfortunately, its present limitations.

[74] Nye, "Patterns and Catalysts," 882.

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Review Articles

TOTALITARIANISM

The Revised Standard Version

By ROBERT BURROWES*

Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 3rd edition, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1966, 526 pp. $8.75.

Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 2nd edition, revised by Carl J. Friedrich, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965, 439 pp. $9.95.

THE virtually simultaneous appearance of new editions of Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and Carl Friedrich's and Zbigniew Brzezinski's *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* affords an opportunity to reopen the question of the utility of the classical theory of totalitarianism in systematic comparative political analysis. The original editions of these two volumes went far toward shaping lay and academic understandings of totalitarianism in the 1950's; in addition, most subsequent general scholarship on totalitarianism has been written implicitly or explicitly in the light of—if not in reaction to—these two earlier works.[1]

A rereading of the original editions suggests that a single "classical theory" of totalitarianism exists more in the memories of readers than between the covers of these two volumes. Strikingly similar in some respects, the theories of Arendt and of Friedrich and Brzezinski are at best complementary and often surprisingly dissimilar in other important respects. For this reason, and contrary to my original impulse, I will treat the two volumes separately.

I

The latest edition of *The Origins of Totalitarianisn* is an unrevised hard-cover reissue of the revised paperback edition of 1958, minus the

* A version of this article was originally presented at a colloquium during my year as a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Studies at New York University, 1967-68. I wish to thank the Center for its kind support, material and otherwise, and those Junior and Senior Fellows who offered many helpful comments and criticisms on the original effort.

[1] See, for example, Bertram D. Wolfe, *Communist Totalitarianism* (Boston 1956); John A. Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism* (New York 1961); Adam Ulam, *The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963); Alfred Meyer, *The Soviet Political System* (New York 1965); and Dante L. Germino, *The Italian Fascist Party in Power* (Minneapolis, Minn. 1959).

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Epilogue on the Hungarian Revolt. What is new, and rather interesting, is a twenty-page Introductory Essay that concisely restates the thesis of the earlier editions and states explicitly for the first time Miss Arendt's position on the durability of Soviet totalitarianism.

On this latter point, Arendt states that with the death of Stalin the Soviet Union began "an authentic, though never unequivocal, process of detotalitarization" (ix). Soviet citizens emerged from "the nightmare of totalitarian rule to the manifold hardships, dangers, and injustices of one-party dictatorship" (xxi). Unfortunately, Arendt does not attempt to explain the dynamics of Soviet detotalitarization. The ascendency of the party and army over the secret police, and the rich recovery of the arts, are taken as evidence, not explanation, of this process. If anything, Arendt seems to attribute much to Stalin's death itself, and—in this regard—appears to be in agreement with Robert Tucker's recent emphasis on the crucial role of the totalitarian leader.[2] It is perhaps for this reason that she believes that the Soviet Union "can relapse into totalitarianism between one day and another without major upheaval" (ix).

The Origins of Totalitarianism is a study of totalitarianism only in part. The more encompassing subject of Arendt's inquiry is "the crisis of our times," i.e., the rapid twentieth-century demise of the "bourgeois-dominated class society" and nation-state. Totalitarianism is only the most recent of three manifestations of this crisis. Consequently, it is the specific subject of only a little more than the last third of her study. The rest is devoted to an always interesting and sometimes original and profound analysis of the origins and natures of the other two expressions of this crisis: anti-Semitism and imperialism. Moreover, the part of Arendt's study that does deal directly with totalitarianism is concerned less with established totalitarian political systems than with the prerequisites, nature, and dynamics of totalitarian mass movements during their ascendancy. On this point, Arendt's original and insightful thinking has justifiably influenced the study of modern social and political movements. Her analysis of the psychological ("loneliness") and sociological ("classes into masses") conditions out of which mass movements emerge continues to influence current scholarship.[3] Further, her analysis of the organization and dynamics of these movements is full of suggestive insights, e.g., their multilayered, "onion-like structure."

Arendt's treatment of totalitarianism as a type of political system is

[2] See below, part III.

[3] See, for example, William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill. 1959).

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far less satisfactory than her treatment of mass movements prior to their assumption of power. Difficulty on this matter begins with her connotative, not her denotative, definition. She states unambiguously that "up to now we know only two authentic forms of totalitarian domination: the dictatorship of National Socialism after 1938, and the dictatorship of Bolshevism since 1930" (419). Her study is laced with arguments and "proof"—most of it convincing—of the nontotalitarian character of Italian fascism and other modern class or party dictatorships, including those that grew out of movements which were totalitarian at their inception.[4] In her new Introductory Essay, moreover, Arendt seems to regard the former "satellites" of the Soviet Union as nontotalitarian Communist one-party dictatorships. About China, she is inclined to reserve final judgment, although the beginnings of the Cultural Revolution do suggest to her a possible turn toward full-blown totalitarianism analogous to Stalin's "second revolution" of 1928 (x-xii). In short, Arendt consistently follows her own admonition and uses "the word 'totalitarianism' sparingly and prudently" (xii).

By contrast, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* does not easily yield up an explicit and clearly stated connotative definition. Arendt *seems* to conceive of totalitarianism as a political system of "total domination," total domination being defined as "the permanent domination of each single individual in each and every sphere of life" (326).[5] Terror—not ideology—is "the very essence of its form of government"; the secret police—not the party or army—is the executor and guardian, and the concentration camp is the laboratory, of "its experiment in total domination" (344, 392). However, to distill even this definition, the reader has both to search the volume with great care and to discard along the way many suggestive alternatives, each with implications of its own.[6]

Arendt conceives of totalitarianism in teleological terms, at one point referring to it as an "experiment in organizing a people for ultimate purposes" (392). It is less clear, however, precisely what she conceives the *telos* of totalitarianism to be. She does insist that "the totalitarian form of government has very little to do with lust for power or even the desire for a power-generating machine, with the game of power for

[4] See Arendt, 308. For a less convincing argument, which makes a large population a prerequisite of totalitarianism, see 310.

[5] That "total domination" is the core of Arendt's definition is suggested by the fact that it appears at least eleven times in the Introductory Essay to the new edition.

[6] In her concluding chapter, Arendt defines totalitarianism more explicitly as "a form of government whose essence is terror and whose principle of action is the logicality of ideological thinking" (474).

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power's sake" (407).[7] In support of this disclaimer, there is much to suggest that she regards "total domination and global rule" as merely instrumentally related to the goal of fabricating a new kind of human species—described variously as "living corpses" or "inanimate men, i.e., men who can no longer be psychologically understood" (451, 441). This interpretation finds support in the fact that she regards the concentration camp as the purest form of total domination, and believes its purpose to be the "experiment of eliminating . . . spontaneity itself . . . and of transforming the human personality into a mere thing" (438). At times, however, Arendt does seem to reverse this relationship and make the transformation of human nature a necessary condition for total domination. At one point she states that man "can be fully dominated only when he becomes a specimen of the animal-species man (457)." Viewed in this perspective, the importance of the camp is that it provides "the only form of society in which it is possible to dominate men entirely" (456).

Consequently, I am never certain whether Arendt regards "total domination and global rule" as means to the fabrication of "inanimate men," or *vice versa*. At times she seems to regard the two as so inextricably intertwined as to render impossible any distinction between them in terms of instrumental and ultimate purposes. In all probability, however, she conceives both goals to be instrumentally related to an even more ultimate purpose—the transformation of "the human species into an active unfailing carrier of a law" (462). Total domination and global rule permit the destruction of an infinitely varied and irrepressible humanity that otherwise would not embody "the law of Nature or the law of History" (462). In this fashion, totalitarianism meets the need of the elite "to make the world consistent, to prove that its respective [ideological] supersense has been right"; it enables the elite to translate "reality into fiction" and to prove that "everything is possible" (392, 458-59).[8]

The usefulness of Arendt's conception of totalitarianism for comparative political analysis is further qualified by a number of *a priori* assumptions. For one thing, her theory is an example of what has been referred to as the "unitotalitarian" approach: Nazism and Soviet communism are assumed to be so alike as to be virtually identical.[9] The only differences she repeatedly refers to are the bases of their ideological

[7] Arendt finds the absence of the more conventional power urge to be one of the most disturbing characteristics of totalitarianism (417-18).

[8] For a paragraph that seems to point in a number of teleological directions, see 392.

[9] See Alexander Groth, "The 'Isms' of Totalitarianism," *The American Political Science Review*, LVIII (December 1964) 888-901.

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appeals—race and socialism—and the fact that Stalin had to create artificially the atomized society that had been prepared for Hitler by historical circumstances. Assuming identity between Nazism and Soviet communism, and often stretching the facts to meet this assumption,[10] Arendt fails to anticipate or allow for the possibility, suggested by Zevedei Barbu and more recently by John Kautsky, that it may be more useful to think in terms of more than one variant of totalitarianism.[11]

The "unitotalitarian" assumption is central to the failure of Arendt's theory to provide a convincing description and explanation of the Stalinist system. This inadequacy largely stems from the fact that the theory was derived primarily from the Nazi experience and then analogically extended to the Soviet Union. The process of analogical extension is inherently dangerous, and its dangers are magnified when the data on the system to which a theory is being extended are scarce and/or unreliable. This seems to be what happened in Arendt's case. A theory generated from good data was extended analogically to what by comparison was a *terra incognita*. By the late 1940's and early 1950's, the quantity of reliable data on Nazism was staggering; by contrast, the amount of reliable knowledge about the Soviet Union for the period from the late 1920's through the 1940's was meager. Consequently, Arendt's theory had free rein when applied to the Soviet Union. Data that in a data-abundant setting would have been ruled insufficient or questionable were taken as proof of the theory's validity. Indeed, it is not going too far to suggest that in some instances the theory tended to generate its own data.[12]

Viewing the Soviet system through lenses ground to the specifications of Nazism causes Arendt to fail to see things that were there, as well as to see things that were not there. The most notable defect of those lenses is their failure to focus on the relationship between the Stalinist system and the process of forced modernization and development. It is possible to read *The Origins of Totalitarianism* without getting the slightest inkling that the political events and process that are described in detail were paralleled by—much less systemically related to—the rapid and radical modernization of most aspects of Soviet society.

This is by no means an unconscious error of omission on Arendt's

[10] For example, see the strained analogy on 411.

[11] See Zevedei Barbu, *Democracy and Dictatorship* (New York 1956), 5-7; and John Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries* (New York 1962), 97-113.

[12] For example, the theory itself seems to be the basis of Arendt's accepting the highest death figures for the Stalinist era. See 417.

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part. In her new Essay she quite explicitly dissociates totalitarian politics and the task of modernization, and dismisses the "current view" that is wont to relate the two.[13] She sees Stalin's social programs and policies solely as responses to the peculiar political needs of the system. Unlike Hitler, who fell heir to a mass society, Stalin after 1928 had to "prepare the country for totalitarian government"; he had to "fabricate an atomized and structureless mass" (318-19). The collectivization of agriculture, the Five-Year Plans, and the Great Purge are explained as means of transforming classes into masses, the *sine qua non* of totalitarianism. The implication clearly is that Stalin effected profound social change in order to create a full-blown totalitarian political system, rather than *vice versa*.[14]

Arendt's inability to see a relationship between the politics of Stalinism and the goal of rapid modernization helps to explain her judgment that the most distinguishing feature of totalitarianism is the use of terror that has no "*raison d'état* in the old sense of the term" (321). Her argument for this, reiterated in her new essay, rests on the belief that "totalitarian terror . . . is let loose when all organized opposition has died down and the totalitarian ruler knows that he no longer need to be afraid" (xiv).[15] Arendt fails to see that the increased use of fear and coercion occurred during and immediately after the first phase of radical social transformation and is possibly related to the tensions and strains created by that process. She fails to see this despite her awareness that the drive for collectivization and industrialization ended "a beginning reconciliation between the people and its government," and was resisted by many workers and by "the solidarity of the whole peasant class" (xv).

The decidedly non-comparative nature of Arendt's theory is explained in large part by the assumption that totalitarianism, despite superficial similarities to other systems, is unique and totally new.[16] She is unequivocal in her insistence that totalitarian systems develop

[13] Arendt takes Isaac Deutscher, Richard Lowenthal, and Merle Fainsod to task on this point, and suggests that the linkage they establish is a "Marxist hangover." Unfortunately for Arendt's case, the absence of a systemic link between totalitarian politics and modernization is not proven by the facts that modernization could have been effected by other means and that the means chosen were probably dysfunctional to that process (xvii-xviii).

[14] See 318-23.

[15] Arendt writes in the main body of her text that "terror increased both in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany in inverse ratio to the existence of internal political opposition, so that it looked as though political opposition had not been the pretext of terror (as liberal accusers of the regime were wont to assert) but the last impediment to its full fury" (393).

[16] See 419, 460, and also chap. 13 *passim*.

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such entirely new institutions and operate according to so radically different a set of values that "none of our traditional legal, moral, or common sense utilitarian categories . . . [can] help us to come to terms with, or judge, or predict their course of action" (460). Consequently, she does not attempt to locate totalitarianism within a typology of political systems or to analyze it in terms of a general and inclusive set of political categories; instead, she draws a sharp conceptual and theoretical line between totalitarianism and "the traditional political forces —liberal or conservative, national or socialist, republican or monarchist, authoritarian or democratic" (460). Elaborated *in vacuo*, her theory of totalitarianism makes rigorous comparison difficult, if not impossible.

Arendt's emphasis upon the uniqueness of totalitarianism has a more serious effect than her failure to cast her theory in comparative terms. She repeatedly warns the liberal that totalitarianism "only *seems* familiar to the student of despotism" (442);[17] her deepest fear is the "great temptation to explain away the intrinsically incredible by means of liberal rationalizations" (440). Unfortunately, concern to lay bare the "intrinsically incredible" nature of totalitarianism leads Arendt to an unacceptable guide to political inquiry and standard by which political explanations are to be judged acceptable or unacceptable. Her *modus operandi* would seem to be to select the less, rather than the more, plausible explanation. Since totalitarianism verges on being beyond logic, reason, or belief, the explanation that is more illogical, irrational, and unbelievable is given the benefit of the doubt.[18]

The theory generated by this peculiar procedure contains an exotic or fantastic bias. Arendt's conception of totalitarianism is that of a "fictitious, topsy-turvy world" (437). The most striking feature of that world is less the omnipresence than the non-utilitarian character of terror. Unlike the terror of other systems, totalitarian terror is not understandable in terms of the utilitarian motives or self-interest of the rulers. It is explicable only as a means to the insane, anti-utilitarian and selfless "experimental inquiry into what is possible" (436, 440). Nevertheless, the sheer ubiquity of terror also distinguishes Arendt's conception. The instruments of terror—the secret police and concentration camps—assume paramount significance as her theory unfolds.[19] The party, bureaucracy, and other instruments of rule derive their

[17] Italics in original.

[18] This standard comes into play especially in Arendt's treatment of the secret police and the concentration camps. See 419-25, 437-59.

[19] Arendt asserts that the police is "the true executive branch of the government" (430), and that the concentration camp is "the true central institution of totalitarian organizational power" (438).

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importance and distinctiveness solely from the terroristic essence of totalitarianism. Arendt's explication moves logically from the nonessential to the essential: from the ascendant totalitarian movement in a nontotalitarian society, to "imperfect" totalitarianism in power, and finally to the "perfected terror" of the concentration camp. The consuming drive for "total domination and global rule" is explained by the fact that totalitarianism remains imperfect and vulnerable as long as the "concentration-camp society" is not coextensive with the entire world. Significantly, Arendt discusses the concentration camp last and under the heading of "total domination." Totalitarianism as an ideal is finally reduced to the camp and its population of dehumanized and mutually interchangeable executioners and victims, i.e., to "the society of the dying" (456). It is in terms of this essentially fantastic construct that she attempts to explain all that took place of theoretical relevance in Germany after 1938 and in the Soviet Union after 1928.

An over-reliance on deductive reasoning and a disregard for data contribute to the tendency of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* to lose touch with reality. Arendt's theory is a logical *tour de force* despite its verbiage and minor ambiguities. Its elegance and architectonic character become apparent as it is deduced entirely from the premise that the use of terror in the absence of opposition can be explained only in terms of the attempt by the leaders to validate the ideological conceit that "everything is possible." Arendt leaves few loose ends; virtually everything is traceable to this initial premise.[20] Unfortunately, however, her deductions from this premise lead to an extremely reductionist theory. In the process, factuality and the great complexity of the reality she has chosen to call "totalitarian" are sacrificed to simplicity and consistency. The theory that issues from this process does not approximate reality even to the degree required of an ideal type. In short, Arendt seems to succumb to the pattern of thought she most decries—"the logicality of ideological thinking" (474).

Despite a large bibliography and lengthy footnotes, Arendt does not marshal data in a systematic way to illustrate or to test her theory; instead, data and the opinions of other authorities are cited selectively and often in a very contrived way.[21] Innumerable factually unsupported assertions serve to support her major assertions. Indeed, the

[20] For examples of the rather unfortunate lengths to which Arendt is prepared to go with logic, see xx, 350, 380, 390, 416, and 458.

[21] A glaring example is Arendt's use of Victor Kravchenko's *I Chose Freedom* (New York 1946). Admitting that it is "a highly questionable source," Arendt defends her use of it by asserting that it is no more questionable than "material . . . furnished by the Russian Government" (321).

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sheer assertiveness of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is noteworthy. Such words as "obviously," "unquestionably," "clearly," and so on, frequently take the place of data to support assertions that are at least debatable. What this suggests is simply that Arendt is not a social scientist. She does not confront reality with the tentativeness and skepticism of the scientist; nor does she demand as much of reality in the way of evidence as does the scientist.

Finally, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is flawed as an aid to systematic comparative political analysis by its judgmental and pejorative tone. In the first place, analysis and moral criticism are so inextricably intertwined that the latter constantly interferes with—indeed, supersedes—the former. Systematic analysis frequently gives way without warning to the vocabulary of outrage and condemnation. Such evocative terms as "totalitarian virus," "nightmare," and "terror-sustained lying fiction" have little analytical utility. Unfortunately, Arendt frequently uses these terms and others like them as an integral part of her analysis. In the second place, at the core of her often strident and emotional critique is a fundamentalism which has its normative basis in the Judeo-Christian and Western political traditions. Arendt believes deeply that totalitarianism is the absolute antithesis of those traditions. Reflecting this belief, her conception of totalitarianism has taken on the character of a demonic construct: it is no less than man's first successful attempt at "radical evil" (443, 459). What she says of the concentration camp might equally be said of her conception of totalitarianism in general: It resembles nothing so much as "medieval pictures of Hell" (447).[22] It is not surprising that, viewed in this perspective, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* finally reduces itself to a vast morality play in which the political forces of good are pitted against those of evil, and in which "coexistence is not possible" (xii).

In the final analysis, Arendt's theory of totalitarianism is brilliantly wrong. Its chief virtue—its logicality—is also its chief vice. Her numerous flashes of insight are not sufficient to support a conception of totalitarianism that can only be described at best as caricature and at worst as fantasy. It is perhaps ironic that a person who sees totalitarianism as an attempt to translate reality into fiction should herself produce a fictitious theory. What is disturbing is that the hysteria of the Cold War allowed so many—academics among them—to confuse Arendt's fiction with reality.

[22] For this metaphor carried to the point of a political distinction among Hades, Purgatory, and Hell, see 445.

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II

Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy has been revised by one of its original authors, Carl J. Friedrich. New chapters have been added on autocracy, the legal system, and literature and the arts (this last by Gail Lapidus). The Foreword states that extensive revisions were made on the sections on terror; that minor changes were made throughout the rest of the book to take account of subsequent events and scholarship; and that, in all, "about a quarter to a third of the text . . . is new." New chapters and changes notwithstanding, the conception of totalitarianism presented in the original edition is not altered in a fundamental way. Though viewed as "in part a critique" of that conception, the revised edition bears witness to Friedrich's belief that "on the whole . . . both the theory and practice of totalitarian dictatorship have tended to confirm the analysis we offered" (viii).

The original edition of *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* takes as its point of departure the assumptions that "totalitarian dictatorship is historically unique and *sui generis* . . . (and) that fascist and communist totalitarian dictatorships are basically alike" (5). The organization and argument of the book emphasize both the similarities between Nazism and Soviet communism and the differences between them and other political systems. Unlike Arendt, however, Friedrich and Brzezinski do not push these assumptions to the extreme. As they point out, to say that the Nazi and Soviet systems "are *basically alike* . . . means that they are *not wholly alike*" (7).[23] Accordingly, many differences are enumerated, and a few of them are elaborated upon at some length. Unfortunately, however, these differences are by no means dealt with as systematically as the similarities; no attempt is made to explain or to suggest a pattern to these many differences. The result would seem to justify the assertion that *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* also contains a "unitotalitarian" bias.

Friedrich and Brzezinski cast their theory in more comparative terms than does Arendt. They at least begin with the assumption that totalitarianism, while different, is nonetheless a member of the family of autocracies; they attempt initially to compare and contrast it with other autocratic systems in terms of a number of factors (e.g., degrees of accountability). Unfortunately, their attempt is not put in a typological form that would facilitate comparison; intent notwithstanding, their theory of totalitarianism is not explicitly derived from "the general

[23] Italics in original.

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framework of our knowledge of government and politics" (vii). What comparisons are made in subsequent chapters tend to be casual and unsystematic. More often than not, moreover, they are made between totalitarianism and the *theory* of constitutional government rather than between totalitarianism and the *practice* of other and more closely related autocratic forms.

The revised edition of *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* does not meet these objections adequately. Friedrich makes no effort to treat the differences between Nazism and Soviet communism in a more theoretical and systematic way; if anything, the differences are blurred further by his suggestion that recent changes have brought "the Soviet Union closer to some Fascist regimes" (viii).[24] His decision to begin the revised edition with a new chapter on autocracy helps only slightly to give his and Brzezinski's theory a more comparative perspective. The chapter is loosely discursive and, again, fails to take a rigorous typological approach; moreover, its terms of discourse are more those of classical political philosophy than of modern political science. Whatever its character, the chapter seems to have had little influence upon Friedrich's approach to—or the content of—subsequent chapters. Finally, and most disappointing of all, the comparisons made in the new material tend to be between totalitarianism and traditional forms of autocracy. What the new chapter fails to do is to distinguish systematically between totalitarianism and the other modern variants of nondemocratic politics, particularly the newly emergent "modernizing" dictatorships. This is where the greatest confusion currently lies, and consequently this is precisely where systematic differentiation is most needed.

The principal shortcoming of the original edition of *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* is the absence of a solid core of theory. Unlike Arendt's work, in which theory tends to overwhelm data, the theoretical content of Friedrich's and Brzezinski's work often seems too insubstantial and shaky to support the mass of data and examples marshalled on its behalf. For one thing, instead of explicitly defining totalitarianism connotatively, they have chosen to identify totalitarianism in terms of a set of six interrelated traits or characteristics—Friedrich's oft-referred-to "totalitarian syndrome" (9-10).[25] The syndrome includes an official ideology, a single party typically led by one man, a terroristic police, a communications monoply, a weapons monopoly,

[24] See also 26, 54.

[25] The syndrome was first presented by Friedrich in slightly modified form in *Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1954), a volume edited by him for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

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and a centrally directed economy. Outlined in Chapter 1 of *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, the syndrome provides both the organizational framework of the book and the conceptual focal point of its authors' understanding of totalitarianism. Unfortunately, a syndrome of identifying characteristics is not an adequate substitute for an explicit connotative definition; in the medical sciences, from which the term is borrowed, a syndrome identifies an otherwise defined pathology. The result, in the case of Friedrich and Brzezinski, is confusion and vagueness as to the essentially distinct nature of totalitarianism. The conceptual problem their approach creates is somewhat like that created by an attempt to convey the meaning of an automobile solely by a description of its parts (e.g., engine, wheels, brakes, and so on). The auto itself remains difficult to comprehend, and the parts have no extrinsic meaning and interrelatedness, logical or functional. Without question, the notable lack of rigor in *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* can be traced largely to its authors' decision to take the syndrome instead of a connotative definition of totalitarianism as their point of departure.

Unlike Arendt, moreover, the authors of *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* feel compelled to define totalitarianism denotatively to include Mussolini's Italy.[26] This was an unfortunate decision. In attempting to apply the syndrome, Friedrich and Brzezinski are repeatedly forced either to except Italy more or less completely or to dilute and qualify their understanding of the characteristics and dynamics of totalitarianism so as to make it applicable to the Italian case.[27] The effect is both to blur the distinctiveness they ascribe to totalitarianism and to invite inclusion of a large number of political systems that most scholars—perhaps Friedrich and Brzezinski included—would be reluctant to call totalitarian. In short, taken together, the absence of an explicit connotative definition and the denotative inclusion of Italian fascism lead towards a very elastic and indiscriminate conception of totalitarianism, one that comes very close to being synonomous with modern dictatorship in general.

What serves to diminish even more the rigor of Friedrich's and Brzezinski's theory is their apparently conscious decision not to take a teleological or essentialist approach to totalitarianism. It seems clear—

[26] The authors also use, but much less systematically, Communist China and the Eastern European "satellites" as empirical referents of totalitarianism. (See 294.)

[27] This is most evident in their treatment of terror, the police, and the concentration camps. (See 46.) Interestingly, Arendt uses the quantitatively and qualitatively different character of terror in Fascist Italy as her chief argument for its nontotalitarian character. (See Arendt, 308.)

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in hindsight, at least—that they regard formulation of their theory in terms of a syndrome of characteristics to be a preferable alternative to such an approach. Apparently doubtful as to whether a general purpose or essence of totalitarianism either exists or is readily discoverable, they choose to build their understanding around the organization and methods that collectively distinguish totalitarianism from other political systems. Unfortunately, this metatheoretical decision poses at least three difficulties. In the first place, there would seem to be a contradiction between a nonteleological theory of totalitarianism and the syndrome itself. An extremely prominent aspect of the syndrome is an utopian ideology that is "focused and projected toward a perfect final state of mankind" (9); the authors maintain, and go to great lengths to demonstrate, that this "official ideology" is taken seriously and acted upon by the totalitarian leadership.[28] Consequently, it seems that a particular kind of purpose—utopianism—is implicit in their conception of totalitarianism. If not, it would seem that their syndrome is fundamentally misleading.

Secondly, Friedrich and Brzezinski feel compelled repeatedly to slip *telos* in through the back door to explain particular behavior and events in their detailed and more empirical treatment of the various aspects of the syndrome. On some occasions, it is put in the form of the needs of the system, its maintenance or inherent dynamics (109, 150, 155); on others, it is put more behaviorally in terms of the goals and motives of the totalitarian elite (84-85, 130-31). Unfortunately, these choices seem to be extremely arbitrary—matters of explanatory convenience—and often quite contradictory. If, as probably is the case, multiple and often contradictory "purposes" do operate in any given totalitarian system, then they must be treated in a systematic way if confusion is to be avoided. In short, one result of failing to deal in general theoretical terms with the question of teleology is the worst sort of *ad hoc* "teleogizing." Finally, the failure of Friedrich and Brzezinski to deal generally with this question leaves their theory vulnerable to misuse by those who would tailor it to their own theoretical purposes. The syndrome, emptied of teleological or essential content, is like an old bottle into which all kinds of new wine can be poured indiscriminately. It is particularly suited to a simplistic reduction of the complexities of totalitarian politics to "total power" or the "power urge." That it is others, and not Friedrich and Brzezinski, who abuse the concept in this fashion is beside the point. What is very much to the point is that their conception lends itself to such abuse so readily.

[28] See Chapters 7-9.

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Despite occasional Orwellian overtones, their treatment of totalitarianism is fairly free of some of the excesses that mar Arendt's work.[29] References to the fantastic or demonic nature of totalitarianism are much less in evidence. Though less clear and consistent, their conception is more believable than hers. The main thrust of their *ad hoc* and often implicit theorizing is to suggest an instrumental relationship between totalitarian politics and the ideologically defined goal of revolutionary social change (84-85); indeed, they seem to regard totalitarianism as a response to the requirements of this goal (293-99). Consequently, attention is given to the role of ideology, the educational system, and youth organizations in the process of social and cultural change; attention is also given to the relationship between a centrally planned and directed economy, and the "battle for production" and development. Unlike Arendt, moreover, they believe that "it is this determination to achieve total change that begets the terror. Change always entails opposition. . . . In a totalitarian society opposition is prevented from developing by the organization of total terror" (131). Unfortunately, these theoretical threads tend to get lost in Friedrich's and Brzezinski's analysis. As often as not, they reduce politically planned and implemented societal change of great speed, scope, and degree to an incidental subplot in the totalitarian political drama.

The revised edition of *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* indicates some awareness on Friedrich's part of the definitional and teleological shortcomings of his and Brzezinski's conception of totalitarianism. If anything, however, Friedrich's recent thinking seems to be pulling in different directions. At one point he seems to suggest a connotative definition that is teleological in nature when he states that totalitarianism is "a system of rule for realizing totalist intentions under modern political and technical conditions" (17).[30] At another point, he seems to be attempting to make a juncture between the syndrome by which totalitarianism is identified and its *telos*: "The specific difference, the innovation of the totalitarian regimes, is the organization and methods developed and employed . . . in an effort to . . . [effect] total control in the service of an ideologically motivated movement, dedicated to the total destruction and reconstruction of a mass society" (17). Unfortunately, Friedrich never quite completes the juncture; indeed, he seems ultimately to retreat from this modification of his theory. For one thing, he now uses the term "morphological" to

[29] Orwell does lurk in the background, and is specifically cited by Friedrich and Brzezinski on a number of occasions. (See 99, 134, 294.)

[30] Elsewhere in the revised edition Friedrich defines totalitarianism as "an autocracy based upon modern technology and mass legitimation" (4).

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distinguish his theory from others, morphology being a branch of knowledge that deals with form and structure, *without regard to function* (vii). Further, he has revised a key passage to read that the similarity between Fascist and Communist totalitarianism is specifically "in terms of organization and procedures—that is to say, in terms of structure, institutions, and processes of rule" (19). In keeping with this reaffirmation of his earlier position, he continues to make the syndrome the chief focus of his theory and the basis of his explication.

What seems to prevent Friedrich from effecting this juncture more completely is his continued reluctance to take an essentialist or teleological approach to totalitarianism. He makes this position explicit for the first time in a recent paper in which he states that "it is doubtful whether . . . an essentialist or teleological theory will remain tenable, as totalitarianism matures."[31] However, after criticizing Brzezinski and others for their efforts in this direction, Friedrich in this same paper defines totalitarianism as the attempt to realize the "totalist intentions" of an "ideologically motivated movement."[32] The difference between this and Brzezinski's new emphasis upon "institutionalized revolutionary zeal" and "the purpose of effecting a total social revolution"[33]—the specific points to which Friedrich objects—is difficult to discern.

To the unresolved confusion concerning the *telos* of Friedrich's conception of totalitarianism must be added a pronounced dilution of that conception in order to include what he now calls "popular totalitarianism" (53). On the one hand, he broadens his denotative definition to include at least Castro's Cuba (32), Tito's Yugoslavia (370), and Nkrumah's Ghana (353). On the other hand, dilution occurs through the subtle reinterpretation of certain elements of the syndrome itself. The first edition has the virtue of clearly placing emphasis upon the secret police and overt terror, and upon the relationship between these aspects of totalitarianism and the need to use coercion against individuals and groups opposed to the regime and its revolutionary goals (p. 131). In the revised edition, the syndrome is stretched to fit regimes in which "psychic terror" and "widespread consensus" have largely replaced overt terror and opposition (viii).[34] To object to this extension is not to suggest that internalized constraints and a degree of consensus have

[31] Carl J. Friedrich, "The Changing Theory and Practice of Totalitarianism," mimeographed, prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September, 1967, 2.

[32] *Ibid.*, 5, 6.

[33] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York 1962), 19, 20.

[34] "Consensus" is a major theme in the revised edition; Friedrich also refers to "general consensus" (13) and "broad national consensus" (26).

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no place in a theory of totalitarianism. What is objectionable is that such an extension of the syndrome, unless elaborated further than Friedrich has chosen to do, blurs much that remains of the distinction between totalitarianism and nontotalitarian forms of modern dictatorship. In a similar way, the requirement of a centrally controlled economy is relaxed to allow for economies characterized by a significant degree of decentralization (223-24).[35] Most surprising, particularly in the light of the emphasis he places upon utopian ideology, is his assertion in his recent paper that ultimately "totalitarian regimes will probably resemble other governments as far as their ends or objectives are concerned."[36]

More generally, the dilution of Friedrich's conception of totalitarianism proceeds apace by means of both the distinction between the "early stages" of totalitarianism and "mature" totalitarianism, and the introduction of a cyclical notion of recurring "harsh" and "lenient" phases of totalitarianism (375). The early stages and recurring harsh phases conform to the syndrome as originally conceived, while mature totalitarianism and the lenient phases are characterized by an out-of-focus version of the syndrome that includes psychic terror, decentralization, collective leadership, literary and artistic freedom, "socialist legality," and so on. Here again, the result is to destroy much of the utility the syndrome may have had as a standard by which regimes may be classified as totalitarian or not. It is not enough to say in response to this criticism, as Friedrich does, that totalitarianism is "a *relative* rather than an absolute category," and should be understood "in terms of more or less."[37] The substitution of a set of continua for the absolute categories of an ideal type does not release the theorist from the need to establish cutoff points and threshold levels. To do so would be to preclude thinking in typological terms, something that Friedrich himself is probably not prepared to do.

A partial explanation of the marked erosion of Friedrich's conception of totalitarianism is probably to be found in his never fully explained reluctance to consider seriously the argument that the Soviet Union has ceased to be totalitarian. While admitting that many changes have taken place, he continues to maintain that "the Soviet Union still exhibits all the criteria of totalitarian dictatorship"; indeed, as I have mentioned, he argues that these changes have brought the Soviet Union

[35] See also Friedrich, "The Changing Theory and Practice," 13.

[36] *Ibid.*, 2. In the revised edition of *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Friedrich takes note of the tendency toward "pragmatic goals [that] seem far removed from the earlier ideological controversies" (110).

[37] Friedrich, "The Changing Theory and Practice," 15. Italics in original.

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closer to the totalitarianism of "national Fascist regimes" (p. viii). To reach these conclusions, however, he has been forced to tailor his conception of totalitarianism to the "procedures [that] were the core of Khrushchev's popularism" (26). The dilution of the totalitarian syndrome has been the price he has had to pay to make it square with the changing reality of Soviet politics.

In turn, Friedrich's failure to deal adequately with the possibility of a nontotalitarian evolution of the Soviet Union may in part be the result of the inherently static nature of his model of totalitarianism. Despite his acknowledgment that such an evolution is at least possible, he does not provide his theory with an implicit or explicit dynamic of change (376-78).[38] He does not deal in theoretical terms with the question of why and under what circumstances such an evolution becomes possible, probable, or inevitable. This is the case in spite of his hope that the revised edition would make it "a bit easier to deal with that vexed question" (viii). Most references to "change" and "dynamics"—and there are many—allude to these phenomena as they occur *within* the defined limits of totalitarianism. Interestingly, the theory that deals so inadequately with the question of the extinction of totalitarianism also explicitly eschews consideration of its genesis (vii, 18). It is possible that both omissions are traceable to the absence of a solid core of theory that I previously mentioned. To deal with the genesis or degeneration of a pattern of politics requires that the nature of that pattern be sufficiently elaborated in theoretical terms.

It is doubtful whether the revised edition of *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* measurably improves upon the original. The revision of a book is rarely successful even under the best of circumstances. In this instance, Friedrich has chosen simply to patch up a body of thought that is in need of a major renovation. To some extent, the effect of only partially coming to terms with his critics and his own second thoughts has been to add to the inconsistency and confusion of his and Brzezinski's original effort. Moreover, there is some question as to whether any amount of revision could produce a satisfactory result. The problem is that the original study is less a theory of totalitarianism than an encyclopedia of totalitarian politics. Despite the illusion of theory it conveys, the totalitarian syndrome is perhaps most appropriately viewed as a set of general categories in terms of which a vast amount of data can be catalogued. Unfortunately, the syndrome itself does not confer theoretical relevance upon this data. This un-

[38] Friedrich now rejects as untenable his and Brzezinski's original assertion that totalitarian regimes tend to become more and more totalitarian. (See 376.)

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happy conclusion suggests the probably impossible nature of the authors' attempt to limit themselves to what Friedrich calls a "morphological . . . theory of totalitarian regimes" (vii).

III

It must be concluded that the new editions of Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and Friedrich's and Brzezinski's *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* have little to offer the comparative study of nondemocratic systems. In addition to the defects already mentioned, the original editions of both volumes have the added misfortune of having been written just prior to a time when the conduct of inquiry in comparative politics and empirical political theory was beginning to take a distinctly new turn.[39] Moreover, they are specifically responses to—and written in the idiom of—the crisis of the 1930's and 1940's and the early phase of the Cold War.[40] The new editions have changed little in these respects. As a result, both volumes seem dated in their modes of analysis and in the substance of their analyses.

By no means original, this judgment is widely shared by students of comparative politics. The "classical theory" of totalitarianism fell into disfavor in the early 1960's, and the downward trend continues to gain momentum. The present view within the discipline, particularly among its younger members, seems to be that the term "totalitarianism" suffers from the fact that it was developed in isolation and outside the mainstream of a rapidly changing field of comparative politics. Judged by concepts and theories new to the field, the term as heretofore conceived has now been declared either intrinsically devoid of utility as an analytical construct or so burdened with extraneous connotation as to negate whatever utility it might once have possessed. In the light of this verdict, students of politics have tended to adopt either of two strategies: (1) implicit or explicit abandonment of the term altogether; or (2) redefinition of the term in such a way as to incorporate it into the typologies, theories, or problem foci currently in vogue in the comparative study of nondemocratic systems.

[39] See, for example, David Easton, *The Political System* (New York 1953); Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960); Roy Macridis and Bernard Brown, eds., *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, rev. ed. (Homewood, Ill. 1961); and Harry Eckstein's introduction to Eckstein and Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (London 1963).

[40] For a vigorous critique of the term "totalitarianism" in terms of its relationship to the Cold War, see Herbert Spiro and Benjamin Barber, "The Concept of 'Totalitarianism' as the Foundation of American Counter-ideology in the Cold War," prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 1967.

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Unfortunately, scholars who suggest abandonment or revision of the classical theory have been more successful in their criticism than in their efforts to suggest alternatives. Among the "revisionists" who have tried to rethink and thereby retain the concept of totalitarianism are Robert Tucker and John Kautsky. Tucker, who regards the concept as "an essential part of our theoretical equipment," believes that its salvation requires "a more radical critique of the theory of totalitarianism than has yet been made."[41] To this end, he has sought in several articles both to redefine totalitarianism and to locate it within a typology of modern form of dictatorship.

Tucker's salvage job is surprisingly unsatisfactory. What begins as an attempt to locate totalitarianism "*within* a comparative politics of movement-regimes"[42] results in a definition of totalitarianism that logically places it *outside* his definition of movement-regimes. As conceived by Tucker, the genus movement-regime is distinguished by three characteristics: (1) revolutionary goals and dynamism; (2) active, organized mass participation; and (3) the organizational centrality of the vanguard party. The species of the genus, each distinguishable but not fully distinct, are three: (1) Communist single-party regimes; (2) Fascist single-party regimes; and (3) nationalist single-party regimes.[43] Significantly, totalitarianism is not regarded as a separate species but rather as an extreme variant of each of the species; as any case of one of the species "grows much more authoritarian . . . the adjective 'totalitarian' may become applicable."[44] Further, Tucker equates the totalitarian variants of at least the Fascist and Communist species with what he calls "führerism." The examples he presents are "Hitlerism" and "Stalinism."

Up to this point, Tucker's typological exercise is not objectionable. The failure to make totalitarianism a separate species of the genus conceived to contain it, while surprising, is not unacceptable. Beyond this point, however, Tucker runs into difficulty. In a führerist system, the psychopathology of the leader becomes the driving force of the political mechanism. "The regime is shaped into a highly complicated instrumentality for acting out the needs of the paranoid leader-personality, whose psychodynamics are politicized, i.e., expressed in political terms."[45] The principal components of the führerist instrumentality are the leader himself, his small coterie of sycophants, and a terroristic

[41] Robert Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism," *World Politics*, XVII (July 1965), 566.

[42] Robert Tucker, "Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes," *The American Political Science Review*, LV (June 1961), 283.

[43] *Ibid.*, 283, 284. [44] *Ibid.*, 285. [45] *Ibid.*, 288.

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secret police. Unfortunately, führerism conceived in these terms bursts the defined bounds of the genus movement-regime. If the psychological needs of the leader replace revolutionary dynamism in a führerist or totalitarian system, and if a movement-regime is defined in terms of this dynamism, then totalitarianism can not be considered an example of the genus movement-regime. The same is true if the party is subordinated to the secret police in führerism, since the single party was singled out by Tucker as the organizational core of the genus movement-regime.

Tucker's new definition of totalitarianism presents difficulties that go beyond the fact that it falls outside the typology designed to contain it. Tucker is correct in placing greater emphasis upon the leader and his personality, and in adding this element to the syndrome as a separate component. It may be useful to view totalitarian leaders as paranoidal and possessing such organizational power as to be uniquely able to act out their paranoia through the political mechanism. It is another thing, however, to reduce totalitarianism primarily to "the needs of the paranoid leader-personality." This is every bit as reductionist as Arendt's conception, and just as dubious.

John Kautsky also believes that "the term 'totalitarianism' has been applied so loosely as to become virtually useless in communicating any specific meaning."[46] To sharpen its meaning, he both relates it to a specific problem focus of current concern to students of politics and suggests the existence of two distinct variants of totalitarian politics. The problem that he focuses upon is that of modernization and development (or, to use the narrower term he prefers, industrialization). As he sees it, "Totalitarianism of the Aristocrats" and "Totalitarianism of the Intellectuals," his two variants, are best explained and understood as responses to the peculiar circumstances of twentieth-century industrialization. "Not only does industrialization produce the technical instruments required by totalitarianism, chiefly the modern military weapons and means of communications; it alone can create the need and desire of certain groups for the use of totalitarian methods."[47] Ordinarily, industrialization is accompanied by the growth of political parties, trade unions, and many other types of voluntary associations representing the interests of their membership. Totalitarianism grows out of the attempt to make the maintenance or even the acceleration of industrialization compatible with the prevention of the growth of

[46] John Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism* (New York 1965), 90.
[47] *Ibid.*, 91.

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such organization, or their suppression where they have already grown. In short, totalitarianism is "a way of eating one's cake and having it, too—of having industrialization and yet retaining or establishing authoritarian government."[48]

Kautsky's decisions to relate totalitarianism to the dynamics of modernization and to conceive of it in terms of two variants are steps in the right direction. Unfortunately, however, he fails to define totalitarianism in terms that adequately distinguish it from other closely related nondemocratic patterns. It is not sufficient to define it as "a set of methods used, under certain circumstances, by a group or several groups in control of a government in order to retain that control."[49] Despite a brief discussion of these methods—among them total terror, total regimentation, and total manufacturing and control of opinion—Kautsky's conception of totalitarianism tends to dissolve when he attempts to order the political universe in terms of it. "Totalitarianism of the Aristocrats" apparently includes the Nazi, Italian Fascist, and Spanish Falangist systems, three markedly different political systems; moreover, the line between these systems and a host of "quasi-fascist" systems is not at all clear. As a consequence, "Totalitarianism of the Aristocrats" comes very close to being synonymous with "fascism." The same fuzziness, though perhaps not so extreme, exists in the distinction between "Totalitarianism of the Intellectuals" and those nontotalitarian dictatorships in which modernization takes place under the auspices of the emergent middle sectors. Consequently, Kautsky's conception shares with that of Friedrich and Brzezinski a lack of discrimination; his belief, shared by Friedrich and Brzezinski, that totalitarianism is a matter of "more or less" does not excuse this defect.

The efforts of the revisionists have not convinced those who prefer abandonment of the term "totalitarianism." The belief that there is no need for the term or that it cannot be made to serve needs that do exist is particularly popular among students of Communist political systems who are committed to the reintegration of their subject matter into the general framework of modern comparative political analysis.[50] Alfred Meyer, a representative of this persuasion, rejects the term for a

[48] *Ibid.*, 93.
[49] *Ibid.*, 91.
[50] See, for example, Alfred Meyer, *The Soviet Political System* (New York 1965); H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 435-42; Skilling, "Soviet and Communist Politics: A Comparative Approach," *The Journal of Politics*, XXII (November 1960), 300-313; Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton, *Soviet Policy-Making* (New York 1967). Interestingly, Brzezinski does not make use of the concept "totalitarianism" in a volume he recently co-authored with Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York 1963).

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number of reasons: its Cold-War overtones; its divergent meanings; its bias toward the similarities between Nazism and Stalinism; and the assumption that it applies to "something unique and totally new—a claim which appears highly dubious."[51] In Meyer's own recent study of Soviet politics, the term has been "avoided or used only with the utmost reluctance."[52]

Unfortunately, however, students who believe that there is no need for the term do not distinguish sufficiently between Stalinism and the post-Stalinist pattern of politics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Both Meyer and H. Gordon Skilling base their arguments against any fundamental difference between systems conventionally called totalitarian and other modern nondemocratic systems upon an analysis of contemporary Communist political systems. Their discoveries about modern bureaucratic behavior or group politics in the 1960's lead them to reject a totalitarian model of politics. Their rejection is not based on a determination of whether the nature and dynamics of Stalinism were sufficiently different from present patterns to suggest the usefulness of a specialized analytical construct. In short, their argument that even a revised conception of totalitarianism does not fit present reality is not evidence enough that such a conception is unnecessary both to understand Stalinism and to explain the continuing transition from the Stalinist pattern.

For their part, students who reject the term and yet feel the need for a concept to distinguish the phenomena conventionally labeled "totalitarian" from other phenomena are presented with two problems. In the first place, no acceptable alternative has been brought forth. For instance, the term "mobilization system," despite its merits, is usually conceived of as embracing an even wider range of political systems than does Friedrich's attenuated definition of totalitarianism.[53] Similarly, Tucker's use of the term "movement-regime" would seem to eliminate it as a possible substitute. In the second place, whatever the merits of substitution, the terms of discourse in a discipline are not wholly a matter of choice, and this is particularly true of a discipline as much a part of the public domain as is political science. The term "totalitarianism" is widely used by laymen and by nonspecialists in the discipline. Because of this general usage, the attempt at substitution may serve only to confuse matters further by simply adding another term.

[51] Meyer, 470-76.
[52] *Ibid.*, 470.
[53] See, for example, David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965), 25, 36. Indeed, Apter seems to regard totalitarianism as only the most extreme form of mobilization system (see 388).

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The fact that the term "totalitarianism" is so deeply entrenched suggests that the choice may be less between non-use and misuse than between misuse and a more satisfactory use.

In conclusion, and despite the validity of some of the arguments for abandonment, I share with Tucker and other revisionists the belief that a conception of totalitarianism "answers a genuine need of intellectual communication."[54] This need appears to grow out of modern political experience. Stalinism, Nazism, and possibly Maoism suggest a pattern of politics that can be neither subsumed under any of the traditional schemes used to classify nondemocratic politics nor simply equated with the less extreme "modernizing dictatorships" of the contemporary non-Western world. Stalinism was neither a modern version of Tzarist rule nor the equivalent of Kemalism, Nasserism, or Castroism; similarly, Nazism was fundamentally unlike the Italian and other Fascist systems.

In view of the unlikelihood of finding an acceptable substitute, the most practical strategy would seem to be to retain the term "totalitarianism." To be of utility, however, the term must be revised. The limitations of space permit only the briefest mention of some of the conditions that a revised conception of totalitarianism must meet. It must be both purged of pejorative and ideological overtones and cast in terms compatible with the theory and method of modern comparative political analysis. It will have to deal with the question of whether the significant differences between Stalinism and Nazism were such as to require thinking in terms of more than one variant of totalitarianism. Further, it will have to effect a juncture between *telos* or essence on the one hand, and characteristic organization and behavior on the other. Most important of all, a revised theory must be conceived in such a way as to distinguish totalitarianism from other forms of modern dictatorship without defining it out of human experience.

I believe that these conditions can be met. The result, however, will be a construct with extremely limited applicability to the real world. It will have to be applied, to quote Arendt, "sparingly and prudently."

[54] Tucker, "Towards a Comparative Politics," 283.

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PRISMATIC THEORY AND AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION

By NELSON KASFIR*

Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1964, xvi, 477 pp. $7.50.
Fred W. Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity*, Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1966, xvi, 470 pp. $10.00.

I

ARE there prismatic societies in Africa? That such a question can now be asked is as much a measure of changes in the study of administration as it is a recognition of new patterns of government emerging from African independence. During both the colonial and the current period, students of African bureaucracy have contributed little to administrative theory. Before independence, scholars concentrated on formal studies designed to raise efficiency. Since independence the field has been dominated by studies of political parties, trade unions, and voluntary associations, because these organizations carried on the independence struggle, often over the opposition of the bureaucracy. Behavioral studies of colonial administration and independent African civil services are badly needed.

The newly burgeoning field of comparative administration presents an attractive framework for research to fill this gap. In particular, a narrow concern with administrative behavior has been supplanted by an insistence on applying the insights gained in the more general field of comparative politics.[1] The view in some quarters now is that disputes in the political system will be reproduced in the bureaucracy, with the effect that administration cannot be studied in isolation from the rest of the political system.[2] A few go even further and insist that the entire cultural and social system—the context within which administration operates—must be understood if administrative action is to be comprehended.[3]

* An earlier draft of this article was delivered to the University of East Africa Social Science Conference at Dar-es-Salaam in January, 1967. I am grateful to George Von der Muhll and Ali Mazrui for helpful criticism.

[1] Alfred Diamant, "The Relevance of Comparative Politics to the Study of Comparative Administration," in Nimrod Raphaeli, ed., *Readings in Comparative Public Administration* (Boston 1967), 25-45.

[2] Joseph LaPalombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," in LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton 1965), 15.

[3] Fred Riggs, *The Ecology of Public Administration* (Bombay and New York 1961).

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However, use of the term "development administration" in these studies to describe these changes in bureaucracy in new nations has resulted in ambiguity. Development administration is often used to refer to that type of administration that best assists economic development.[4] When it is used in this way, the researcher is prescriptively concerned with shaping administration to achieve certain goals. As Edward Weidner puts it, "if there are no development goals, there is no development administration."[5] Thus, reform of the bureaucracy in order to accelerate development is directly implied by this definition.

One problem associated with this use of development administration, however, is caused by the tendency to overlook important structural characteristics of developing bureaucracies. Consequently, administrative reforms intended to increase a country's capacity to achieve economic goals may fail, since important social variables influencing the administrative process have been ignored. In addition, these reforms are generally imported from countries that have already experienced spectacular economic growth, so that Western (or Communist) administrative techniques must be grafted onto local structures.[6] However, measures designed to produce economic growth in one country may not be suitable in another country, in which a different set of values shapes bureaucratic action. Finally, even if the ultimate goal is policy-relevant research, it is necessary for social scientists to investigate developing bureaucracies in as value-free a manner as possible in order to discover how they actually work, before making recommendations.

These difficulties have led to a second use of development administration as referring simply to the patterns found in administrative structures in developing countries whether they are assisting economic development or even preventing it. From the point of view of political science the second approach is more fruitful because it encourages more careful study of the dynamics and interrelationships in bureaucracies about which we know very little. Though Fred Riggs has had much to say about the role of administration in assisting economic development efforts,[7] it is fair to regard his theories as primarily an

[4] Merle Fainsod, "The Structure of Development Administration," in Irving Swerdlow, ed., *Development Administration: Concepts and Problems* (Syracuse 1963), 2.

[5] "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research," in F. Heady and S. Stokes, eds., *Papers in Comparative Public Administration* (Ann Arbor 1962), 98.

[6] See for example the United Nations *Handbook of Public Administration* (New York 1961).

[7] He was one of the first to call the attention of scholars to this problem in "Public Administration: A Neglected Factor in Economic Development," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, cccv (May 1956), 70-80, reprinted in *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society*, 243-59.

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effort to explore both the external and internal behavior of the bureaucracy in transitional society in relation to its environment.

As the title of his most recent book—*Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity*—suggests, Riggs's ultimate goal is to analyze societies in which the bureaucracy rules supreme. He regards this situation as a disaster, likely to produce decay and stagnation rather than development. Since the next decade in Africa may well see the rise of the "bureaucratic state," we need to consider his work quite carefully to determine whether it will help us to understand bureaucratic behavior in Africa.

This concern is particularly important in the light of the feeling of several experts that Riggs's theories are directly applicable to African administration. C.A.G. Wallis states flatly: "It can be said at once that although Riggs has taken most of his examples from South East Asia and none from Africa, he has nevertheless accurately described the ecology of administration in African countries. Once one has got used to the terminology one finds oneself on familiar ground."[8] In his study of politics in Acholi District, Uganda, Colin Leys asserts that it "certainly exhibits the features of Riggs's 'Sala' model. . . ."[9]

In the remainder of this paper I shall concern myself first with a brief summary of Riggs's theory of prismatic society and the sala model of bureaucracy, and then evaluate some of its strengths and weaknesses to determine whether it helps us understand the emerging forms of African administration or leads us astray.

II

Riggs begins with the assumption that the ideal typical form of traditional society embodies one polar position of each of three of the Parsonsian pattern variables (i.e., it is ascriptive, particularistic, and diffuse).[10] Modern society, on the other hand, in its ideal typical form is at the opposite extreme (achievement-oriented, universalistic, and specific).[11] Prismatic society is the special case—also an ideal type—of

[8] "An Impression" (Book review of Riggs's *Administration in Developing Countries*), *Journal of Administration Overseas* v (October 1966), 285.

[9] *Politicians and Policies* (Nairobi 1967), 46. Leys's qualification that it is unnecessary to apply Riggs's analysis when a rational self-interest axiom will explain the behavior in question is dealt with below at fn. 20.

[10] The theory is best laid out in *Administration in Developing Countries*, particularly chapters 1, 7, and 8.

[11] It should be kept in mind that it is Riggs and not Parsons who identifies the pattern variables with traditional and modern societies. Riggs suggests that this is an "hypothesis," not a definition, so that traces of ascription, etc., might be found in modern societies and vice versa. No actual society, of course, will be likely to embody exactly any of the ideal types. *Administration in Developing Countries*, 23n.

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societies that lie between the other two types.[12] The thrust of Riggs's argument is that the prismatic type has a logic of its own (though one that is "intrinsically paradoxical").

One of the Parsonsian pattern variables—specificity-differentiation—is singled out as the basic difference among the three types of society. By way of definition, then, Riggs asserts that structures in traditional societies are functionally diffuse (thus, "fused"), while structures in modern societies tend to be functionally specific (thus, "diffracted"). In this context his use of an image of fused light being broken up or diffracted by passage through a prism becomes intelligible.[13] It is rather interesting to note how closely this conception parallels Émile Durkheim's notion of the passage of society from a state of mechanical to a state of organic solidarity as a result of division of labor.[14]

While both fused and diffracted societies are highly integrated and institutionalized, prismatic society is not, because it contains elements of each of the other two. In Riggs's analysis of each aspect of social structure, his technique is to consider how it manifests itself in modern and traditional societies, and then to assume that it exists in transitional society in the form of some uneasy compromise. "Clects" (a word composed of "cliques" and "sects"), for example, combine some of the characteristics of functionally specific, bureaucratized, formal voluntary associations on the one hand, and functionally diffuse, traditional, informal groups on the other. An African urban tribal union would be a good example.

Riggs's point is that scholars tend to consider such organizations as being oriented toward either the traditional or the modern, and thus misunderstand the peculiar ways in which they function in transitional

[12] Riggs prefers to use "prismatic" rather than the more common term "transitional" on the ground that use of "transitional" suggests that modern societies are no longer developing—that is, all societies are in fact transitional. For my purposes the terms will be used interchangeably.

[13] In a recent article Riggs has broadened his notion of "prismatic" society so that such imagery no longer makes sense (which, perhaps, is the fate of most such coined vocabularies). He now argues that in addition to structural differentiation, the level of performance of a society and its institutions must be taken into account. Thus a highly differentiated society with a low level of performance is also "prismatic." As this merely broadens the category of "prismatic" societies, I shall not incorporate this distinction into the argument. See Fred Riggs, "Administrative Development: An Elusive Concept," in John Montgomery and William Siffin, eds., *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change* (New York 1966), 237-44.

[14] *Division of Labor In Society*, tr. George Simpson (New York 1965). Both men rely heavily on population growth as one of the factors impelling differentiation. See Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries*, 37-38. However, Riggs does not insist that there is any inevitability to the development process. In fact he is quite pessimistic about most developing countries.

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society. Therefore he argues for a new terminology that will distinguish each of these phenomena in transitional society from its counterparts in traditional and modern societies.

When Riggs applies this procedure to administrative structures, he labels bureaucracy in fused society as the "chamber," in prismatic society as the "sala," and in diffracted society as the "office." Once again, each has its own pattern. The chamber operates on the basis of a few rules derived from immemorial norms, followed ritualistically with no sense of the possibility of change, and applied at least partly in accordance with the client's social status. In those administrative situations not covered by these rules the traditional bureaucrat is left to his own devices—that is, he may rule by whim and attempt to extract as much from the populace as possible. The office, on the other hand, is based on many formal rules rationally determined on the basis of public goals and applied impartially.[15]

Two dimensions of administrative behavior that Riggs regards as important are the "weight" of the bureaucracy (or degree of its institutional participation in rule-making) and its "scope" (range of values affected by its activities). Traditional bureaucracy is characterized by great scope and limited weight. Its scope is wide because officials are relatively free to do as they please (in part because of lack of control from the center).[16] Its weight is limited for the same reason—central government officials are largely unable to influence decisions of their field agents, who often become local notables and act independently.

Modern bureaucracy, on the other hand, is marked by both limited scope and limited weight. These limitations exist because each department in a modern bureaucracy is functionally specific and thus is responsible for the implementation of a narrow range of policies.[17] In addition, differentiation in modern society also means distinct separation between politics and administration. Thus, in both Western and

[15] Riggs's view of modern bureaucracy appears to be based on a rather uncritical acceptance of Weber's ideal type of administrative organization in rational-legal society, in spite of the wide range of criticism to which the latter has been subjected.

[16] Riggs's notion that traditional regimes were characterized by great freedom from control underplays the importance of religious and social norms in setting strict and narrow boundaries for the conduct of many traditional rulers.

[17] However, to argue that because a department is responsible for a narrow range of policies, the bureaucracy as a whole fails to play much of a role in rule-making is fallacious reasoning. Consider the "confessions" of many U.S. Congressmen that they had to approve uncritically the projects submitted by the Defense Department, because they had no independent source of technical expertise. Lewis A. Dexter, "Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy," in Robert Peabody and Nelson Polsby, eds., *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives* (Chicago 1963), 305-24.

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Communist nations the weight of the bureaucracy is limited, because it is kept under political control. For Riggs this accounts for its greater "efficiency" compared to that of sala bureaucracy.[18]

Applying these concepts to prismatic society, Riggs finds both modern and traditional patterns of administration operating simultaneously. This leads him to assert that both the scope of informal control and the weight of bureaucracy in prismatic society will be greater than that found in fused or diffracted societies. A wide variety of social factors—including unassimilated communities, who must "buy" access to the bureaucracy; indeterminate price structures; overlapping norms from the traditional and modern elements in the society; and a "bifocal" power structure, one in which the informal power of control of the bureaucracy is much greater than its formal authority—make possible what Riggs calls a "dependency syndrome" (that is, the illegal appropriation of wealth by bureaucrats). As a result, the need for individual protection of the citizen increases the power and wealth of the bureaucrat, and thus the dominant position of the bureaucracy.

However, this does not mean that the bureaucracy is very much more effective in achieving public goals. Far from it. Riggs has a corollary proposition, which is the linchpin of his argument: the administrative efficiency of the bureaucracy varies inversely with the weight of its power. Basically, he argues, the more control bureaucrats have over themselves, the more they are free to do as they please. Prismatic society is characterized by the absence of political institutions capable of controlling the bureaucracy, since parties, interest groups, courts, and parliaments are too weak. Consequently, sala administrators will take advantage of the relatively uninstitutionalized nature of the polity to enrich themselves. Since their personal tastes will inevitably be wasteful in terms of public goals, their efficiency will be quite low.

In addition, governmental policies in prismatic societies often have paradoxical consequences. For example, a government may decide to crack down on corruption and increase the penalties attached to its practice. However, if that government also discriminates against a minority engaged in business ("pariah entrepreneurs"), the result may simply be to make corruption both more expensive and more widespread, instead of eliminating it. The same result may occur if a ceil-

[18] The concept of "efficiency" cannot be applied to traditional bureaucracies, according to Riggs, as officials are given a free hand in applying rules so long as they remain loyal to the king. Thus the efforts of traditional bureaucrats cannot be measured. His notion is confused, however, by his later discussions of the goals implemented by traditional regimes (notably order, unity, and tax collection). See *Administration in Developing Countries*, 266-67 and 346-47.

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ing is set on interest rates. If the old rate accurately measured the risk factor, the new policy may result in a black market. A similar paradoxical consequence may follow from the adoption of reforms suggested by visiting technical experts, which, because they were designed for performance in a modern society, only exacerbate the problems of sala administration. Recommendations to decentralize administration in order to relieve top government officials of routine burdens that lead to great loss of control would be a case in point.

A variety of ecological factors intensify the inefficiency that marks the sala. First, prices are more indeterminate than in either a fused society, which depends on a redistributive market mechanism, or a diffracted society, which depends on a free market or severely enforced planning controls. The consequences for administrative behavior include more discrimination on the basis of the social status or personal influence of the client; an increase in administrative costs stemming from unequal distribution of routine services such as welfare payments and traffic court fines (more time involved, and so on); the appointment of bureaucrats on the basis of social status, which means that many will be unable to carry their administrative responsibilities; and, finally, the introduction of an element of uncertainty into the budgetary process, with the result that some sala departments get more money than they need, while others receive too little.

Another important ecological factor in prismatic societies is the ineffectual performance of structures that articulate and aggregate demands. When this is the case, officials can indulge themselves in arbitrary policies reflecting what they think is desirable rather than what their clienteles want. Inability to bring pressure through institutionalized channels means that more deals will take place at the back door, with the result that corruption increases.

Though recruitment into the sala is formally based on examination and merit criteria, in actual practice nepotism is widespread. Candidates are evaluated in terms of their family connections and their potential effect on power struggles within the bureaucracy. Prismatic interest groups (clects) may form within the civil service as a result of the recruitment process. One department may become dominated by members of a particular ethnic group, who form a close-knit solidary group. This means that the incompetence of particular officials will be hidden for long periods of time by their co-workers, rules will be relaxed when a member of the same ethnic group is the client, and interagency coordination will be complicated by ethnic divisions.

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A final characteristic of the sala is the emphasis on personal power accumulation. While high-ranking bureaucratic officials have great power, they rarely have effective control over their subordinates who are also playing their own power games with clients and other officials. Thus nepotism and corruption cannot be checked, because higher civil servants cannot impose effective constraints on their staff. This struggle for power means that sala bureaucrats spend much of their time trying to make rules (or violate others) in order to handle special situations, and very little time on administration and management of public policies.

III

Caution is required in evaluating a theory like this one because of its encyclopedic range and the attention paid to empirical illustration, as well as its profusion of hypotheses. However, a number of its advantages call for further comment. Among its attractive features is the emphasis it places on developing a model that will permit comparison among the administrative structures of various countries, particularly the new nations. While the crudeness of the conception (transitional society as the product of overlapping modern and traditional elements) limits the kinds of comparisons that can be made, we are better off than we were when we attempted to compare the formal administrative procedures in one country with those in another.

However, in spite of this crudeness, broadening the framework of variables relevant to administration to include ecology increases the potential richness of future analysis. On the other hand, two challenges to the inclusion of ecological factors in administrative theory have been raised.

Milton Esman has questioned the value of an ecologically based theory on the ground that it necessarily introduces a conservative bias. If we must understand a whole society in order to understand how its bureaucracy functions, then it will be possible to delay reform for years on end. Further, reform can also be blocked by this approach on the ground that no significant changes can be made until it is possible to change the entire society.[19]

Taken to its logical extreme, an ecological theory would be subject to this sort of criticism since it then would be the sole basis for action by administrators. However, Riggs does not demand this condition. His quest for social factors that affect the operation of the bureaucracy

[19] Esman, "The Ecological Style in Comparative Administration," *Public Administration Review*, XXVII (September 1967), 271-78.

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need not be interpreted as an exhaustive search for all variables affecting action, but only as an effort to uncover some hitherto ignored influences. Furthermore, no administrator can ever afford to wait for perfect information before acting. This is an important difference between scholars and administrators. On the other hand, it does no harm for administrators, in introducing reforms as well as in routine administration, to take a more careful look at the social factors within which they must operate than they have been accustomed to doing.

Colin Leys raises another question about Riggs's emphasis on contextual values. He argues that there is no need to adopt a theory of " 'transitional' men *inclining* towards 'fully' rational behavior but being tugged back, half consciously and half unconsciously, towards behaviour that is governed by custom and primordial sentiments which do not have a truly rational basis at all."[20]

Instead, he suggests looking for a pattern showing that Acholi political behavior is rational in terms of the horizons of the Acholi world. Further, as Glenn Paige points out, a thoroughgoing ecological theory denies any place for politics in the explanation of so-called "political" behavior.[21]

Individual taste probably determines how far one goes in adopting an explanation based on individual rationality rather than on the influence of social factors. Ultimately neither can be eliminated, since social factors condition choice, but men usually choose in terms of rational self-interest. Riggs has an adequate defense of his position when he argues that "an ecological approach is not deterministic. It does not suggest that environmental conditions shape administrative behavior to such an extent that no choice is possible, that whatever appears is inevitable, hence unchangeable. Rather, ecological forces set boundaries; they give the ranges within which choice is possible" (*Administration*, 428).

Several other advantages of Riggs's approach are also worth mentioning. The type of model he develops for prismatic society is the perfect antidote to reification, because it demonstrates the lack of institutionalization found in many transitional societies. For example, his discussion of the shifting bases of power in the sala reminds us not to place excessive trust in analyses of formal administrative structures. Further, unlike most discussions of administration in new nations, Riggs's argument focuses on administrative behavior within the bureaucracy

[20] *Politicians and Policies*, 47 (italics in original).

[21] "The Rediscovery of Politics," in Montgomery and Siffin, eds., *Approaches to Development*, 49-58.

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and thus provides a framework for further research in this area, providing that his theory is acceptable.

On the surface, a final advantage of the theory of prismatic society is that in many respects it *does* appear to be plausible in African countries. Several of the social characteristics of prismatic society shape the context within which African bureaucracies must operate. Pariah entrepreneurship can be found throughout West Africa since Lebanese traders, as well as the Ibo (formerly) in Northern and Western Nigeria, must make their peace with a variety of governments, each of which is at least unofficially hostile to their communities. Asian businessmen in East Africa present the same sort of problem. Much could be learned about the operation of bureaucracy in Kenya, Uganda, or Tanzania, for instance, by studying the patterns of access used by this group. For example, special directorships given to high-ranking bureaucrats often provide a special link between businessmen and government, overcoming access problems in an irregular fashion.

Obligations to the extended family, as well as loyalty to the tribe, generate pressures on African bureaucrats that may cause them to concentrate on personal considerations at the expense of their public duties. Claims of kin may overreach a man's salary, bringing him to the point of accepting bribes. Protection of a member of his tribe may seem more important than revealing evidence of his incompetence. In addition to these factors, the various social gaps, acutely symbolized by the enormous inequality of income between civil servants and the rest of the population, tend to concentrate an enormous amount of power in the hands of bureaucrats.

The "formalism effect" (a wide discrepancy between prescribed and actual behavior) can often be found in African bureaucracies. A study of the Ugandan recruitment process, for example, has shown that the official description of selection of candidates was at odds with actual practice.[22] Speaking of African bureaucracies in general, Ronald Wraith notes that "at present directives disappear in the sands of departmental procedures, responsibility is shirked, expertise is underemployed, paperwork is overwhelming.[23] A former member of the Ugandan Public Service noted two years after independence that lack of confidence within ministries sometimes led to the practice of private filing systems, so that assistant secretaries never saw graded corre-

[22] David Gugin, "Africanization of the Uganda Public Service," unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Wisconsin, 1967.

[23] "Administrative Change in the New Africa," *African Affairs*, LXVI (July 1967), 232-33.

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spondence.[24] These practices tend to lead to a bureaucracy in which civil servants are increasingly careful to protect their own position at all costs.

IV

However, when all of these points are made, there is still a feeling of unreality pervading Riggs's model when it is considered in the context of Africa. In this section I shall consider: first, whether Riggs's argument can be regarded as a scientific theory; second, whether Riggs's formulations reflect Asian conditions more accurately than they fit African administration; third, whether the ecology of developing countries necessarily produces sala administration; and, finally and most importantly, whether differentiated political control over administrators is a necessary prerequisite for administrative efficiency.

Riggs clearly intends us to regard his work as at least the prolegomenon for a scientific theory explaining the behavior of bureaucracy (*Administration*, 401). I suspect that the technical language he coins and the graphs that appear throughout his work are designed to fortify the scientific underpinning of his enterprise.

Two requirements for a theory of political behavior are that the meanings of key terms must be specified and that the theory must be cast in a form that permits it to be proved true or false.[25] The more global the theory, of course, the more difficult these requirements are to fulfil.

In many respects Riggs fails to specify adequately his terms so that we can actually test his propositions. For example, his proposition that the scope of bureaucratic power is inversely correlated to the degree of diffraction of the society (*Administration*, 207) appears to be testable. But just how do we measure "scope"? Does it refer to central government officials or to their field agents, when the latter implement different policies from those ordered by the former? Is the range of values affected by traditional bureaucracies proportionately greater than the range of values affected by "specialized" modern bureaucracies? We know that an administrative act may produce a wide variety of consequences—often unanticipated—in numerous interconnected fields. American military administrators, for example, have recently developed a plan to "salvage" young men from the ghettos through military training. Is the enormous scope of American bureaucratic action neces-

[24] B. L. Jacobs, "The State of the Uganda Civil Service Two Years after Independence," University of East Africa Social Science Conference, Kampala (January 1965), 6-7.

[25] Robert Dowse, "A Functionalist's Logic," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966), 607.

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sarily wider than that of traditional bureaucracy (thus disproving Riggs's proposition)? We cannot tell, since we have no way of measuring values in discrete comparable units. But if comparisons cannot be drawn, the proposition is useless.

Let us take a second example. Riggs takes some pains to demonstrate that prismatic bureaucracy is less efficient than fused or modern bureaucracy. The "unit cost of . . . operations is, I submit, greater in a prismatic bureaucracy than parallel activities in the fused" (*Administration*, 263). But in what sense are the activities of developing countries "parallel" to those of traditional societies? These countries are regarded as developing precisely because they have changed their goals from those adopted by traditional societies. Consequently, we cannot, despite Riggs's assertion (*Administration*, 264), compare the "social cost per unit of output" in different types of societies.

Another reason Riggs's "propositions" are not testable is his failure to specify, on a theoretical level, differences stemming from the unique mix of elements to be found in each country. If we grant that no country will exactly resemble any of the ideal types, we are then faced with the task of showing how different combinations of characteristics may lead to different outcomes, if the theory is to be genuinely explanatory.

Perhaps the less said about the jargon Riggs has invented, the better. As I suggested above, the main point is to establish a separate theoretical identity for transitional states. But the terms carry little more meaning than would ordinary English usage. Consider the use of "prismatic" to convey the fact that societies in which traditional and modern norms overlap will not behave like traditional or modern societies, but must be put in a separate category. The use of such language helps trap Riggs into assuming that *all* prismatic societies will exhibit more or less the *same* sorts of behavior. The more one insists on particular terminology, the more one is likely to be imprisoned by it.

Far too much time is spent by Riggs in discussing and defending his verbal choices.[26] Far too much time is spent by everyone else in trying to remember the meaning Riggs has assigned to each of his pet terms. This is particularly painful when further theoretical refinement destroys the original reason for adopting a term.[27]

The same sort of point can be made of the graphs and figures that

[26] For an example see his reply to Wallis, "A Commentary," *Journal of Administration Overseas*, v (October 1966), 286-90.

[27] See fn. 13. A worse consequence that cannot be ruled out is that further theoretical refinement may be ignored in order to preserve the language.

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dot the pages of Riggs's books and articles. From one of his most recent and more complicated figures Riggs is able to derive the relationship that "the degree of diffraction of a system represented by point *m* in Fig. 1 would be equal to the square root of the sum of d^2 and $P_2{}^{2}$".[28] Unfortunately, the usefulness of knowing the square root depends on the ability to measure the level of performance (P) and degree of differentiation (d) sufficiently accurately to place them on a two-dimensional graph, which in turn implies that each is a single dimension. Neither of these assumptions is proved—or even considered—by Riggs.

A student of the sociology of knowledge might suggest that the use of such techniques indicates an overwhelming urge to appear to be engaged in a "scientific" enterprise. For a long time students of administration have been unsuccessfully attempting to develop their field into a science. Political scientists, too, showing their discomfort with the "unscientific" nature of their discipline, have adopted all sorts of mathematical tools, which sometimes turn out to be too strong for their data.[29] Perhaps this is one of the reasons for Riggs's "scientism" also.

Turning to the question of whether Riggs's model reflects Asian more accurately than African conditions, we are again faced with the staggering difficulty of making comparisons, this time cross-continental. Though it is impossible to come to definitive conclusions, particularly in the light of the enormous variety of conditions on the two continents, it seems probable that prismatic society is more descriptive of Asia in general and Thailand in particular than it is of any African country. We must keep in mind that while Riggs has had long and intensive experience in various Asian countries, particularly Thailand, he has spent little time on the African continent.

William Siffin suggests that the dominant values governing Thai bureaucracy are the following:[30]

1. Open access, but status expressed by rank;
2. Hierarchy (rank) more important than functional responsibility;

[28] "Administrative Development: An Elusive Concept," 240. The figure in question is on page 239 and an even more complex one can be found on page 241.

[29] Examples can be found in Arthur Banks and Robert Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge 1963). See also Gabriel Almond, "Toward a Probabilistic Theory of the Polity," in Almond and James Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 58-64.

[30] "Personnel Processes of the Thai Bureaucracy," in Heady and Stokes, eds., *Papers*, 217-18, 224. For more recent development of these themes see Siffin, *The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development* (Honolulu 1966), 159-64.

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3. Predominance of personal and paternal relations over impersonal relations between superior and subordinate;
4. Little emphasis on productivity, especially initiation of new activities;
5. Great importance of family connections and school friendships;
6. Transcendence of the material realm as ultimate goal.

These values are likely to have a far greater impact on Thai bureaucracy than *any* single set of interrelated values will have on a given African bureaucracy simply because there is only one Thai culture, while most African countries are syncretic societies made up of a composite of several widely differing cultural patterns.

Thus, a primary distinction between the bureaucratic ecology of Africa and that of Asia is the greater national unity of Asian countries resulting from their long and relatively unified cultural history. African countries, for example, have more reason to take special precautions to prevent centrifugal tendencies and thus have tended to strengthen their central administrative structures at the expense of local and regional governments.

An important social factor that also distinguishes Africa from Asia is the emphasis on egalitarianism rather than hierarchical social structure in Africa. Lloyd Fallers, comparing Indian and African societies, gives two reasons for this difference.[31] First, in Africa there are almost always solidary descent groups, emphasizing the equality of members, that cut across political hierarchical structures. These are rarely present in India. Second, the absence of literary religious traditions in Africa means that there has been no basis for establishing an elite subculture like that of India. We might conjecture that the presence of weaker hierarchical social pressures in Africa would result in bureaucracies that function in a quite different manner than they do in Asia.

The stress on attainment of appropriate rank in the hierarchy in Thailand is such that Siffin reports that one new recruit sat in his office and read newspapers for three months because he felt that he had been assigned to a place in the hierarchy beneath his "attained" rank.[32] It is hard to imagine such an incident resulting in a *promotion* in any of the African civil services, though this is what happened in Thailand. Writers often complain that African bureaucracies are too hierarchical

[31] "Equality, Modernity and Democracy in the New States," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York 1963), 180. While Fallers limits his comments to India, they appear to be equally applicable to Thailand.

[32] "Personnel Processes of the Thai Bureaucracy," 218. The official in question had studied under Siffin in the United States. (For Riggs, "attainment" falls midway between "ascription" and "achievement" and is typical of prismatic bureaucracies.)

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and therefore not suited to broad-gauge problem-solving requiring a "project team."[33] But it is not an accepted value that a man's position in the bureaucracy is a secure niche from which he cannot be fired, even if functional responsibilities are ignored. In this connection consider the removal in 1963 of five Tanzanian permanent secretaries, because they could not handle their responsibilities.[34]

Similarly, the deference paid by a subordinate to the person of his superior, which in Thailand extends beyond office hours, is not typical of African bureaucracies. It may simply be the result of African acceptance of a more "diffracted" norm (i.e., British or French), but a District Co-operative Officer takes little paternal interest in the welfare of his Co-operative Assistants—assuming they carry out their job properly—and they tend to accept him on a fairly impersonal level as the incumbent of a particular office.[35]

The lack of interest Thais manifest in productivity would appear to be closely related to their fundamental belief that the work of this world does not matter. Consequently, it is easy to imagine that their efficiency—measured in this-worldly terms—suffers. African civil servants, on the other hand, are heavily committed to planning as an instrument for changing the lives of their people. While some argue that their efficiency could be greater, the reasons given never include their interest in other-worldly goals.

When Thai cultural values are laid against the sala model, a rather close relationship appears. Emphasis on attained rank and paternal relationships at the expense of productivity gives rise to personal battles for power at the expense of public business. Riggs makes these battles the central characteristic of sala administration. The warm nature of the surrogate family that marks both Thai bureaucracy and the "clect" of Riggs's prismatic society does not find its counterpart in African bureaucracies. Even in those cases where ethnic representation in African bureaucracies is marked, the reason is more likely to be rivalry among ethnic groups than the desire to create a network of protective obligations.

It does not seem unreasonable to assume, as Ferrel Heady does, that Thailand is one of the outstanding examples of a bureaucratic elite system.[36] Thus, finding that Thai bureaucracy is notoriously inefficient

[33] Guy Hunter, "Development Administration in East Africa," *Journal of Administration Overseas*, VI (January 1967), 8.

[34] William Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi 1967), 85.

[35] This conclusion is based on data collected in a study of cooperative organizations in Uganda and general observation of East African bureaucracy.

[36] *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs 1966), 108.

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would not be sufficient to establish that African bureaucracies operate in conformity with the dynamics of prismatic society.

While Riggs's ecological approach is generally defensible, as I suggested above, it does raise some problems. One quickly gets the impression that every aspect of transitional society contributes to the prodigality of prismatic bureaucracy. Surely, however, there are some social forces in some developing countries that support effective administration.

David Apter, for example, has called attention to important differences in the receptivity to change between the Baganda and the Ashanti. He argues that the more instrumental beliefs of the Baganda allowed them to innovate more rapidly than a consummatory cosmology permitted the Ashanti.[37] This variation in traditional culture may or may not be linked to the effectiveness of administrators drawn from these ethnic groups. But it would clearly be wrong to assume that their ecologies must be similar just because both societies are relatively fused.

Tradition has been used by countries undergoing rapid social and economic change to help build an effective modern bureaucracy. After the Restoration in Japan, for example, the Meiji reformers were able to use feudal obligations of loyalty to convert *samurai* into policemen and permit nobles to become innovative bureaucrats as well as businessmen.[38] Manipulation of loyalty to an emperor, who reigned rather than ruled, permitted tight control of the bureaucracy by the new leaders without impeding the introduction of wide-ranging reforms.[39]

The development of a system of public education in Japan demonstrates how responsive the bureaucracy was to the policies of the new political leadership. Before 1868 education had been the privilege of the wealthy.[40] By 1910, only forty years later, 98 percent of the children between six and thirteen were registered in primary schools with a daily average attendance of 93 percent. The government also estab-

[37] "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda," in William J. Hanna, ed., *Independent Black Africa* (Chicago 1964), 254-77. Note, however, that Apter's distinction may be as easily explained by the difference in political position in which the Baganda and Ashanti found themselves during colonialism, as by reference to their traditional cultures.

[38] Marion J. Levy, "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, II (October 1953), 190-94. See also Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XIII (July 1965), 385-93, especially 390.

[39] Claude E. Welch, Jr., "The Challenge of Change: Japan and Africa," in Herbert J. Spiro, ed., *Patterns of African Development: Five Comparisons* (Englewood Cliffs 1967), 82.

[40] This account of changes in Japanese public education is taken from Robert Holt and John Turner, *The Political Basis of Economic Development* (New York 1966), 270-71.

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lished secondary schools, teacher-training colleges, and state universities. Achievements of this sort would not have been possible without a fairly effective bureaucracy, but this was just the period during which Japan was turning toward the West and thus entering its most "prismatic" stage.

Another question concerns the *degree* to which a society is prismatic. Riggs asserts that this may vary, as some countries may be closer to modernity than others. However, from his argument it follows that countries that are more prismatic—that is, have a greater degree of overlapping between modern and traditional norms—would have bureaucracies that more closely approximate the sala model.

All African bureaucracies are prismatic, in terms of Riggs's definition, since all are the result of imported European structures superimposed on traditional societies. Indeed, J. Donald Kingsley argues that "their ethos, structure, and functional character all reflect European more than African conditions."[41]

But are some African bureaucracies more prismatic than others? It would appear that East African administrative structures should more closely approach the sala model than do their counterparts in British West Africa, as they took over a European system while far less developed themselves. Furthermore, as Wraith points out, "in West Africa indigenous influence and control [in administration] manifested themselves at a much earlier stage."[42] Yet, in practice, East African bureaucracies seem to be less prone to corruption and nepotism, hallmarks of the sala model, than do those of Ghana and Nigeria.

The final basic criticism of Riggs's argument concerns his proposition that administrative prodigality (inefficiency) results where adequate political control is absent. Riggs asserts that when the political (input) functions shift to bureaucrats, "the consequences are usually ominous for political stability, economic growth, administrative effectiveness, and democratic values."[43] Since the trend all over Africa is for political functions to shift to the bureaucracy, this point must be considered most seriously.

Riggs's fundamental view of bureaucrats is that they are essentially inward-looking, more interested in their private interests than in doing the job expected of them. "When these [political input] functions are carried out predominantly within a state bureaucracy, then the same

[41] "Bureaucracy and Political Development, with Particular Reference to Nigeria," in LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, 302-03.

[42] "Administrative Change in the New Africa," 236.

[43] "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, 120.

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persons both make and implement policy. When this happens, *we can assume* that they will tend to take it easy, to adapt both the formulation and execution of policy to their own expedient interests" (*Thailand*, 365, italics added).

In the first place, Riggs's assumption that lack of political control will mean pursuit of private interest is not a necessary truth, but a testable hypothesis. Many men possess internal controls that hold them to the path of public duty. The successful execution of public policy is often an extremely important motivation for a bureaucrat—in a developing country as much as in England or America. Colonial administrators in both Africa and Asia, for example, served far from centers of political control. Yet no one suggests that their behavior can be explained by the sala model.

Second, the existence of powerful bureaucracies, resulting from weak political institutions, does not necessarily imply that individual bureaucrats will be able to do as they please. For example, individual politicians often exercise great authority over civil servants. Many African states controlled by the military have imposed exceptional discipline on their administrators. Such regimes may find it easier to stamp out corruption, for instance, than did the political parties they replace. The same might be true for civilian bureaucracies possessing great *esprit de corps* or charismatic leaders. One department of the bureaucracy may exercise controls over the others—a role the Treasury plays in many African countries. Furthermore, goals like economic development, which may endanger the preeminent position of the existing elite, may be pursued more effectively if political institutions have little control over the bureaucracy. Thus, it remains an open question whether the absence of political institutions will result in more or in less efficiency on the part of bureaucrats.

Third, Riggs seems to assume that power struggles within bureaucracy are typical of prismatic society only. Yet political scientists find them in all modern bureaucracies.[44] It is not characteristic of the sala only that one bureau gets more than its share of the budget while another gets less. Such complaints are universal. Nor in prismatic bureaucracies only are men appointed to office because of their potential for power rather than their administrative expertise. Such a policy governs appointment to office in many government positions in the United States. Finally, Riggs asserts that "in the diffracted model, the rewards

[44] See Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago 1964). Many examples from United States administration are collected in Harold Stein, *Public Administration and Policy Development: A Casebook* (New York 1952).

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of office are primarily professional, but in the prismatic model they include also the hope of power" (*Administration*, 273). What official in a modern bureaucracy does not also concern himself with the accumulation of power, both for self-advancement and in order to get his policies implemented?[45]

The pernicious implication in Riggs's propositions on this point is that ordinary power struggles in the bureaucracies of developing nations will be regarded as proof of their prismatic nature and thus of their inefficiency. In fact these power struggles are characteristic of any large-scale organization and often play a useful role in helping a government determine its priorities. It may be a serious mistake to assume from the struggles among departments of the Tanzanian civil service that the country is prismatic and its bureaucracy inefficient.[46]

Once again Riggs's suspicion of the motives of bureaucrats strikes a chord familiar to social scientists. For several decades bureaucracy has been pictured as a dehumanizing mindless monster opposed to individual liberty. Esman calls attention to this aspect of Riggs's thought: "It is quite clear that underlying the model of the bureaucratic polity is a set of values deeply distrustful of bureaucracy as an institution. Any non-bureaucratic force, including single party regimes, is less suspect of propensities to self-service and exploitation. This basic suspicion of bureaucracy as an institution is a prominent tradition in much social science writing. . . . Riggs's fear of bureaucratic power is related to this strong tradition."[47]

V

In what ways can we use Riggs's work in further research on problems in African administration? In my opinion, to take his work as a "theory" capable of explaining African administrative behavior is to engage in a useless venture. Indeed, Riggs's criticism of those who import foreign theories designed for other countries is equally applicable to the theory of prismatic society.

But he has a number of important accomplishments to his credit. He has widened the field of significant variables that must be considered in

[45] See Norton Long, "Power and Administration," *Public Administration Review*, IX (September 1949), 257-64.

[46] A. Rweyemamu, "Managing Planned Development," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, IV (May 1966), 14, reprinted in Hadley Smith, ed., *Readings on Economic Development and Administration in Tanzania* (Nairobi 1966), 423. On conflicts within the Tanzanian bureaucracy, see also R. Cranford Pratt, "The Administration of Economic Planning in a Newly Independent State: The Tanzanian Experience 1963-1966," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, V (March 1967), 38-59.

[47] "The Ecological Style in Comparative Administration," 273.

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any study of bureaucracy in a developing nation. He has described many of the mechanisms peculiar to societies whose governments are casting about for ways of rapidly changing the life of their citizens. In addition, he has traced out many of the paradoxical consequences of "reforms" designed as shortcuts to development.

The greatest value of his work for students of African administration lies in his enormous inventory of factors affecting bureaucracy in transitional countries. Putting these ideas to use need not involve applying the theoretical baggage with which they are encumbered. But employing them will go a long way toward providing the data for theories that will help us explain African patterns of bureaucracy.

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AMERICA, EUROPE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

By LINDA B. MILLER

Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, or The Setting of American Foreign Policy*, New York, McGraw-Hill, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968, 540 pp. $11.95.

A useful consequence of America's deepening involvement in Asian affairs is the widespread questioning of the premises that are assumed to underlie United States policy, but debate stressing the weaknesses of American strategy in Vietnam without placing present dilemmas in a broader perspective is deficient. Similarly, discussion that ignores the distinctive features of the American historical experience, especially its influence on the processes of policy-making, courts irrelevance. Failure to look beyond the confines of the Vietnam predicament may prove as detrimental to observers as to officialdom, yet both find the process of distinguishing the relative importance of internal and external constraints increasingly arduous. In an era of contagious domestic unrest in industrialized countries and ambiguous conflicts in less developed geographical areas, both may be tempted to generalize too broadly from a dominant though still restricted series of events. Such, such are the joys of appraising American foreign policy during the Vietnam anguish.

Fortunately, a protracted period of governmental malaise in non-Asian affairs has not prevented, and may have encouraged, reassessments of American-European relations. Indeed, the plethora of suggestions recently generated on both sides of the Atlantic by academic and other specialists indicates a healthy willingness to let many flowers bloom, many schools of thought contend. The burden for those who would follow all arguments to their logical or, in some cases, illogical conclusions need not be exaggerated; serious speculation is far preferable to a reiteration of stale dogma. The issues that confront U.S. and European policy-makers in an uncertain international milieu differ from the preoccupations of the 1950's or early 1960's. The familiar emphases on strategic nuances, weapons deployment, and nuclear "sharing" have diminished as the immediacy of a Soviet military threat to Western Europe has continued to recede, although the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia has encouraged a revival of West German

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fears about Russian intentions. Clearly, old intractable alliance problems of command and control, purpose and policy have not been solved; they are perceived in an altered context that has dictated a reordering of priorities.

The renewed primacy of national concerns, of the domestic setting, in Western and Eastern Europe and in the United States, would seem to demand at least a refurbished vocabulary. Nevertheless, the prevailing rhetoric belies limited visions: "The only brave new world we can imagine after the end of NATO or of the Cold War bears the hardly youthful face of the disengagement and denuclearization plans of the 1950's, of the projected treaties of the 1940's, of the collective security agreements of the 1920's, or of the balance of power or the European concert of the nineteenth century."[1] Thus Stanley Hoffmann's richly detailed contribution to the Council on Foreign Relations' ten-volume *Atlantic Policy Studies* is especially welcome. It offers not only a thorough examination of the political and military environment in which Western policy-makers act and react, but also a perceptive analysis of the psychological factors affecting these interactions. Policy prescriptions (Part IV) emerge from interpretations of contemporary world politics (Part I) and America's national style and political institutions (Parts II and III). The book's structure therefore facilitates a critique of specific proposals according to criteria the author himself advances.

I

The obvious fluidity of the global political environment calls into question the validity of both abstract models of international relations that ascribe stability to particular diplomatic-strategic configurations, and state-centered theories that downgrade the impact of transnational forces or non-state actors. For some years the disadvantages of a number of approaches to the study of world politics have appeared more impressive than any proclaimed advantages. "Single concept" doctrines are distressingly restrictive; often the more "multifaceted" explanations are excessively inclusive. While it is evident that attempts to label temporal phases of the postwar era or specific kinds of relations among state actors as "bipolar" or "multipolar" are more misleading than revealing, these terms may have greater utility, as Hoffmann suggests, in describing "levels" within the international system. Whether the idea of "levels" or "layers" will "capture much of the

[1] Pierre Hassner, "Change and Security in Europe," Part I, *Adelphi Papers*, No. 45, London, Institute for Strategic Studies (February 1968), 1.

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essence of the contemporary flux,"[2] is arguable, yet an alternative attack, stressing the concepts of "congruence and discontinuity" requires more explicit criteria for differentiating various "subsystems" than are currently developed.[3] Nevertheless, analyses of the contemporary flux should proceed without rejecting the insights both approaches may provide.

Hoffmann's depiction of ideal types of international systems demonstrates the need for continuing studies of *transitions* that mark shifts in the structure or content of such systems. His categories of "moderate" and "revolutionary" allow considerable latitude for understanding the capacity of state actors to exert various kinds of influence, and to reduce the costs of a disjunction between ends and means in foreign policies. The peculiar characteristics of the present system, especially its "fragmentation," "competitiveness," and "heterogeneity," its varied domestic structures, ideological clashes, and technological contests, unfold as the bipolar, multipolar, and polycentric levels are delineated. If we ask how transitions between systems are related to linkages between levels or to patterns of discontinuity, the present evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive.

The evolution of world politics since 1945 makes it difficult to disagree with the judgment that "never have international politics been so important to so many states, but never before have they been so frustrating" (53). Familiar debates of theory and strategy need not be rehearsed in order to identify two sources of importance and frustration: the changes in the role of the nation-state and the changes in the role of military force. These changes affect the conduct of international relations at all strata (regardless of the labels assigned to them). They also account for widespread "discontinuities." Unfortunately, discussions of the "obstinacy" or "obsolescence" of the nation-state may divert attention from a salient result of ideological as well as technological "permeability": "Modern conditions help nations to preserve their independence but prevent them from using it. . . . They make nations more jealous of their sovereignty but make this sovereignty less meaningful."[4] In so far as the development of inhibitions on the use of the most destructive weapons has enabled *threats* of punishment to be

[2] Oran R. Young, "Political Discontinuities in the International System," *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 369.

[3] The usefulness of subsystems as intellectual constructs might be enhanced if the focus on geographical regions could be broadened to include the emergence of functional groupings of states whose ideological or other demands cut across regional boundaries.

[4] Pierre Hassner, "The Nation-State in the Nuclear Age," *Survey*, LXVII (April 1968), 5.

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substituted for *acts* of punishment, the relationships among members of the international system have been transformed. Not only do denials take precedence over gains in these circumstances, as Hoffmann asserts, but the range of acceptable types of conflict is correspondingly altered[5] and the imprecision of "rank orders" of states is accentuated.

To be sure, at the highest stratum of strategic interaction "the essential role of states with nuclear capacity in defining the rules of interstate politics"[6] still obtains. The content of these "rules" continues to be shaped by the interplay of the "limited adversary" U.S.–U.S.S.R. relationship and the partially collaborative relationship of the two chief nuclear powers vis-à-vis the middle-rank or smaller states. Deterrence has helped to emphasize the sophistication demanded of the powerful in their use of lesser elements of statecraft. The tenuous stability at this stratum is continually threatened by technological innovation that could require the evolution of new "rules." Therefore, as the superpowers confront the rise of hitherto peripheral challengers, some with nuclear aspirations and rules of their own, a tendency for them to regard the status quo as tolerable, since it is manageable according to tested practices, reinforces conservative biases.

These biases against destabilizing change can be shared, despite residual asymmetries between the two superpowers in the military or economic sphere. Indeed the development of parallel preferences for a status quo that permits minor readjustments of interests but preserves the structure of the existing system has been strengthened at a time when the inability of the superpowers to "co-manage" the international system is most marked. Since conflict has been transferred to political and economic channels and to geographical areas where few, if any, stakes could justify the use of nuclear weapons, the declining political value of maximum national military forces for the achievement of territorial or other traditional objectives is underlined.[7] Thus, in theory, considerable scope for independent initiatives would seem to be open to middle-rank or smaller states, especially non-nuclear ones, yet the failure of many of these states to attain even well-articulated foreign policy goals is obvious. In practice, then, the sources of effective political power remain as elusive as those of effective military power.

[5] For additional discussion of this point, see Linda B. Miller, ed., *Dynamics of World Politics: Studies in the Resolution of Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs 1968), 2-4.

[6] Ciro Elliot Zoppo, "Nuclear Technology, Multipolarity, and International Stability," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966), 589.

[7] See Klaus Knorr, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age* (Princeton 1966), 37. See also Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, *Force, Order, and Justice* (Baltimore 1967), 157.

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If we accept Hoffmann's view that "*de facto* polycentrism" is no more satisfying to statesmen than "latent" or "muted" bipolarity, there remains a significant difference that introduces another potential element of tension into world politics: the lack of congruence between the failure of deterrence and "repellence," as practiced by the superpowers to promote gains, and the success of selected uses of force by other states at conventional or subconventional levels of confrontation. These lesser uses of force, accompanied by possible misperceptions of others' intentions or extensive testing of others' capabilities, augment the pervasive sense of precariousness. As varieties of internal conflicts and small-scale interstate wars have supplanted large-scale wars, the development of procedures for accommodation, conflict resolution, or regulation of competitive interventions has lagged behind. Yet despite the absence of "rules," policy-makers have demonstrated a preference for negotiated settlements. The traditional catalogue of material resources neither exhausts the increments of power relevant to these conflicts nor advances the establishment of hierarchies of states. Few could assign places in Hoffmann's metaphorical international system, the chain gang, with any confidence.

II

If the years since 1945 constitute a discrete political epoch, the primacy of international politics in the domestic settings of both industrialized and less developed countries has permitted policy-makers to cite the pressures of the external milieu as a justification for the neglect of cleavages in their own societies. It would be premature to call a by-product of Hoffmann's "stalemated" international system the transnational rejection of the preeminence of international politics, but recent events in France, Czechoslovakia, America, India, and Ghana, to give but a few examples, indicate that a reversal of the dominant-subordinate relationship between the international and domestic realms may be taking shape in diversified policy-making contexts. Although we cannot know now whether such a shift will be merely transitory, this reversal may generate an intricate combination of opportunities and dangers for the United States.

Hoffmann's deft dissection of America's deceptively familiar "national style" and political institutions assumes greater interest in the light of this change and its import for possible future international systems. Here it is not necessary to construct superficially sophisticated hypotheses of "interpenetration," or to indulge a current fascination with theory building, in order to inquire what avenues of adaptation

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may be available in a political system that so consistently affects the content of policies as well as the effectiveness of actions. Of the many related stylistic or institutional flaws Hoffmann exposes, several would seem to be especially consequential in an international environment of competitive domestic strains and transnational demonstration effects. "In social affairs, awareness need not be the prelude to resignation; it can be the prelude to change, just as it can (or ought to) set the limits of what change can accomplish" (224). Some of the limits of change are suggested in the following questions.

If we concur in Hoffmann's assertion that American policy-makers have attempted to project outward into the international system visions of domestic consensus, harmony, and the perfectibility of man—the beliefs or practices of "the liberal tradition"—would not a continuation of this tendency become even more paradoxical when this vision has become so tarnished at home? If we agree that American policies have oscillated between "quietism" and "activism," between the poles of "intervention" or "isolation" in a fashion that introduces "brittleness," is it not conceivable that the interplay of current international and domestic problems—the Vietnam–race–poverty cycle—could exaggerate this trend? If we deplore a reluctance on the part of American policy-makers to admit confusion in the variegated roles the United States has tried to play since World War II, and a corresponding failure to develop "middle-range" goals, could the availability of alternative policies in a less polarized but highly politicized world facilitate greater coherence in policy formation or execution? If we decry "hardware" solutions to psychological problems within alliances, bureaucratic "skill-thinking" that substitutes "administrative" for political processes of burden selection, and "crisis-coping" that encourages the application of false analogical responses to internal upheavals in differing Asian, African, and Latin American states, are additional demands on our human and other resources likely to alter these patterns of reaction?

Domestic preoccupations in the United States and abroad may continue to dramatize the growing remoteness of strategic interactions for the day-to-day conduct of international relations. If so, the temptation for American policy-makers to "play the domestic politics of other countries" may prove harder to resist as the desire to build constituencies for numerous policies intensifies, and as the process of securing complicated domestic-international tradeoffs from a recalcitrant Congress stimulates endemic intra-agency rivalries or executive-legislative tensions. In such circumstances, the selection of choices that maximize "restraint" and "flexibility" might appear too onerous; a regrettable

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tendency to fall back on simple formulae or stock positions either in bilateral relations or in regional contexts could be reinforced for American and other policy-makers. The preponderance of domestic concerns in the affairs of advanced and modernizing countries might serve to moderate overt conflict in the international environment. Yet such moderation would produce a false sense of stability, if narrow national concerns were to be used as an excuse for ignoring the widening gulf between the developed and less developed states. Moderation of this type could mask a steady deterioration in rank orders, a decline that would impede the formation of regional or functional "balances."

The consequences of unregulated interventions in the newly independent countries have received much scholarly attention; the consequences of neglect on the part of more advanced countries must receive more. As F. H. Hinsley elaborates,[8] it is not enough for the major actors to limit their efforts to "benign forms of competition"[9] or to await the emergence of "regional and local systems under the leadership of indigenous centers of power,"[10] a feat perhaps beyond the capacities of most developing states in the near future. Unfortunately, Hinsley's remedy, an attempt to revitalize a nineteenth-century European concert in "forms, methods, and attitudes"[11] may be impossible to adopt in the wake of a post-Vietnam reaction in America and Europe that rejects the employment of supposedly "usable" power—the United States sub-nuclear military instrument—in post-colonial internal conflicts.

It is of course the Vietnam experience, coupled with the persistent ambiguities in U.S.–U.S.S.R. and American–European relations, that strengthens Hoffmann's forceful case for an international system with complimentary hierarchies which recognize and reward "usable" power and which acknowledge the complicated economic and political tasks that must be performed in the contemporary era. In the short term, the most appealing part of Hoffmann's vision is the possibility that a restructured system would encourage highly selective American interventions, especially military engagements, in Asia, Africa, Latin America, or the Middle East. In the long term, his persuasive brief for a reconciliation of capabilities and responsibilities raises the issue of the kinds of influences that can be marshalled to realize this aim.

The influence that the superpowers might exert to foster this desirable evolution in world politics is circumscribed, not only by the

[8] F. H. Hinsley, "On the Present State and Future Development of the International System," *World Politics*, xx (July 1968), 705-20.
[9] Osgood and Tucker, 169, quoted in *ibid.* 718.
[10] See Footnote 9.
[11] *Ibid.*, 719.

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competitive aspects of the U.S.–U.S.S.R. relationship but also by their collaborative enterprises—for example, the nonproliferation treaty—that appear to enshrine the present distribution of power in their favor and to foreclose the future for those who seek a loftier place in the hierarchy. Moreover, heightened involvement in purely national problems on the part of the middle-rank political leaders could retard the development of the institutional framework required by Hoffmann's moderate "multihierarchical" system. The "national styles" and political institutions of the major European states, especially Britain, France, and Germany, could encourage uneven contributions to Hoffmann's regional or functional hierarchies, for what is apparent from a cursory review of Western Europe's recent tribulations is the tenacious grip of parochial rather than "systemic" approaches to a world order, as distinct from a continental one. There may exist an impressive discontinuity between convergent interests in a multihierarchical system and collective influences that could promote its establishment.

If, with Hoffmann, we rule out both a rejuvenated "tight" bipolar system and a "true consortium" of the superpowers (a benevolent duopoly), the willingness of political leaders to move toward a multihierarchical structure of international *relations* (not merely *politics*) may be tested by their readiness to perceive the distinction between "usable" and "unusable" forms of power in domestic and international settings. The fundamental shift in perceptions that Hoffmann's decentralized system contemplates could be delayed by a reluctance to confront such complex choices. Thus, at a time when American policymakers, perhaps for the wrong reasons, might be most eager to "give other countries a role in managing world affairs," the capacity of others to oblige may be weakest. This eventuality in no way releases the United States governmental apparatus from the obligation to postulate minimum and maximum goals, as Hoffmann urges. This obligation, neglected in American-European relations when the costs of dominance appeared less threatening than the risks of "devolution," is of prime importance in the present phase of détente that has exposed both the absence of consensus among Western policy-makers and the inadequacy of American aspirations for West European "unity."

III

"In the early 1970's, Europe will probably be neither the divided Europe of the cold war nor the restored, reunified or integrated Europe of a continental balance of power, of collective security, of a general

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settlement or of a political federation. Rather, she will be the 'mixed motive' Europe of 'imperfect partnership' and 'incomplete antagonism,' of overlapping groupings and cross-cutting alignments, of spectacular but inconsequential manoeuvres, of subterranean but essential evolution."[12] This forecast suggests that, as European politics gain in subtlety if not in significance, the chances for miscalculation will be plentiful. It also indicates that if American and Soviet policies fail to correspond to the intra-European détente the capacities of the superpowers to compel others to act in ways that ignore these failures will decline still further.

As the problem of coordinating and managing contacts between the two parts of Europe becomes one of preventing competitive, bilateral approaches from producing confusion, American policy-makers will experience a restricted margin for error. Hoffmann's penetrating review of American attitudes toward Europe clarifies the remaining opportunities for United States participation in Europe's evolution—participation without dictation. His plea for "co-operation with a uniting Europe" or "limited engagement in European unification" satisfies his own criteria for American approaches to Europe that could assist in the development of a moderate international system. His proposals may, if implemented, permit replacement of disparate, *ad hoc* responses to events with a coherent United States policy, for they look toward the creation of a different *ambiance* in American-European relations.

Is not a changed atmosphere as necessary as a changed set of aspirations or techniques? Surely, the power of the Atlantic "mystique" to obscure the extent of divergence between American and European interpretations of appropriate strategic postures, or disagreement among Europeans on suitable forms of economic interdependence, has been shrinking since the early days of the Kennedy Administration, if not in the late 1950's. For this reason American interpretations of general "Atlantic Community interests" have produced disproportionate acrimony in the alliance context. The concept of Atlantic Partnership, launched with excessive fanfare, purported to recognize and respond to the legitimate desires of the European states for a greater voice in NATO's decision-making processes, in Atlantic economic relationships, and in the politics of détente with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Yet what a history of this American effort reveals is a persistent reluctance to correlate political, economic, and military aspects of

[12] Hassner, "Change and Security in Europe," Part I, 24.

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policy: as Hoffmann insists, a refusal to explain who would share what with whom, when, and why.

In retrospect, the intra-alliance controversies of 1961-1964—over the Berlin crisis, the strategy of flexible response, the Nassau agreement, De Gaulle's veto of British entry into the Common Market, the Kennedy Round, and the MLF proposal—are notable for the poorly concealed British and German (not only the more vocal French) resentment of "grand designs" drawn in Washington. Throughout these years, the rhetoric of U.S. spokesmen precluded a candid exchange of views, for American policy-makers habitually overemphasized the need for a centralized strategy and underestimated the need for "an effective sharing of political decisions."[13] While American officials neglected to explore seriously the Fouchet plan or other proposals calling for a confederal approach to European unity rather than a supranational one, and while they lobbied for the MLF as a means of implementing the "dumbbell" concept, they helped obfuscate the problems of nuclear control and the real political objectives of French and German leaders. The confidence of allied leaders in the Kennedy Administration was shaken by the oscillations in U.S. policy toward Germany, the Skybolt episode, and the American failure to anticipate the French veto. The vagueness of the relationship between "interdependence" and "partnership" encouraged a lack of differentiation between long-term goals and short-term operational policy.

Had the British, French, and Germans resolved the contradictions in their own policies vis-à-vis each other or the Soviet Union in this period, the effects of American policies might have been less deleterious, but the energies of the major European countries were employed in realizing the painfully constricted boundaries of their own usable power. In theory, now that these boundaries have become more evident, the prospects for a revitalized sense of *European* direction should improve, yet since 1964, as Hoffmann demonstrates, the confluence of general trends and special circumstances has complicated the search for policies that link the intra-alliance problems of purpose and control. A core of common objectives—especially the deterrence of Soviet attack and a solution of the German problem within a general European reconciliation—has not concealed the *de facto* disinvolvement of the United States in European affairs as the Vietnam engagement has escalated.

The important sources of contention within the disarrayed alliance have become the definition, sources, and validity of 1) the détente,

[13] Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (New York 1965), 23.

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and 2) the so-called "technological" or "managerial" gap. Is the détente to be understood as a parallel relaxation of tension between Eastern and Western Europe and between the superpowers, or as an instrument for promotion of a "European settlement," or both? Has it taken place as a result of internal developments within the Soviet Union and as an outgrowth of the Sino-Soviet split, or does it stem from the successful "containment" of Soviet expansion and the nuclear stalemate in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis and the test-ban treaty? Not surprisingly, "détente management" has proved to be as seductive a concept as the earlier "crisis management" or "alliance management": each set of policy-makers wants to consider its own individual government as the initiator, implementor, and beneficiary of an unpredictable process. To the varying Western estimates of Soviet intentions, especially after the Czechoslovak crisis, has been added a broad range of often incompatible opinions on the Soviet capacity to exploit differences within the alliance via the détente.

Although the policies of Britain, France, and Germany have continued to diverge, their recent national experiences have been similar in at least one respect: Over-ambitious international objectives have produced domestic frustrations that compound the problems of moving beyond existing regional-functional hierarchies. For Britain, the domestic ramifications of devaluation have shown the futility of juggling relations with the United States, Europe, and the Commonwealth in a fashion that fails to yield any positive gains. For France, De Gaulle's simultaneous attempts to prevent superpower "hegemony," to restrain Germany, to lead an intergovernmental Europe, to serve as a pole of attraction for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, to act as the chief protector of Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East have foundered on the rock of domestic dissatisfaction. For Germany, the Grand Coalition's welcome repudiation of the Adenauer era's rigidities has generated expectations for reunification or rapprochement with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that may be beyond Bonn's abilities to achieve and that may prepare the way for serious domestic strains.

Fissures within the Six and the Fifteen, a product of the multiple stresses that British, German, and French as well as American and Soviet policies have stimulated, hinder the development of a "division of labor"[14] among the West European states, a division that may be critical if discussions of European security and political cooperation

[14] See Karl E. Birnbaum, "Ways Toward European Security," *Survival*, x (June 1968), 193-99.

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are to be fruitful. The fact that destabilizing tendencies in weapons technologies (for example, ABMs or MIRVs) could threaten the détente, as well as complicate defense planning, augments the attractiveness of proposals that offer decreased costs for American involvement in Europe. But proposals that concentrate on lowering the expense of U.S. commitments without questioning the quality of various kinds of involvement run the risk of sanctifying Europe's division. Despite Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia, there is an increasing awareness that NATO, or similar organizations identified with Cold-War ideologies and West European "subordination" in "integration," are not likely to be useful in reorganizing intra-allied relations or in promoting Soviet incentives to reconsider the status of Eastern Europe.[15] Nevertheless, there are manifold problems for policy-makers who would build upon other parts of the present institutional basis of the American-West European relationship, for example, the West European Union, as a means of moving toward a "European Europe." If Soviet acquiescence in shifts of emphasis in intra-allied relations is allowed to determine the value of any change in the West, the inevitable disagreements over interpretations of Soviet responses could make outdated institutions or conceptions seem acceptable.

It is precisely because Hoffmann's vision of a European Europe allows for Soviet cooperation but does not predicate intra-alliance reorganization on alterations in Soviet tactics that his proposals are realistic, if long-range. The minimum goal, a restructuring of the alliance that would reflect political, economic, and military transformations in Europe, may lead to the maximum goal of European reconciliation. Even if it should not, the minimum goal itself will have been worth attaining. The division of labor between the United States and Western Europe that Hoffmann outlines would avoid assigning responsibilities in Washington according to a rank order that discriminates against either a non-nuclear but potentially unstable West Germany, a nuclear but impatient France, or a nuclear but ostracized Britain. Since the West European entity envisaged as the vehicle for cooperation with the United States and Eastern Europe would evolve in structure as its experience in foreign policy and strategy deepened, disputes over procedures and internal organization could be accommodated without the debilitating crises that have plagued the EEC.

Would a West European entity of political, military, and economic

[15] Compare Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Alternative to Partition* (New York 1965), with his later "The Framework for East-West Reconciliation," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVI (January 1968), 256-75.

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dimensions develop its own mythology? Would it become an inward-looking, selfish grouping absorbed in its own affairs, unconcerned with the deteriorating conditions of the developing countries or with the superpowers, whose obligation could comprise a nuclear guarantee rather than the maintenance of cumbersome alliances? Is this the price that any additional joint European activities in welfare, technology, and defense would exact? The questions that Hoffmann's imaginative prescriptions invite go to the heart of the West European countries' scientific, industrial, and educational traditions. Movement away from American military predominance, without a corresponding change in the economic sphere, may breed pernicious frustrations that could undercut the significance of the reorganized U.S.–West European defense relationship. In the non-military sectors, the burdens of devolution will weigh heavily on the West Europeans until collective efforts are mounted to end the benefits that obsolete social and economic practices still afford.[16]

Gulliver's troubles, so relentlessly revealed in Hoffmann's massive study, cannot be relieved without the promotion of an international system of shared rights and responsibilities, with significant roles for state and non-state actors, organized in flexible rank orders. That such a global environment would minimize suspicions of American motives or mitigate the fluctuations in the American image abroad should be of secondary importance. That such a milieu would discourage policy-makers from attempts to substitute American power and influence for absent social structures in countries or regions of interest to the United States is of primary importance. Yet a haphazard effort to adapt American traditions, styles, or institutions to the demands of a moderate international system should not be undertaken in an atmosphere of boredom with the incessant pressures of international or domestic politics. If the values of moderation and self-restraint are to become apparent to other actors whose cooperation is essential, a comprehensive attempt is mandatory.

[16] For contrasting views of Europe's capacities in the managerial and technological realms, see John Diebold, "Is the Gap Technological?" *Foreign Affairs*, XLVI (January 1968), 276-91; Theodore Levitt, "The Gap is Not Technological," and a rejoinder by Robert Gilpin in *The Public Interest*, XII (Summer 1968), 119-29.

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